SECRET FORCES

F.O. Miksche

SECRET FORCES

by the same author

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PARATROOPS

BLITZKRIEG

WAR BETWEEN CONTINENTS

(*with E. Combaux*)

IS BOMBING DECISIVE?

(*Allen and Unwin*)

LES ERREURS STRATÉGIQUES DE HITLER

(*Payot, Paris*)

SECRET FORCES

The Technique of Underground Movements

by

F. O. MIKSCHE

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Contents

INTRODUCTION *page* 11

I. MARXISM AND MODERN WARFARE 17

II. STRATEGY OF SECRET WARFARE 61

III. TECHNIQUE OF UNDERGROUND WAR 98

IV. DEFENCE (AGAINST UNDERGROUND WARFARE) 157

CONCLUSION 170

INDEX 173

Maps and Diagrams

Strategic Lines of U.S.S.R. in Asia *page* 53
Possible Guerrilla Air Bases in Asia 56
Underground Movements in a Future War: showing strategic axes of the U.S.S.R. 59
Relation between Regular and Underground Strategy in World War II 66
Influence of Politics on Organization of Underground Movements 83
Influence of Geography on Resistance Movements 91
Influence of Geographical Structure of France on Underground Activities in World War II 93
Suggested Structure of General Committee of a Resistance Movement 110
Organization of an Underground Movement in five separate networks 113
A Liaison Network 116
Economic and Industrial Structure of a Country as affected by Sabotage 131
Effect of coalmine strikes on steel production 133
Timing of strikes 137
Organization of the Redoubt of Vercors 152

Introduction

Modern military literature is rich in books on strategy, general tactics, tank and aerial warfare. There are, however, few works on 'People's War', and those which do exist are principally concerned with personal adventures during the Second World War or other conflicts. They do not deal with this important question scientifically and methodically: that is, from the technical and military point of view. This book, I hope, will fill the gap, although I fully realize that it is too small to cover the subject completely: I must leave it to other students of military science to go into greater detail. However, I believe that, despite its shortcomings, the reader will find in this volume answers to the main questions inherent in the problem. Further, the subject of this work should not only satisfy the soldier's professional curiosity, but also prove useful to anybody who takes an interest in the political events of our time. It will help the general reader to view from a totally different angle what is happening in Greece, Indonesia or Malaya, and wherever else guerrilla warfare is being waged, or where social unrest is prevalent.

The world paid little attention to an interesting remark of a former Soviet War Minister, Marshal Bulganin, a few months ago. He declared that the East now possesses an entirely novel doctrine of strategy, which Moscow is utilizing without carrying on regular army warfare. This book should clarify Bulganin's statement. It may help the reader to understand what secret forces are at the back of the many civil

wars, strikes and acts of sabotage, that are so typical of our epoch, and how these are organized and conducted. The reader will also understand what Lenin meant when, during the study of a book by Clausewitz he pencilled in the famous marginal comment: 'War for a Communist state is the continuation of the revolution by other means.' *When one regards world events in this light it becomes clear that we are already at war with the East to-day, whether we care to acknowledge this state of things or not.* It is possible to fight battles not only with conventional armies, but also with revolutionary forces.

Practically without intermission we have passed from a period of national wars into one of ideological conflicts. That we now live in the era of international civil wars is confirmed by the events of the Second World War and illustrated even more obviously by post-war happenings.

Underground movements have become as much a part of modern warfare as armoured divisions and air forces. Never-the-less, even experienced military experts remain baffled by the problem; and, as we shall see, this new branch of war has been developed mainly by amateur soldiers.

The leaders of international Communism have felt no prejudice against this new method of fighting, whereas officers of the regular armies, with great traditions behind them, have clung to more orthodox weapons and tactics as being, in their view, more honourable. They have sought to deal with irregular situations by applying dogmatic principles of strategy totally ineffective in the peculiar conditions of underground war.

There is nothing 'real' in underground movements. They are, to quote T. E. Lawrence, more in the nature of 'an influence, an idea, a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas'. Lawrence himself was, in his time, hardly understood by his regular army superior officers. One day, at General Headquarters in Cairo, he was asked what was the object of all his uprisings

apart from getting melodramatic advertisement for Faisal. Yet there have been generals with other ideas. When, in 1841, General Bugeaud took command of the French troops fighting in Algeria, the guerrillas of Abd-el-Kader, he made a speech to his officers beginning: 'You will have to forget a great deal.' The same remark would apply to those of my readers who have received a regular army training.

This book consists of four chapters. The first gives a short historical outline of the subject, with particular emphasis on the importance which the Marxists attach to the development of the People's War. It is not by any means intended to be a complete history of 'Secret War'; it serves rather as an introduction and is meant to lead to an easier understanding of the subsequent chapters. It also answers the question: 'Why does guerrilla warfare play such an important part in our time?' The second chapter deals with the strategic elements of the People's War, its dependence on the operations of the regular armies, and various factors such as the terrain, political situations, traditions and character of the people involved. In the third chapter we deal with the technique and tactics of underground warfare, such as intelligence, propaganda, sabotage and open fighting. The last chapter contains an analysis of the characteristics of defence against underground activities. I should like to make it clear to the reader that the present work offers nothing of a refreshing nature: it has not been written for that purpose.

Perhaps some of the statements and ideas in this book may appear to be truisms, but it was necessary to mention them because they are an integral part of this work, and they enable us to draw further and far-reaching conclusions. In order to explore the unknown, one has to lean on the known and fundamental facts.

As everyone discovers when writing on new phenomena, I have found it difficult to adopt a suitable terminology. Marx

and Lenin often spoke in their writings about 'Wars of the People' and 'Popular Uprisings'. In my opinion these terms indicate a form of already open warfare, whereas 'underground movement' or 'resistance movement' signify more particularly activities which do not necessarily lead to open acts of violence. In reality, it is difficult to define all these conceptions in exact terms; they interlock too closely. A movement begins generally with passive underground activities, developing into a resistance movement which reaches its culminating point in open guerrilla warfare.

The after-effects of a People's War are in every respect formidable, and especially politically and psychologically. Normal warfare has for its object the destruction of the opposing army in battle, aerial attacks demolish the adversary's industrial centres and cities. But the People's Underground War destroys the soul of a nation, systematically leading it into disobedience and disrespect of law and order. As in all revolutions, the People's War means complete chaos, a savage struggle in which the end justifies the means, and vengeance, trickery, and even treachery, play a great part. Each action provokes a reaction, and the consequent reprisals engender hatred to a degree hitherto unknown. The Second World War has already proved all this, and we see in contemporary Europe the dire consequences of the war-time underground struggles.

'Was it a wise policy on a long-term reckoning—taking account not only of winning the war but of securing the peace that should follow victory? Was its contribution to victory outweighed by its legacy of disorder? These may seem startling questions, but they are underlined by the spirit of violence that is rampant in many liberated countries. . . . The habit of violence takes much deeper root in irregular than it does in regular warfare. In the latter it is connected by the habit of obedience to constituted authority, whereas the former makes a virtue of defying authority and violating

rules. . . .' So Captain Liddell Hart judged the underground resistance movements in the Second World War. Let us hope that his words will serve as a warning. I shall not hesitate to refer to the question whenever an opportunity arises.

Of the few works I have written so far, the first, entitled *Blitzkrieg* (a study of German tactics), was based on my experiences during the Spanish Civil War. At that time I came into contact with international Communism and was able to observe, on the spot and amidst the prevailing chaotic circumstances, the activities of revolutionary elements. Later, during the Second World War, I was in charge of the Operations Planning Department of General de Gaulle's Secret Service and was able to gather additional experience in secret warfare.

After the war, in my capacity as Military Attaché and Diplomat, I had opportunities to broaden my knowledge in this particular sphere. Thus, after resigning from the Czecho-Slovakian army, I devoted the first months after my second migration to preparing this book, in which I have embodied not only my own experience but also the results of extensive studies.

I should like to take this opportunity of thanking my friend, Mr. Josef Josten, formerly of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was attached during the war to S.H.A.E.F./P.W.D. for his valuable advice in the sphere of psychological warfare and propaganda.

F.O.M.

This small work is dedicated to those whose task is the freeing of Europe from the horrors of Communism, in the hope that they who are responsible for policies and armies will draw the necessary conclusions

CHAPTER I

Marxism and Modern Warfare

What is war? 'The continuation of policy by other means,' was the reply once given by Clausewitz, the greatest military thinker of the nineteenth century. This famous and universally acknowledged definition may have been correct in its time. It would appear to recognize a definite boundary between peace and war—between political and military activities. In our era however there has emerged a sort of transition stage between peace and war in the shape of revolutionary conflicts. These are really neither definitely political nor military but are a mixture of political and military methods of manœuvre, sometimes legal but often totally illegal, which have their own strategic and tactical rules. Their authors and exploiters are principally communist revolutionaries who, in recent years, have shown us more than once that it is possible by means of such revolutionary fighting methods, to win important battles, if not regular wars, without having recourse to planes or tanks. Nowadays we are living in such a stage, and our relationship with the Eastern bloc is one neither of peace nor war.

Soviet war doctrine attaches almost as much importance to the 'People's War' as the Anglo-Saxon theorists to material and technical superiority. It is certainly an extremely dangerous 'weapon' and its full potentiality is as little known as that of the atomic bomb to which it even bears a certain resemblance. Is not the latter also designed to disintegrate normal strategy into a multitude of small individual actions?

MARXISM AND MODERN WARFARE

The Second World War, like all previous conflicts, brought forth entirely new elements. New weapons were invented and they, in turn, led to methods of warfare previously unknown. It also frequently happened that, in the field, methods to which no great importance had been attached proved extremely effective, whereas others, on which great hopes had been placed, were useless in actual practice. Apparently obsolete methods and forms of warfare were revived whenever it was found profitable to do so. So it is with the underground 'People's War', which often looks like a reversion to the times of prehistoric struggles.

Clausewitz said that the military art will never reach the definite or absolute stage. Nothing on earth is stable; everything is in a state of constant flux. All theories, systems and techniques, even life itself, are being continually subjected to modifying influences. New ideas are born, new methods invented and new resources discovered whilst the old ones fall away, generally slowly but sometimes quite quickly, into the limbo of the past. Thus it can easily happen that, many years or generations afterwards, old ideas or methods are revived under a new form and with new means and appliances.

Each era has its own style of waging war. If Frederick the Great had attempted, with the forces at his disposal, to follow Napoleon's tactics and allowed his mercenaries to fight in open order, his troops would have been quickly dispersed and have fled in all directions. The fighting methods of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were designed to achieve the liberation of the *bourgeoisie*. War had suddenly become a national matter because the private citizen was himself involved in it. *In our time of ideological revolutions the proletariat has, in its turn, found its own military expression and will create its own peculiar technique.*

In each conflict the political background is the determining factor. The political objectives for which a war is being fought have a decisive influence on the manner in which it is

conducted. What is the objective of Communism? It is the subjection of the world to Marxist ideology, with the help, whenever possible, of revolutionary movements.

'War reveals the weaknesses of governments, demolishes false façades and exposes internal rottenness . . . in our times, one of the salient features of war has been brought to light in a particularly striking way, namely by the clashes between peoples and governments which, previously, were only apparent to a small minority.'[1]

The basic element of the People's War is political infiltration through the weak spots of the State's social structure. For this reason 'Class War' is one of the principal foundations of Marxian ideology, whose final aim is the creation of a classless society. Never had the Third International taken its eye off this target and any deviation from the perfectly straight course is never more than a tactical manœuvre.

Under Moscow leadership the Communist parties in various countries serve not merely their own national purposes but, on principle, the international interests of the movement. Inter-state treaties between a Communist government and those of non-Communist countries, or internal policy pacts between Communists and other parties, are of a provisional nature and considered binding only in so far as they serve immediate tactical purposes.[2] This principle of

[1] Lenin: *The People's War.*

[2] As proof and example of the above we would cite the following: In a note addressed to the French Communist Party, signed by the famous Communist leader, Zdanow, a few days before his death on 31st August 1948, he states that an eventual understanding between Moscow and Washington would by no means be of a definite character. Such a development would not imply the abandoning by the 'true democracies' of the fight against Capitalism and should consequently be considered as only a transitory phenomenon. The fight of the Communist Party against the Marshall Plan must nevertheless continue and be waged by every possible means. (Declaration of the French Home Secretary, M. Jules Moch, in the Paris Chamber on 16th November 1948.)

Marxian strategy and tactics is further developed, even within the ranks of the party itself. Wherever political circumstances call for it, the party is developed into a mighty organization making use of the widest sections of the population in its struggle for power. For many, however, membership represents only a temporary and one-sided alliance which is dissolved by a 'purge' as soon as the tactical purpose has been achieved. The party then reverts to its original framework. In fact, the real body governing the various Communist parties all over the world consists of a group of men, members of the Cominform, who have been trained in the schools of the Soviet Union.

Viewed from this angle, the Communist movement can be considered as the greatest international conspiracy in the history of the world, hiding behind the mask of a political party and unremittingly making its influence felt amongst the masses. In other words, the Communist parties, whilst remaining independent of the proletariat, look upon revolution as a means of action and at the same time as their objective.

The co-ordinated co-operation between the fully fledged Communists states—at the head of which stands the Soviet Union—and the various Communist parties in democratic countries, is one of the principal fundamentals of Communist policy. It allows Moscow to play a double game throughout the world and to exercise an influence over the inner-political development of non-Communistic states. Theoretically all Communistic parties are free and independent and consequently enjoy the same rights as other parties in all democratic countries. In their assumed role of defenders of the nation and especially of the working classes, they are legally unassailable. On the other hand the Government of the Soviet Union, as well as those of the other Communist states, figure as being totally independent of each other and of the Communist parties. In reality, however, not only the satellite states but also the Communist parties, in the coun-

tries which are still free, are completely subordinate to the Kremlin through the Cominform and, in this manner, serve the double foreign policy game of Moscow.[1] In this fight for the Utopian idea of a classless society 'Secret War' is the most important weapon in the armoury.

Among the essential conditions of success in war are the intelligent anticipation of technical progress, the exact assessment of the effectiveness of new resources, weapons and methods of combat, and their use before the enemy has had time to perfect them himself. Material superiority alone is no guarantee of victory. In order to win, and win quickly, a proper tactical and strategical conception is necessary. Woe to him who, following an attractive will-o'-the-wisp, is lured by theoretical consideration into the realms of fancy. War is cruelly real and not at all an abstract theory.

So far no single weapon has been the deciding factor in any war, and one should not run away with the idea that future conflicts will be fought out and victory achieved by robots; by pulling the levers of complicated machinery from a safe distance. Strategy is far too complicated a science to allow of such a simple solution. Not only technical and material factors enter into the question; more often than not the psychological and moral issues have a capital influence. This opinion is shared by the American military writer, Colonel Marshall, when he says:

'Success becomes a purely mathematical problem of counting machines and men and what is required to supply them. I know now that is not true.'[2]

[1] 'Above everything else the proletariat needs the Party as a fighting headquarters which is essential for the successful seizure of power. . . . The more quickly Socialism is consolidated in one country the more quickly that country will be turned into a base for the promotion of world revolution.' (Josef Stalin: *Problems of Leninism*, Edition Moscow 1947.)

[2] *Man Against Fire* by Colonel S. L. S. Marshall.

To whatever extent technique develops, it is always the thinking human being who remains the perfect war machine. This can be said without underestimating in any way the importance of large-scale employment of modern weapons. For man remains the being whose soul brings life and action into the machine. Up to the present there exists no technical instrument as perfect as the human brain; no mechanical installation works as quickly and accurately as our nervous system, in which detection, decision and action all take place in the fraction of a second. Thus the individual combatant, completely disregarding all instinct of self-preservation, can easily succeed in destroying the most deadly and complicated engines of war. The history of the last conflict proves this clearly. Not only has guerrilla warfare survived into the era of aeroplanes, tanks and massed armies, but in that era it has reached its highest development. 'Guerrilla' now means overcoming material superiority, not by employing more perfect material, but by the use of superior intelligence and stratagem.

The German general, Ludendorff, is generally considered to be the originator of the idea of total warfare, probably because after the first World War he published his celebrated book, *Total War*. In reality, Ludendorff only modernized the nineteenth-century theories of Clausewitz, who based his ideas concerning popular uprisings on the experience of the Napoleonic wars. He found his model partly in the German Free Corps. The legendary heroes of that period, Lutzow's Black Rifles, the mounted Free Corps of Generals Dornberg, von Tetterhorn and von Marwitz and Tchernitchev's Cossacks, thanks to their audacious raids, disintegrated the rear of the French armies and contributed considerably to the great decisive victory of Leipzig. For Clausewitz's theories of penetration raids by mounted Free Corps, Ludendorff has substituted air attacks designed to paralyse the enemy's industrial and economic centres. Ludendorff was a typical

representative of the Prussian military caste; he probably knew nothing, or very little, of social and political problems. So he could not be aware that, fifty years before his time, the creators of Communistic ideology had advanced much further in the theory of total war than he had after the first World War. Whilst Ludendorff thought principally in terms of modern weapons, his predecessors had already turned their minds to the employment of the politically fanaticized masses. Ludendorff is not the inventor of total war. And had he read the works of Marx and Engels he would have had fewer surprises while he was Chief of the General Staff of the German Armies.

In 1870 Frederic Engels wrote that the world had forgotten what a real war was like. According to him, the Crimean, the Austro-Italian and the Austro-Prussian Wars were only conventional conflicts between governments which, on the defeat of their regular armies, simply made peace with one another. He maintained that, for several generations, Europe had not experienced real warfare—the kind in which a whole nation took part. Such wars had taken place only in the Caucasus or in Algeria, where the struggle had continued without interruption for twenty years. 'It seems that only the Barbarians have recognized and made use of the right to fight individually and that the civilized nations conform to a certain etiquette which precludes them from continuing the struggle after the official capitulation.'[1]

Karl Marx held similar theories on war. He wrote: 'It is a typically Hohenzollern idea to believe that a nation which continues to defend itself after the destruction of its army is committing a crime.'[2]

The Marxist theorists paid particular attention to the struggles of the Spanish population against Napoleon, the

[1] *Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1816, of 8th December 1870.

[1] Letter from Karl Marx to Ludwig Kugelmann, 13th December 1870.

Austrian campaigns in Italy and also to the Franco-German War.

In their studies they tried to find out how an organized popular movement, without proper arms, can be led to fight with any hope of success against highly organized and well-equipped armies. In this respect the Franco-Spanish War is exceptionally enlightening. Armies which, for their time, were of considerable size—they totalled 670,000 men and 520 guns—crossed the Pyrenees between 1807 and 1813 to conquer Spain. Only 250,000 men and 250 guns returned to France.

The universal uprisings interfered with the French armies so much that the latter were frittered away in small operations without achieving anything decisive. And the help Wellington received from the Spanish Maquis should not be underestimated. Napoleon's generals were never able to bring the bulk of their forces against the British and, in their struggles with the Spanish people, their superiority counted for little. The Spaniards appeared suddenly where they were least expected, disappeared just as quickly into their mountain hide-outs, and then re-appeared in some entirely different place. Their losses in human lives were surprisingly small and they were certainly not interested in any stubborn defence of territory. Obviously this kind of fighting could not lead to any decision, but the Spanish managed to keep the French constantly on the move, and so brought about a fatal dispersal of their forces.[1]

Marxist writers have also gathered useful information from studies of the Austro-Piedmontese and Franco-German wars. For instance, in an article written by Karl Marx in 1849 we find the following description of the battle of Novara: 'How did the Austrians gain their victory? Because, thanks to the

[1] Article by Karl Marx and Frederic Engels entitled 'Revolutionary Spain' in the *New York Daily Tribune*, 30th December 1854.

treachery of Romarin, they were able to cut off two of the Piedmontese divisions and drive the remaining three into the Alps. It was an initial mistake of the Piedmontese to offer battle in open, flat country, with only regular troops, and to conform to the normal etiquette of war. A nation fighting for its liberty ought not to adhere rigidly to the accepted rules of warfare. Mass uprisings, revolutionary methods, guerrilla bands everywhere; such are the only means by which a small nation can hope to maintain itself against an adversary superior in numbers and equipment. By their use a weaker force can overcome its stronger and better-organized opponent.[1]

It is certainly not without interest that the military theories evolved by Engels and Karl Marx did influence the events of the Franco-German war. Thanks to the political confusion which, following upon the capitulation of Sedan, reached its climax in the Paris Commune, not only their social and political ideas but also their military theories were taken up. The French confronted the German victor with a call for a general uprising, 'war to the knife', and Francs-Tireurs. A certain Monsieur Baraque, in a written communication to the government, stated that 20,000 Francs-Tireurs working in the rear of the enemy would be more effective than 200,000 men in Paris.

'War to the knife' certainly did make things very difficult for the German armies. It hindered the offensive conduct of the war and even nullified some of the plans of the Prussian Supreme Command. Large forces had to be employed to crush the Francs-Tireurs and protect the hinterland. Towards the end of the war the rear defences accounted for at least one rifle for every four used in the front lines.

[1] At the battle of Novara on 23rd March 1849, the Austrian Field Marshal Radetzky vanquished the Piedmontese arms. This article by Karl Marx was published in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, No. 161, of 1st April 1849.

This conflict of 1870 occupies a very special place in the history of warfare. It was during it that, for the first time, an army made use of modern technical development such as railways and telegraphs. At the same time the Underground People's War made great progress. The operations carried out during only two or three months against the technical installations in the enemy's rear were of extraordinary importance. In addition to numerous attacks on bridges and railways, operations were directed against the Luetzelborg and Foug tunnels. Train hold-ups were frequent. German telephone wires were cut in many places and small detachments of the German army ambushed in roads and isolated country places.[1]

The results of these revolutionary tactics influenced deeply the subsequent development of France. To quote Captain Liddell Hart: 'Looking back further, one observed that the irregular forces that France had armed to meet the German invasion of 1870 had turned into a boomerang. They had been merely a nuisance to the invaders but they had developed into the agency of that appalling fratricidal struggle known as the Commune. Moreover, the legacy of "illegitimate" action has been a continuing source of weakness in the subsequent history of France.'

The military ideas of Marx and Engels have been closely followed up by their successors. They formed the basis of Russian revolutionary strategy first in the popular revolt of 1905–6 and subsequently in the revolutionary wars of 1917–21. Lenin wrote, 10th October 1905: 'The proved and accepted methods of partisan warfare—constant strikes and wearing down of the enemy in barricade fighting here, there and everywhere—have proved most effective.' In an article in *Izvestia*, dated 14th March 1918, Stalin mentions that similar methods were used in the Russian civil war. At that

[1] Arthur Erhardt, *Kleinkrieg* (Small-scale Warfare), Potsdam, 1944.

time he was a peoples' commissar in the Ukraine where he fought against the German troops of occupation. 'Soviet Ukraine declares war on the invader. Every grain of wheat, every pud of ore, must be withheld from the Germans, if necessary by force of arms.'[1]

During the Russian revolution the very nature of the immense spaces tended to facilitate partisan warfare while another point in its favour was the fact that the White Russian troops, with nothing particular to fight for, were sick of war.

In the dense forests, in the open marshes and in the mountains, the partisans fought on foot whereas in the open plains they operated almost always on horseback. Raids would be carried out hundreds of miles in the rear of the opposing White troops. Wherever the enemy front showed a breach, the partisan bands would penetrate deep into the enemy lines. Their objectives were surprise attacks on supply routes, bridges, depots and similar important points. Their methodical propaganda also did incalculable harm amongst the peasants, who were irritated by the forced requisitions and ruthless demands of the White armies. Wherever the partisan groups penetrated they forged bonds of sympathy between themselves and the population, with which they quickly mixed, so that it became impossible to distinguish the Partisan from the peaceful peasant.

Yet before 1939 little was known outside Russia of the tactics and experience of the Bolsheviks. In accordance with the traditional military way of thinking, the reports of the

[1] One could cite many quotations showing how profoundly the idea of Marx and Engels influenced the military ideas of Lenin and Stalin. See Lenin: 'Partisan Warfare', article in *Proletariat* of 13th October 1906. 'From defence to attack' in same journal, 26th September 1905. 'The sanguinary days of Moscow', 10th October 1905. 'The revolutionary army and the Government of the Revolution', 16th October 1905. See also writings by Stalin: *To the Workers of the Caucasus*, manifesto of 25th March 1905, and others.

White Russian generals confined themselves to strategic questions; battles, changes of front and operations in general. The reader of those reports must frequently ask himself whether these soldiers ever realized that their military art had become antiquated and had collapsed under the blows inflicted by a new method of warfare.

Whether or not, the lessons of the civil war were carefully studied in the Red Army and in the youth organizations of the Soviet Union itself. Numerous troop formations were linked traditionally with some of the older partisan bands, such as those of Tchapejev. Apart from the sentimental nature of these historic ties, the tactical and strategic experiences gained in the conduct of operations proved of immense value.

This short analysis of underground warfare, derived principally from Marxist literature, presents a certain interest in the light of the present world situation. It is because the creators of Communism did not concern themselves solely with political and social questions, but were also skilled strategists who paid much attention to military problems, that the Communist parties possess not only a wide and varied experience of People's War but deep-rooted traditions which date back almost a century. And it is this which explains why the Communists were able to exercise such a dynamic influence in many underground resistance movements of the Second World War. It is interesting, in the light of this knowledge, to consider the speech made by Stalin on 3rd July 1941 in which he described the way the Soviet should wage war against Germany:

'The struggle against Germany must not be looked upon as an ordinary war. It is not merely a fight between two armies . . . in order to engage the enemy there must be bands of partisans and saboteurs working underground everywhere, blowing the bridges, destroying roads, telephones and telegraphs, and setting fire to depots and forests. In territories occupied

by the enemy conditions must be made so impossible that he cannot hold out. Those helping him will be punished and executed. Sabotage all enemy organizations.'

The First World War gave a new orientation to the conduct of military operations. For the first time in history not only armies but whole nations were opposed to each other, with all their military, political, economic and moral potentials. This was the first *total* contest, however great the difference between it and the second world conflict. For at that time internal social and political factors had not attained the importance they have gained in the last two decades.

After the spring of 1915 the great battles tended to depend more and more on the industrial productivity of the hinterland. Verdun and the Somme were less a demonstration of purely military art than a competition in technical superiority. The outcome depended on carrying more material to the front than the enemy could. Each war begins along the same lines on which the last was finished, and operations in 1914 were undertaken with the same dash as characterized those of 1870. All the belligerent powers anticipated a classic war of movement which would be decided by a few battles. They thought in terms of months and not of years, However, as the struggle became fiercer, the need for ever-increasing forces and supplies made itself felt. The front became stabilized and new means were sought to achieve a break-through or decide the issue by any kind of action in the rear of the enemy. At first the supreme commands attached little importance to attacks which were being made behind the enemy lines and on the economic and industrial bases. But towards the end of the struggle, it became necessary to resort to political and underground actions to undermine the enemy's morale at home and thus achieve the decision that apparently could not be obtained on the fighting fronts.

Several months before the declaration of war, the German and Austrian High Commands made arrangements to pro-

voke disorder and acts of sabotage in the enemy's hinterland. An appeal was made to the patriotic sentiments of the Poles in order to impede the advance of the Tsar's armies moving towards Germany and Austria. All along the principal railway lines, near important bridges and similar nodal traffic centres, special groups of local inhabitants were equipped with explosive charges. Similar measures were adopted in Serbia, in the Balkan theatre of operation. The main purpose in this case was to prevent the Serbian army (which had no national war industry) from receiving arms and munitions from Russia by boat up the Danube, or from Salonika through the narrow valleys of the Vardar, Struma and Morava rivers.

In both schemes the German and Austrian secret services had organized guerrilla bands, none of which was inspired by patriotic sentiments. They were just groups of bandits in the true sense of the word who, in the Danube area, cashed in to the extent of 25,000 francs for each boat sunk. As a matter of fact, the Danube was completely blocked for a fortnight by these methods. At the same time the Austrian General Staff sought to provoke a revolt in Macedonia, where small bands of guerrillas, aided by some Austrian emissaries, succeeded in doing considerable damage to the Serbian cause. In the valley of the Vardar, several bridges were sprung on different occasions. In Albania, where Italian intervention completely crushed the revolt, only poor results were obtained.[1]

But in general the activities of that time produced only insignificant results. The plans of action had been laid before the war and the anticipated circumstances did not correspond with those that developed during the actual conflict.

In its then existing stage of development, radio-electric signalling could not provide perfect co-ordination between the activities of the bands and events on the field of battle.

[1] General Max Ronge, Chief of the Austrian Secret Service: *Kriegs-und-Industrie-Spionage* (Military and Economic Intelligence).

These bands soon lost touch with those from whom they received their orders and General Ronge complains bitterly in his book that the news of successes achieved on the various lines of communication reached the Secret Service headquarters only after months of delay.

However, the Central Powers scored one great success in the sphere of secret warfare—the clandestine crossing into Russia of Lenin and other Russian revolutionaries who had been in Switzerland as refugees. Events on the eastern front, especially after the dispersal of the Tsarist armies in 1917, took a very favourable turn for Germany and Austria. Nevertheless, history has shown that the work of the German Secret Service at this juncture was not of a very fortunate nature from a political point of view. Scarcely a year later the revolutionary reverberations were felt within the German and Austrian formations, and their influence on the result of the war, if not decisive, was at least important.

The allied Secret Services were more successful. Their war aims were much more clearly defined and corresponded more closely with the political ambitions of the various nations. Furthermore, the Allied Powers paid more attention to these problems than the Central Powers, and brought into play greater and more powerful financial and material resources. The allied propaganda chiefs resorted to every possible device in order to sow political disorder in the enemy countries. In this new art, for it is an art, the English proved themselves masters: they had behind them the knowledge gained in this particular field of action during the Napoleonic era. They set about preparing revolutions and social discontent in Austria and Germany. At the head of this campaign were Lord Northcliffe, for the enemy countries, and Lord Rothermere for the neutrals. The Austrian section was under Wickham Steed and Seton Watson; H. G. Wells, and later Hamilton Fyfe, were responsible for the German section. Since at that time radio technique was still in its infancy, the

work inside enemy territory was carried out mainly by neutral persons. Dutchmen, Swiss and Spaniards visited Germany and Austria as business men. The objective of this type of propaganda was to destroy political unity in the Danubian basin; and it was deployed—principally among the Czechs, certain Yugoslavian circles, the Poles and Roumanians—by cleverly drawing attention to the dangers to which the tired Austro-Hungarian peoples would be exposed if they were to submit to the domination of Germany. At the same time, all the emigrés animated by anti-Austrian sentiments were given full encouragement.

President Wilson was completely bewildered by the complexity of European politics and the United States proved a suitable forcing-ground for this line of action. But, as was proved by the results of sending Lenin into Russia, secret warfare could be a double-edged weapon. In the first years after the 1914–18 war the smaller states of central Europe were an easy target for bolshevik propaganda. In Hungary and Bavaria communistic governments came into power; even Vienna went red, and Europe just managed to escape bolshevization.

It has never been fully recognized that the main credit for this is due to the vanquished German Imperial Army. Under the command of Noske, the Second Reich's Minister of War, the troops of the Reichswehr liquidated, one after another, the Soldiers' Councils and Red garrisons in Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, Leipzig and many other big cities. Practically at the same time, about the spring of 1920, Lenin's Red Army, which was intended to join the revolutionaries in Germany and in the Danubian countries, was beaten at Warsaw, more by chance than by strategic skill. These two events, unknown to many, completely changed the course of European development. What would have become of our continent if the Red revolution had succeeded in 1919? The French Army was war-weary and demoralized. The allied troops which had

been disembarked on the shores of the Black Sea in order to support the White Russian Generals Wrangel and Denikin, had to be hurriedly recalled; and it was in the mutiny of the French fleet at Odessa at that time, that the now prominent Paris Communist, André Marty, made his reputation.

In addition to operating in the political sphere, the Allies originated guerrilla wars whenever possible. We will mention only two of the most characteristic. After the destruction of the Serbian Army in the winter of 1915–16, the Balkan states, not for the first time in their history, became the scene of savage combats. Armed bands caused the Austrian government great anxiety. These clashes assumed real importance only after the allied landing at Salonika which had the objective of penetrating across the Balkan peninsula into the Danube basin. At the beginning of the year 1917 the Serbian Captain Kosta Pecanac was sent by the Allied High Command by plane from Salonika and put down behind the enemy lines. His task was to organize a general revolt in support of the allied offensive planned for the spring. Secret orders issued to chiefs of bands operating in Macedonian territory give some indication of the shape which this rising was to take: '2nd March is fixed for the revolt in all provinces of the Kingdom of Serbia. All warriors must hold themselves in readiness. They should assemble in small groups on the roads and ambush enemy troops as well as destroy telephones, telegraphs, and railway installations. Concentrations of enemy forces should be avoided.' If the rising had taken place according to plan and had been synchronized with the allied offensive, it would certainly have placed the Austro-German command in a very serious situation. But the Allies had not given Captain Pecanac the means to carry out his task. Why the Salonika High Command neglected to send the requisite supplies of arms and ammunition is not clear, but either it was impossible for some reason or the importance of the operation was not fully realized.

Another allied guerrilla chief was more successful. Victory in the Middle East, in Mesopotamia and Palestine, was won partly through the help of the Arab Free Rangers, at the head of whom was Colonel Lawrence.

His curious campaign not only helped to destroy the fighting strength of Turkey but it shed new light on guerrilla strategy. Lawrence's operations deserve to rank among the masterpieces of history both for their breadth of vision and treatment. The three Turkish armies fighting on this front depended entirely upon railway communications, mainly on the line from Damascus to Medina. While the Arabs were both more mobile and less able to bear casualties than orthodox armies, the Turks were almost uninterested in loss of men, though not in loss of material, of which they were short. Superb at sitting tight in a trench or firing at a directly oncoming target, they could neither adapt themselves to, nor endure, the strain of fluid operations.

From Lawrence's war memoirs, which he partly published in his book, *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, comes the following extract: 'In the next four months our experts from Akaba destroyed seventeen locomotives. Travelling became an uncertain terror for the enemy. At Damascus people scrambled for the back seats in trains, even paid extra for them. The engine drivers struck. Civilian traffic nearly ceased; and we extended our threat to Aleppo by the mere posting of a notice one night on Damascus Town Hall, that good Arabs would henceforward travel by the Syrian railway at their own risk. The loss of the engines was sore upon the Turks. Since the rolling stock was pooled for Palestine and Hejaz, our destruction not merely made the mass evacuation of Medina impossible, but began to pinch the army about Jerusalem, just as the British threat grew formidable.'

'The opportunity of carrying the strategy of the Arab revolt to completion was not vouchsafed; for in September 1918, when it had reduced the Turkish forces on the Hejaz

railway to a state of paralytic helplessness, the main Turkish forces in Palestine were overthrown by a single decisive stroke [of the British Army]. . . . This has led to a depreciation of the result of Lawrence's strategy, especially among those whose scale of values is governed by the dogma of Clausewitz that blood is the price of victory.'[1]

The mention of Lawrence concludes our rapid survey of the First World War. In those days the idea was to achieve political destruction by means of propaganda and military coups carried out by armed bands. Less importance was attached to the destruction of enemy industries and internal economic life by organized sabotage on a large scale, and nowhere was it possible to bring about mass upheavals.

During the Second World War, however, the resistance movements played a far more important part. Methods of underground warfare had never previously been employed on any similar scale, firstly because the general character of wars had not favoured their use; secondly, because the results achieved would not have corresponded with the political aims pursued in the conflict.

The circumstances which have brought about their adoption in recent times deserve particular attention, and they can be classified in the following manner:

1. Developments in military strategy and tactics.

2. The absolute dependence of modern armies on indusrial and economic bases in their rear, and on lines of transport.

3. The development of air-lift and radio technique.

4. The importance to-day of the ideological aspect, and the consequent revolutionary nature of modern conflict.

We have grouped these points as above because it is easier to deal with them in this order. If classified according to their importance No. 4 would come first and No. 1 last.

In the two world wars, the employment of great human

[1] Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart: *The Strategy of Indirect Approach.*

masses and huge quantities of weapons played a completely decisive role. But whereas the first was a classic war of position, in the second, movement became the principal element. In 1940 the dynamic combination of massed tank formations with aircraft cover smashed through front-line defences organized on the pattern of 1914–18. And though by the end of the last world war it had nearly become possible to stop tank manœuvres, all attempts to achieve the same result against aircraft proved fruitless. It can be assumed, therefore, that any future war between world powers will again be a war of movement.

Let us examine now the influence of the modern war of movement on the development of guerrilla activities from the point of view of both tactics and strategy. Tactically, the use of motorized troops, tanks and air forces has caused the field of battle to extend to ever wider areas. The conception of a continuous and cohesive battlefront is a thing of the past. Opponents are inextricably mixed up with each other, in both depth and width. In the resultant confusion and lightning development of action, it is extremely difficult to exercise control over the whole battle. In consequence there occur 'empty spaces', in which the infiltration tactics of the guerrillas come into play. But Napoleon's famous maxim, 'the whole secret of the art of war lies in making oneself master of the communications', is truer than ever; and the lines of supply, on which tanks rely for fuel, constitute the Achilles' heel of all armoured forces. To harass an army's lines of communication is to paralyse its physical organization. To close its line of retreat is to paralyse its moral strength; to destroy its means of intercommunication—by which orders and reports pass—is to paralyse the sensory connection between brain and body. The destruction of radio stations or telegraph installations makes an army deaf and dumb.

General de Gaulle has summarized the importance of

guerrilla warfare in the following words: 'The old Queen of the art of war—"surprise attack"—was dethroned only as long as speed was no longer commensurate with fire power. The motorized division comes to her aid with its lightning weapons, but she will have to leave vast spaces to small-scale warfare.'[1]

Taking a broader view of underground warfare, it is of considerable interest that the strategic movements of armies will again assume gigantic proportions. This will inevitably lead to the occupation of vast territories, thus creating a hinterland in which a great part, if not the whole, of the population is hostile to the enemy. The primary purpose of military operations is to destroy the enemy's armies and to occupy strategic areas from which it is possible to defend, on enemy soil, one's own frontiers. Furthermore, there is the prospect of economic plunder, particularly in industrially developed countries. Satisfaction of the ever-growing material requirements of massive armies calls for the mobilization of the industrial resources of occupied territories in addition to one's own.[2] And in modern warfare, there is nothing extraordinary in a neutral state's being attacked solely to obtain control of its economic and industrial potentials. The armies of the middle ages covered their expenses by levying tribute on the enemy, and only by conquering the rich plains of Lombardy were Napoleon's armies able to arm for the struggle against Austria. Nevertheless, the old days were very different from the present. In his numerous incursions into Germany, Louis XIV never sought to occupy the industrial region of the Saar, nor to seize the coalfields of the Ruhr. Such war

[1] *Vers l'Armée de Métier* by Colonel (now General) de Gaulle.

[2] In the course of the last war Germany obtained 30 million tons of petroleum from the oilfields of Poland, Roumania and Hungary. French industry supplied the German Reich up to June 1944, with various goods to the value of 235 milliards of francs (of that period).

aims are a consequence of technique, and the dependence of modern armies on industrial and economic power. The centre of gravity of a conflict has been increasingly transferred from the front to the rear, until to-day the number of men fighting at the front is only a small proportion of the people engaged on war activities far behind the lines. In our epoch of total war, the internal industrial, economic and political factors assume an ever-increasing importance. Tanks and aeroplanes can be put out of action just as effectively by events taking place far in the rear as by actual contact with the enemy. 'Secret War' methods are responsible for the destruction of a large number of weapons before they can take any active part in combat. One small defective piece, such as a carburettor or a particular screw, can put a tank or a plane out of action; the most modern self-propelled vehicle is brought to a standstill as soon as it runs out of fuel.

We can nowadays ask whether Napoleon's celebrated dictum: 'Battles are won by big battalions', still holds good. In the old days a war was well won when the enemy's army and stores had been destroyed or captured and a decisive result thus obtained in one or two battles. In the past, professional armies, trained in peace-time, decided the issue; now we depend on levies organized and armed after the outbreak of hostilities. The armoured divisions and aircraft which fought in Russia in 1943 were different from those which attacked the Maginot Line three years before. Peace-time armies have now only an initial value; those raised during the course of a war are much more important. But this means that a belligerent power must be able, above all, to rely upon a smooth-running war industry.

Great armies depend upon the mass-production of extremely complicated weapons. Take for instance, a tank or an aeroplane. How many widely different components—metals, rubber, leather, precision instruments, etc.—go into their construction? To build them requires the co-operation

of the most diverse industries. Starting with the extraction of the raw materials, they must pass through innumerable workshops and countless hands before completion. And all this calls for the perfect functioning of the transport system connecting the sources of supply with the factories, arsenals, depots, and eventually the front. Any hold-up in this system has an effect comparable with that produced by the breaking-down of an assembly chain in a factory.

The extremely sensitive reactions and reflexes between various branches of industry and modern economic life are liable to constitute so many sources of weakness. A disturbance in any one branch inevitably causes trouble in many others. The steel industry depends upon coal, which has to be mined; the productivity of the miners depends upon the fertility of the land; the morale at the front is supported by the morale and productive efforts of those behind; and so on. From this point of view, Ludendorff's memoirs of the First World War present a certain interest. In them he divulges that the decision to undertake the offensive of 1917 was influenced by the fact that the railway urgently required the rolling stock for the potato harvest! The famous legend of the 'stab in the back' of which Hitlerian propaganda made such use, was founded on certain facts. The defeat of Germany at the front in 1918 was largely due to the economic collapse in the German rear.

The more armies depend upon industrial and economic production, the more vulnerable they are to blows directed against the hinterland which supports them; and this consists not only of the mother country but also of the occupied territories. All and everything, armies and back regions, form one whole living body and the slightest disturbance in any single organ or any interruption of the circulation must have serious consequences for the functioning of the whole system. This fact explains why aerial bombardments, together with the effectiveness of large-scale radio propaganda, have

tended to spread the battle area over ever vaster spaces.

The foregoing remarks apply to highly developed industrial countries such as those of Europe. But resistance movements are no less important elsewhere, for example in Asia. Although not possessing any vital industry, such countries are nevertheless important as potential sources of raw materials or as main nodal traffic points. Troubles fomented in them can have a serious effect on the output of the more industrialized countries.

How different the situation is from the days when Napoleon, for example, drew all his cannons and muskets from a few arsenals. The field of battle, reduced to a few square miles was at one point and the industries were a short distance in the rear, the whole being connected by a few lines of communication. It was comparatively easy to control everything. But is it so easy now? One could enlarge on this, but enough has been said to illustrate the increased possibilities and importance of actions in the rear areas.

The technical progress of the last twenty years is another reason for the growth of resistance movements. It has become much easier to provoke, develop, conduct and maintain secret movements in territories occupied by the enemy. Take, for example, the classic guerrilla war against Napoleon in Spain. It was very difficult in those days to co-ordinate the various activities into one complete scheme and to keep the fighting men supplied with the necessary materials. The only possible means were emissaries who had to slip through the French-controlled territory and materials which could only be supplied by roads or paths.

In the Second World War, the progress made in radio transmission enabled whole populations to be reached by propaganda and constant liaison to be maintained between the active partisans and those from whom they received their orders. And the aeroplane became not only an important instrument of liaison but also a means of conveying abundant

supplies of arms, ammunition, etc., to the resistance movements.

In our examination of the sections of our survey we come now to the fourth, the most important of all. This is the political, or rather social-political development of our age. In olden times people were separated by frontiers which raised vertical barriers between them. The violent social struggle of to-day has brought about the division of society into separate horizontal layers within the nation itself. In nearly every country, especially in Europe, these opposing interests have become so acute that friction between the various classes is often more pronounced than the differences between nations.

In the present world-situation, the more bitter the internal social conflicts become, the greater will be the possibility of the military and political use of resistance movements in future wars. 'War is the continuation of policy by other means.' This well-known idea of Clausewitz was later enlarged upon by Ludendorff when he said that peace was also a continuation of war by other means. That is to say, peace is only a preparation for another war. Political and military strategy exist in close relationship to each other. Consequently, the methods of military strategy can also be applied with success in peace-time politics, remembering that there is a close liaison between economic life and politics.

The policy of a state should be directed to allow the General Staff of the armed forces to carry out its military task satisfactorily. The Government should support its strategy and, according to circumstances, undertake political and economic intervention in the enemy country in order to make the task of its own invading armies easier. In the case of an actual or potential enemy, its aim should be to create disunity, and prevent new enemies from joining in the struggle.

These ideas of Ludendorff's were first put into practice by Hitler. The strategy of infiltration is just as effective in politics or economics as it is on the field of battle. The aggressor first

finds out the small cracks in the enemy's political and economic structure through which he can penetrate prior to the declaration of war. The cracks, only small at the outset, become large under constant political and economic pressure. Each success obtained is at once consolidated, and infiltration progresses on an ever wider and deeper scale. The aggressor in such cases gets help from those elements which are opposed to the government or from such as seek to ally themselves with him for opportunistic reasons. Such elements will soon collaborate politically by getting at some of the politicians or important military men closely connected with economic affairs.

Hitler launched his war during one of the greatest economic crises the democratic world has ever experienced. The socialists and the capitalists, parties of the left and of the right, were engaged in violent internal political conflicts. It was easy for Goebbel's propaganda to appeal to certain elements of the enemy states, to youth in particular, and to claim that the Fascist ideology served the interests of a nation better than democracy. In this way, Fascist parties were created in various countries which sympathized with Germany, and became the fifth columns of the German war machine. Already, before the outbreak of war, Hitler had obtained political control of the Danube basin, which was strategically of great importance to Germany. Parts of the neighbouring countries to the east and south of the Third Reich were inhabited by German minorities, among which the National Socialist secret services organized groups of terrorists. Their task consisted of acts of sabotage, attempts against political persons, and attacks against security and frontier guards. In Austria it was the assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss. These provocations helped to weaken the internal structure of the adversary, and any measures of defence taken by the wronged state served as a pretext for declaring that the German minority was being attacked. In this way

German foreign policy was able to create the necessary foundations for diplomatic action or even, as in the case of Poland, for military intervention. The documents produced during the Nuremberg trial provide a whole series of proofs of this kind of secret warfare. Through them, for instance, we learn that the Free Corps of the Sudeten Germans comprised 40,000 men in military organizations, to whom the German secret services had distributed 18,000 rifles and other small arms.

But it was not only in democratic countries that Hitler was successful with his underground war. His methods proved effective to a certain extent in the struggle against the Soviet Union, in which the German secret service made use of many White Russian emigrants, who directed propaganda and underground activities. It is no secret that, in many places in the Baltic countries, in the Ukraine and in the Caucasus, the German troops were received as liberators. Feeling towards them only changed later. The struggle of the partisans was not always a demonstration of loyalty to the Soviet régime, very often it was the result of ruthless requisitioning and cruelty on the part of the S.S. formations. Further, it should be borne in mind that the war waged by the Russians against Germany was a struggle against a traditional enemy, in which the nationalist feelings of the Russians played a much greater part than their devotion to the Communist ideology. For that reason it is questionable whether, in a war against the Anglo-Saxons, the masters in the Kremlin would succeed in mobilizing the enthusiasm of the masses to the extent they did in the Second World War.

After the war, Moscow found itself compelled to evacuate to Siberia populations of whole districts. In the Ukraine, where the situation still remains doubtful for the Soviets, Ukrainian nationalism threatens the authority of Moscow. In many other parts of Russia it is the agrarian question which constitutes the weakest point of the whole Communist struc-

ture. The Mussulman peoples, most of whom have remained hostile to Communist mysticism, could not help but pay heed to the Islamic propaganda from Berlin. One after the other they betrayed the Soviet cause. Such was the case with the Kalmuks, whose autonomous republic has now become the administrative region of Astrakhan. The ethnical group of the Caucasian peoples suffered the same fate. The Tatars of the Crimea and others, not content with supplying volunteers to fight in the German ranks, formed their own bands, which, after Hitler's forces had retired, harassed the Soviet rear. It was the people of the Caucasus who guided the Alpine troops to the heights of Elberus. The Germans took recruits from amongst their Asiatic prisoners in order to reinforce their effectives engaged in the defence of the 'Atlantic Wall' and in the fight against the Yugoslav partisans. Ukrainian prisoners enrolled in whole battalions. This was the real position concerning patriotism, which, according to Stalin's own definition, was 'love for the Soviet régime and the mode of life created by socialism in the U.S.S.R.'. However, despite all this, it would be unwise to draw too hasty conclusions regarding the inner weaknesses of the Soviet Union.

The Germans met with less success when, in 1945, they tried to organize an underground resistance in their own country. Their people were much too tired to listen to the appeals of the 'Werewolf' organization. A resistance movement is the struggle of an unvanquished nation in a conquered country, and this was certainly not the case with the Germans in 1945. For many months Major General Gehlen studied the fighting methods of the Polish patriots in order to adopt them for the 'Werewolf'. However, when the time for action arrived, it was the leaders themselves who, on Admiral Doenitz's orders and the mediation of the Danish patriots, entered into negotiations with the British. Thus the German nation was the only one which did not have its underground resistance movement in the Second World War. The reason

for this lies in certain interesting aspects of national psychology to which we shall revert at a later stage in this book.

Precisely as in the First World War, the German war aims of the second were too vague and indefinite to offer any attraction to the peoples of Europe. In other words, the Germans, in both world conflicts, were psychologically incapable of gaining the sympathy of the masses. The armies of the Third Reich appeared everywhere as conquerors, whereas the Allies were welcomed as liberators. To this situation was added another important factor. Hitler's attack against the Soviet Union mobilized not only the Red Army but also the network of Communist cells in Europe generally. Whereas the Germans had to organize their resistance movements artificially, the Allied resistance movements came into being spontaneously. This circumstance surprised the Allies so much that at first they were unable to make full military use of it. Here another important factor came into play. From the very beginning, London was convinced that it was necessary to act prudently; and the soundness of this opinion was proved by the evolution of the underground movements not only during, but after the war. In Yugoslavia there appeared internal political dissensions between the followers of Mikhailovitch and those of Tito, in Poland between members of the bands serving the Polish Government in London and the Moscow emigrants; in France between the *bourgeois* and Communist resistance; whilst in Greece there was bitter political competition between the partisans of E.L.A.S., E.D.E.S., and E.A.M. After the war certain elements of the former guerrillas put forward exaggerated political claims; and the fact that for years they had been carrying out all kinds of irregular, secret and illegal activities had turned them into a political danger to Europe. Most of the guerrillas had retained their weapons after the end of the war, and they were difficult to demobilize. In France, for instance, only 15 to 20 per cent of the parachuted arms were surrendered.

The history of the Second World War teaches us many lessons on this subject. Almost all underground movements have their own special character although they have many features in common. In Russia, as well as in western Europe, it was the clash between the regular armies which brought the final decision, but in both cases the irregular bands gave useful help. In Yugoslavia and sometimes in the Far East, the resistance movements played a greater role than the operations of the regular troops. The Japanese columns penetrated deep into the heart of China, but hundreds of thousands of guerrillas swept like a tidal wave round and behind them and cut off their hard-won lines of communication. For eight years, bands of Chinese peasants with the most primitive weapons fought a huge modern army. Guerrilla warfare was never more successful.

The scene of operations of the Russian partisans was just as extensive; it stretched across the steppes and into the interminable forests and swamps of Russia. But their struggle was of a different nature. With the exception of certain important strategic sectors, the extremely long German front was only inadequately manned. In many places there was only one division every thirty miles. This made easy the constant infiltration of single individuals and even groups into the German hinterland, which was in many areas occupied. However, the activities of the Russian maquis had nothing of an improvised nature about them; they had been carefully and methodically prepared before the war.[1]

In the Balkans, resistance was quite different from the Russian movement. It was a classic example of guerrilla war-

[1] The conduct of the underground campaign in the Soviet Union was entirely in the hands of the Communist Party. The General headquarters of the partisans was in Moscow. All operations were directed by the party secretaries—Ponomarenko in White Russia, Denyan Koratchenko in the Ukraine, and Latsis in the Baltic countries.

fare in the high mountains. Very primitive and poorly equipped at the start, as time went on the resistance organization improved to such an extent that towards the end of the war it had almost attained the standard of a regular army. Whereas in the spring of 1941 the Germans required only twenty divisions to destroy the Yugoslav and Greek armies within a few days, the subsequent occupation and policing of the countries called for the employment of fifteen German and thirty Italian, Bulgarian and Croatian divisions. Territories the size of Belgium were governed by Yugoslav partisans. Mussolini suffered the same fate in Yugoslavia that Napoleon met in Spain; his army, of which he was so proud, was worn threadbare by 100,000 Yugoslav peasants. From documents found in the hands of General Reinecke, Chief of the Press Bureau of the Supreme Command of the German Army, we learn that the German losses in killed in the Balkans amounted to 24,000, as compared with only 12,000 in Africa.[1]

September 1944 showed a regular army engaged in guerrilla warfare. This Slovak rising, to which we shall have cause to refer again, was an illuminating example of how *not* to wage a people's war. The idea of this operation was to attack the Carpathian passes from the south in order to open them for the advance of the Red Army, and also to cut the German railway connections with Hungary. This could be done by seizing the principal Carpathian passes before the arrival of the German troops; that is to say, before the German divisions, driven out of Russia, could establish themselves for their defence. For this purpose the Slovak army was concentrated to the south of the Little Tatra near the town of Banska Bystrica. It is true that a certain section of the Slovak troops, those of the eastern garrisons, had not joined the insurgents. This event tended gravely to hamper the success of the operations as a whole, but it should not have led the insurgents to barricade themselves off in the mountains of

[1] *The Times*, London, of 30th July 1945.

the Little Tatra in order to adopt the classic type of defence offered to an enemy of superior force. The situation of the Slovak troops rapidly became untenable, but the order to abandon the regular defensive was given only on 28th October. This order at the same time implied the transition from normal war methods to those of guerrilla warfare. Owing to the delay, the guerrilla plans had not been laid with the requisite care, and consequently a large part of the materials deposited in the valleys and villages was captured by the Germans. If the Slovak army had sought from the beginning to cut a way through to the Red Army, or if its chiefs had decided earlier to adopt guerrilla tactics instead of employing methods of normal war, the result of the movement might have been totally different.

In western Europe, where the network of communications is much more highly developed, it was obviously much easier for the occupation troops to keep the population under control. But though the country, with the exception of a few mountainous regions, did not lend itself to guerrilla tactics, it nevertheless offered rare opportunities for extensive sabotage. And in view of the economic importance of western Europe these operations were particularly harmful to the German war machine.

The resistance movements we have mentioned were mass risings and people's wars, as described in the writings of Marx, Engels and Stalin. We shall refer often to the important lessons drawn from them.

The end of hostilities in 1945 put an end only to the activities of the regular armies. The underground struggles went on. During the war *bourgeois* and Communist resistance movements fought the Germans from both right and left, but once the common enemy, Hitler's army, had been destroyed, these movements suddenly found themselves face to face. In those European countries which have since become the satellites of the Soviet Union, the leftist underground elements have

assumed power and gradually put the parties of the right into a position of illegal opposition.

This was the case in Poland and the Ukraine, where violent clashes are still taking place in certain regions, between bands and police forces. Every day political fugitives cross the Carpathian passes in order to reach, across Czechoslovakia, the American zones of Austria and Germany. In a general sense, the situation is no different in Hungary, Roumania and Bulgaria. There also, as in Poland, the *bourgeois* elements are being pushed more and more underground. Many political leaders have been compelled to seek refuge abroad in order to save their lives; in Bulgaria and Roumania the politicians of the opposition have been tried in the courts. According to news from Yugoslavia bands are fighting there, but this time against Tito. Since 1944 Greece has been torn into two camps by a cruel civil war. One of these camps, backed by the Anglo-Americans, seeks its ideal in the West; the other, helped by the neighbouring Communist countries, looks to the East. All the Cominform countries are behind the government of the Greek rebels. The Red partisans, when pursued by the Greek government troops, find sanctuary in neighbouring Communist countries. Constant reinforcements of arms and ammunition make it possible for the guerrillas to continue the struggle. The greater part of the supplies sent to them is still from war stocks, and of German, English and Italian origin; consequently, it is impossible to tell which countries are actually supplying them. Various security measures are taken, moreover, to ensure secrecy in these outside interventions. The Red Greek partisans were trained before the differences between Marshal Tito and the Cominform, partly at the guerrilla school near Belgrade, partly at the instruction camp at Bitolj, which is also in Yugoslavia.

However, it is not only in the Balkan peninsula, that always active European volcano, that war continues. Farther to the west and south of Europe, where Soviet power has not yet

been able to make itself felt, the *bourgeois* elements have remained in the majority and in authority. Violent social disturbances are taking place in parts of western Europe and Italy. Those who yesterday fought side by side against the common aggressor are now engaged in fratricidal struggles; and in the fight for Berlin, underground warfare would seem to have played quite an important part. Thus, in that phase of 'between wars'—the period in which we now live in constant fear of a third world conflict—violent guerrilla or underground actions are still going on in all corners of the world. 'In many places there is more fighting taking place at the present time than during the war,' declared General Marshall before the United States Commission of Foreign Affairs on 8th January 1948; and as we can see for ourselves, this fighting is taking place in regions of strategic importance for any future war. Hidden warfare has become a powerful accessory of secret diplomacy.

Only two great powers came out victorious from the immense struggle of the Second World War: the United States of America and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Between them Europe—torn socially, ruined economically, and in a state of moral collapse—forms a sort of 'no-man's-land'. On the map, the line of demarcation between East and West can be drawn approximately from Lübeck to Trieste. But from a political point of view, each country in itself is divided by an imaginary line, the front line between the partisans of Communist ideology and those of Western democracy. Consequently, the European continent is becoming more and more the theatre of a 'secret war', in which East and West contend for political, strategic and economic power. In a way this struggle is a continuation of the Second World War. Nobody can say to-day whether these contests are intended solely as useful counters in diplomatic negotiations or whether, in fact, they are the preliminary skirmishes of a new world conflict.

From the present world situation, a future conflict would appear likely to develop in three main theatres: Europe, the Near East, and the Far East.

Even if the principal cause of a clash between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. were the Far East, it is hardly imaginable that Europe, with its important geo-political situation, could remain outside the conflict. The European continent has the best lines of communication for those mass armies which alone are capable of forcing a decision in an inter-continental struggle of such magnitude. Of course, the operations carried out in Europe would form a coherent whole with the happenings in the other theatres of war, particularly as regards any military operations in the Near East. The events in the Far East would, of course, be of a more or less isolated character.

At present the Anglo-Saxon powers could hardly expect to defend Europe; the armies of occupation in Germany are far too weak to stand up to strong pressure from the East, and the armies of western Europe are too small to make an effectual resistance. This time, then, it would be the Red Army which would carry out the Schlieffen Plan, or one of its variants, in order to reach the Atlantic coast or even the Pyrenees. The final objective, however, would in all probability be the western approaches to the Mediterranean—Gibraltar.

In the Near East the jumping-off base would probably be the country lying between the Black Sea and the Caspian; and, even farther afield, the area between the Caspian Sea and the Sea of Aral. There the strategic objective would obviously be the eastern access to the Mediterranean and the capture of Suez, with the purpose of closing the second Mediterranean gateway. Other strategic objectives are the Dardanelles and the Persian Gulf, the latter being a preliminary condition of a thrust towards India.

The consequences of a strategic plan of this kind are obvious:

(*a*) The democratic defence line would be withdrawn behind the Sahara, approximately to an imaginary line: Dakar-Djibouti.

(*b*) The various Anglo-Saxon operation bases such as Italy. Turkey, Greece, Malta and French North Africa, would become isolated and condemned to a slow death.

(*c*) One of the most important British world lifelines, from Gibraltar to Suez, would be severed, and the western powers constrained to use the much longer route round Africa.

The strategy likely to be adopted by the Soviet Union in the Far East is more problematic. Faced with the possible presence of Americans in the Japanese archipelago, it is hardly likely that the Russians, in view of their almost certain inferiority in naval and aerial strength, would attempt an advance from Vladivostock as far as the Dutch islands and archipelagoes. However, what the Japanese succeeded in doing with their navy and air force could more easily be achieved by underground war methods.

Youth in many Asiatic countries has been strongly influenced by Communist ideology; in Indonesia, Burma, Malaya and Indo-China, Marxism has gained a particularly strong hold. In India, too, Communism has become deeply rooted. Its appeal to the famished and oppressed has met with a wide response, and its influence is even more important in intellectual circles. It would be a mistake to underestimate the effect of the slogan 'Asia for the Asiatics'—especially after the Japanese successes during the war. The people of the East will never again show the same respect towards Europeans. This established Asiatic national sentiment is, moreover, being cleverly utilized by Soviet propaganda; its demands of equality of races and political and economic liberty are ones which theoretical Communism looks upon as self-evident rights. Furthermore, in Asia, where it is now extremely difficult to reconcile the interests and aspirations of innumerable races and creeds, Communist ideology could

provide some kind of bridge between the national or other opposing interests. An Asiatic solidarity may, for the first time, be created. The general political atmosphere offers the ideal conditions for launching mass revolts. A certain importance can therefore be attached to the news that it is intended to set up a sort of Cominform in Asia.



STRATEGIC LINES OF U.S.S.R. IN ASIA

The black arrows indicate the strategic axes of the U.S.S.R. in Asia. The Japanese conquered the Dutch Indies with the aid of their Navy and Air Forces. The U.S.S.R. could one day achieve the same result by means of underground movements

The rapid advance of the Chinese Communists towards the south will not remain without influence on the further development of the situation in the whole of south-east Asia. Since the end of the Second World War, Indonesia and Indo-China have seen violent guerrilla combats. In the first of these countries fifteen million Annamites are fighting the French expeditionary force. In the second, seventy million Indonesians are opposing Dutch troops. In the jungle and the primeval forest, constantly surrounded by masses of guerrillas and in the severest climatic conditions, the small European garrisons are trying to accomplish the hopeless task of establishing European domination as it existed before the war.

In India there has been civil war for several months. The situation in Burma and Thailand is characterized by constant troubles. All southern Asia is in a state of ferment. There is every likelihood that the Soviet Union will take advantage of all this. Any power seizing Rangoon could control the Gulf of Bengal and the entry into China by way of the Burmese route. Possession of Burma would at the same time permit the maintenance and extension of the popular risings down the Malay peninsula as far as Singapore; while the guerrillas of Indo-China could spread their tentacles in a north-easterly direction towards Hong Kong.

A people's war, waged by four hundred million Indians, could have very serious consequences for Iran and Arabia; it would facilitate a rapid march by the Red Army through Afghanistan, Kashmir and Baluchistan to the shores of the Indian Ocean. And if the Soviets succeed in cutting the principal communication routes of the western powers at Suez and Gibraltar, the appearance of Red partisans in the regions of the Indian Ocean and Malaya would seriously menace the second, African, line of communcations. Moreover, loss of these regions to the western powers would be of primary importance. Ninety per cent of the rubber,

60 per cent of tin, 90 per cent of quinine and many other important raw materials come from those parts of the world.

In order to carry out this strategy, armies of tanks, fleets of aircraft or large naval forces would not be necessary. It would be enough to have good emissaries, well-developed propaganda and a generous distribution of small arms amongst the masses of the malcontents. These people, as Asiatics, are particularly apt in the ways of guerrilla warfare and they have acquired considerable experience during recent years. In Yugoslavia the partisans were able to liberate regions as large as Belgium, but the Asiatic spaces are far greater, and whole divisions could be put down in them by air. Strong points could be organized for both ground forces and aircraft, and from these centres the resistance movements could be widely extended.

If the present trend of evolution should continue, there is no doubt that the antagonism between white races and Asiatic peoples will grow. It already finds an echo in the declarations of Asiatic leaders. Thus, on 31st December 1945 at Oudhaipur, Pandit Nehru exclaimed: 'If there is one thing certain in this uncertain world, it is the fact that the Asiatic states will never voluntarily submit to domination by any foreign empire—such would merely bring millions of men into open rebellion which even the atom bomb could not crush.' Without doubt, political and military events in southern Asia and the East will play an important part in the future. The effects of small-scale war in these regions would be practically equivalent to those of the atomic bomb, and amongst the milliard or so inhabitants Moscow could enlist sufficient partisans to compensate, by numerical superiority in manpower, for the technical inferiority of the U.S.S.R. What ought to be the size of the European armies required to hold these vast territories? Can Lenin's famous dream be realized, 'Let us look towards the East; the



Possible guerrilla bases or air bases protected by guerrilla movements in Asia

East will help us to triumph in the West'?[1]

[1] '. . . to incite colonial peoples to revolt, even if these revolts are nationalistic and *bourgeois* in character, since the main thing is that they are directed against the capitalist countries . . . they are to be regarded nevertheless as objectively revolutionary . . . support is to be given to the nationalist movements which are calculated to weaken and to overthrow imperialism and not to consolidate or to preserve it. . . .' Josef Stalin: *Problems of Leninism*, Edition Moscow 1947.

Like eastern Asia, the great regions of the Near and Middle East are also a zone of intense political agitation. It is there, in these still semi-medieval lands, rich in petroleum, that great world interests confront each other. There the advance of the Red Army, debouching from the region of the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, could count upon the support of popular revolts. Numerous social and economic problems—the Kurd, Armenian and Georgian questions, the Palestine situation and perhaps the policy of the pan-Arab League—carry within themselves the germs of popular insurrections which could one day sweep like a forest fire from the Caucasus across Egypt as far as Morocco. The social and national antagonisms between the various classes and races in these regions form an ideal basis on which tribe could be played off against tribe and nation against nation. There was the serious affair of Azerbaidjan in 1946. The problem raised then has still not found a definite solution. Communism has also evinced a growing interest in the happenings in Palestine. For instance, in 1948, the Czechoslovak Government supplied the Jewish combatants not only with planes and other weapons but also with volunteers and instructors. Palestinian pilots were trained at the airfield of Zatec near Prague. However, the results of a people's war would not be as fruitful in the Near East as in eastern Asia; for populations are much smaller and the terrain, particularly the desert lands, would be easier to watch.

The European theatre of war has already been dealt with and we need add little here to complete our survey. The various Communist organizations of Germany, France, Holland and Spain would use every means possible to help the Red Army in western Europe and smooth its path. France, and particularly Italy, could become scenes of guerrilla manœuvres intended to harass the western powers' defence of the Rhine and the Alpine passes. Albania would be one of the important bases from which air

help could reach the guerrillas of central and southern Italy.

However, the occupation of Europe would soon bring violent reaction. Opposition movements would be born in all the occupied countries and patriots could offer exceptionally efficient resistance in mountainous regions. In Spain, France and the Massif Central, in the Alps and the Jura and in the high Bavarian and Austrian ranges, the old legend of Andreas Hofer might be revived, and throughout Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Roumania, perhaps even in Russia, underground forces would be raised which would not only harass the occupying forces but also oppose the machinery and troops of pro-Soviet governments. Resistance would also be very strong in the agrarian countries of central Europe where the peasant problem will always be the weak point in Bolshevist Popular Democracy. The peasant class was always looked upon as a very unreliable ally by the Marxists. Lenin wrote in 1905: 'The era of the democratic revolution will pass in Russia, and it is therefore futile to talk about the unity existing between the industrial proletariat and the peasant classes. The latter, as landowners, will play only a very uncertain role in the struggle for socialism. To forget that is to ignore the precepts of dialectical materialism—it is self-deception, and misleading others as regards the true aims and interests of the proletariat. . . . We will support the peasant movement to the fullest extent; but we must remember that it is the movement of a different class and not of one able or willing to accomplish the socialist revolution.' So it is not impossible that the historical development of our times will lead to a new epoch of peasant wars. Such would be the European picture in a new world conflict.

We are advancing steadily into the era of international civil wars, in which national quarrels become less important, while ideologies figure more and more. Military systems as we have known them in the Second World War belong to the past in most European countries. Compulsory



UNDERGROUND MOVEMENTS IN A FUTURE WAR

The black arrows show the strategic axes of the U.S.S.R. The advance of the Red Army toward Gibraltar and Suez would be backed up everywhere by the Communist Parties. However, the opposition would raise its head quickly behind the Russian armies in the occupied territories

service and general mobilization are to-day obsolete conceptions. National allegiance is nowadays no longer a guarantee of political dependability. Formerly, all those who rallied to the flag behind their national leaders, took up well-defined

positions *vis-à-vis* their equally well-defined opposite numbers in the enemy ranks. Is it the same to-day? The march towards ideological war means inevitably the era of ideological armies.

May those readers of this book who are responsible for policies and armies draw the necessary conclusions.

CHAPTER II

Strategy of Secret Warfare

'The organization and conduct of popular risings are as much an art as is traditional warfare. They are subject to certain practical rules, disobedience to which will lead to downfall.'[1] The difficulties of underground warfare are considerable. Insufficient preparation, half-measures or errors in their execution, lead to serious and unnecessary losses in blood and resources.

General revolts, in which whole nations take part, should be conducted on quite different lines from warfare in which only regular armies are employed in battle. This chapter will endeavour to group the fundamental principles of the People's War into some sort of a doctrine, but the ideas which follow do not constitute a complete and infallible theory. There are, of course, certain fixed rules in strategy and tactics, but their observance need not always lead to the same results. Each aspect of the struggle has its own peculiar characteristics, and every action takes place in entirely different circumstances. The only calculable factors are those which consist of fixed and determined elements such as time and space, terrain, climatic conditions, number of combatants, efficiency of transport systems, quantity and quality of weapons and other auxiliary technical resources. The psychological and moral factors are intangible and incalculable, and cannot be ex-

[1] Karl Marx and Engels: *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany.*

pressed in terms of figures. One cannot take the individual characteristics of the men one is dealing with into consideration. It can be said that war is a duel between two opposing wills. The result is that if two-thirds of strategy and tactics are subject to rules, the remaining third remains elusive. This factor can only be summed up by instinct and its employment depends on opportunity and initiative.

In order to get a more clearly defined picture let us compare the strategy of normal war with that of the People's War. In normal war the objective is perfectly clear; *the destruction of the enemy in battle.* Its successful accomplishment implies the concentrated use of every possible means, on the ground, in the air and in certain circumstances at sea, in order to dominate the enemy. What are the best methods of winning battles? 'The best strategy is always to be the stronger at the decisive point,' advises Clausewitz. 'The converging on to the field of battle of several armies which had so far been separated,' said von Moltke. Ludendorff wrote: 'An army is never too strong at the point where the decision is sought.' There are many such quotations. Whether the battle takes place in open country in a war of movement, or is a battle of attrition in a war of position, victory almost always demands material and moral superiority at the proper place and time; in other words, *concentration in time and space.*

The battles of underground warfare, if they can be so called, have a totally different character. There is no battlefield in the proper sense of the word, and not one large blow but a number of small ones are struck ceaselessly in all directions and at all times. This feature can be defined as *dispersion in time and space.* In this kind of war, the total result of these small-scale engagements can be made to equal that of a regular army of similar strength. *Concentration on one side, dispersion on the other; in this antithesis lies the essential difference between the strategies and tactics of the two types of warfare, normal or secret.*

Our analysis leads to two further important conceptions of strategy; centralization and decentralization. The first generally characterizes the strategic and tactical actions based on concentration. On the other hand, the basis of underground strategy and tactics is that of decentralization as it affects command, organization, communications and replenishment of supplies, etc. This is made necessary not only by the need for dispersion in the struggle but also by the illegal atmosphere in which all underground movements are compelled to function.

The demolition of its rear structure makes of an army at the front a façade which can, in certain circumstances, be brought to a state of collapse with relatively little effort. People's war can destroy one regular army after another without incurring great sacrifices in men or materials. The ideal of secret war strategy is, by means of dispersion, to split up the campaign into a series of isolated combats in which the regular army is unable to make use of its material superiority. Concentration on the part of the irregulars would lead to their destruction, but the professional armies, precisely on account of their organization and traditional formation, are seriously handicapped in adopting unorthodox methods of battle.

Resistance movements are not developed by proper troops but by individuals held together by a loose kind of discipline; recognizing no code of strategy and absolutely free in their movements. They avoid, at all costs, a regular battle:[1] the strength of their defence line lies in dispersion. The partisans attack suddenly and disappear as quickly when forced on to the defensive. 'They are everywhere and nowhere; they carry their own basis of operations with them and any action

[1] The combats in Greece are an excellent example. The defence of Konitza by the Markos guerrillas in January 1948 proved that irregular forces engaged in a regular battle with professional troops cannot hold their own.

against them has the immediate effect of causing the disappearance of the target.'[1]

The regular soldier without a definite target is impotent. He can hold only what he actually occupies and can occupy only what he can cover with his rifle or gun. The essential foundation of guerrilla warfare rests in the art of constantly escaping from the enemy. T. E. Lawrence tells us: Never afford a target. 'Many Turks on our front had no chance all the war to fire on us, and we were never on the defensive except by accident and in error.'[2] Lawrence's strategy was the very antithesis of orthodox strategy. Here is an extract from Captain Liddell Hart's book, *The Strategy of Indirect Approach*, which makes the problem clearer. 'Whereas normal armies seek to preserve contact, the Arabs sought to avoid it. Whereas normal armies seek to destroy the opposing forces, the Arabs sought purely to destroy material—and to seek it at points where there was no force. But Lawrence's strategy went further. Instead of trying to drive the enemy away by cutting off their supplies, he aimed to keep them there by allowing short rations to reach them, so that the longer they stayed the weaker and more depressed they became. Blows might induce them to concentrate and simplify both their supply and security problems. Pin-pricks kept them spread out. Yet for all its unconventionality this strategy merely carried to its logical conclusion that of following the line of least resistance. As its author has said: The Arab army never tried to maintain or improve an advantage, but to move off and strike again somewhere else. It used the smallest force in the quickest time at the farthest place. To continue the action until the enemy had changed his dispositions to resist it, would have been to break the fundamental rule of denying him targets'.

The large number of attacking actions also ensures security

[1] Karl Marx: 'Revolutionary Spain' in the *New York Daily Tribune*, 30th October 1854.

[2] Chapter 33 of *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom.*

for the guerrillas. The biggest and best equipped of police forces would be powerless in a country where the whole population began to steal as though it had suddenly gone crazy. The fact that guerrillas are constantly adopting new methods of fighting against their enemies constitutes another kind of security. 'As the circumstances in which we worked were never twice the same, we could not employ the same methods more than once and consequently the enemy's intelligence services completely lost their heads. When battalions and divisions are all the same size, the intelligence branches work to a pattern. Our strength lay in change. . . .'[1]

Guerrilla combats can fully serve their purpose only if their plans are closely related to the general conduct of the war.[2] Their influence on normal strategy can be direct or indirect. Since the action of the Russian partisans was directly in line with the principal strategy of the Red Army, their influence on the results of battles was direct. In the Balkans, however, the partisan struggle remained outside the greater strategic movements of the war, and Tito's insurrection had only an indirect effect. Events of the Second World War proved that no resistance movement could bring about any decisive development within its own area unless its activities were co-ordinated with the larger strategic operations. Tito's final success was due to the fact that the bulk of the German army was paralysed and beaten by the Allied armies in other theatres of war, in the West in France, in the East in Russia, and in the South in Italy. However, the greater the co-ordination between the underground movements and the Allied regular forces the more important could be the results obtained.

[1] Colonel Lawrence: Chapter 33 of *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom.*

[2] Practically all the strategic principles mentioned above retain their validity in connection with social disturbances or revolutions. They must, however, be in proper relationship to the policy of the Power which is supporting the movement from outside.

Popular risings or revolutions rarely succeed without outside assistance. In such cases they can achieve victory only when important units of the regular army join the insurgents or when the whole administrative structure of the



RELATION BETWEEN REGULAR AND UNDERGROUND STRATEGY IN WORLD WAR II

With the exception of the Yugoslav revolt, all the resistance movements were in direct line with the axes of the principal moves of regular strategy

state disintegrates. The Russian revolution provides an example of such a development. Without foreign help, it dragged along for a long time until it was ripe for open

revolt; even defeat of the Tsarist armies in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 did not suffice. Yet the numerous battles lost by the Russians during the First World War proved to be important to the success of the revolution. On the other hand, guerrilla wars, by their very length, can so exhaust both sides that they finally resort to a compromise, which does not always mean the end of hostilities. The reason for this is that all resistance movements are of a predominantly political character, and the authority of the leaders is often based largely on their political influence. Consequently, their decisions may sometimes fail to coincide with the views of the guerrillas, over whom they have only limited authority.[1] In other words, a revolution is never finished, and is doomed to failure from the moment the participants cease to be revolutionaries, a development which depends rather upon the masses than upon the leaders.

Revolutions and underground movements should be initiated and directed at the beginning from outside; material aid is of great importance, but political and diplomatic support are no less necessary. In the present conditions of 'peace-time Europe', both West and East are making underground movements play a leading part on the diplomatic chessboard, and both are doing it officially 'in secret'.

But whether in peace or war, the longer a popular rising remains deprived of material, political or moral support, the more difficult its situation becomes, and the more it loses its usefulness to the strategy of actual war, or to political plans in the case of undeclared war.

Whereas in regular strategy the word objective has a clearly defined meaning, in guerrilla warfare one can hardly talk

[1] On this point the Convention of Varica, concluded at the end of 1946, is instructive. Its purpose was to put an end to civil war in Greece. But, as to-day's events are proving, the Convention was kept by neither side. Hatred figures too prominently in the People's War to be appeased by any compromise.

about strategic objectives. According to Clausewitz, strategy is 'the use of the battle for the purpose of the war'. But the characteristic mark of guerrilla fighting is harassing; and this in itself is not decisive. It can contribute to the decisions only by linking up with regular strategy. That is why guerrilla combats proper do not recognize either offensive or defensive strategic objectives. They have an offensive or defensive value only in so far as they are intended to influence the strategy of the regular army. A resistance movement, organized for the purpose of opening the doors of a country to an invading army, acts in support of an offensive strategy and consequently assumes an offensive character. On the other hand, partisan warfare waged against the rear of an occupying army is essentially of a defensive nature.

If, in the general frame of a world war, resistance movements may be strategically defensive, they should be tactically offensive. Guerrilla warfare does not act on the defensive; it is always either attacking or retreating, never at a standstill. 'Defence is death to the People's War! It would annihilate it before the beginning of the struggle.'[1] The well-known axiom that attack is the best form of defence is particularly applicable to underground tactics. Counter-attacks are seldom on a large scale, since they would only meet the concentrated forces of the regular army troops. Guerrilla combatants can rarely hope to recapture a lost position from regular units, and the attempt would probably result in their own destruction.

The advantage of guerrillas lies in their mobility. They filter like a fluid through the adversary's ranks, re-appearing in his rear to attack wherever they can find points of least resistance. They constantly threaten the communications and lines of the opposing units, and this threat is at the same time one of their best means of defence. Then again, partisans need not fear

[1] Karl Marx, 'Revolution and Counter-Revolution' in the *New York Tribune*, 16th September 1852.

attacks on their rear, and loss of ground is of no importance to them. From the strategic aspect they have nothing substantial to lose and consequently nothing to defend. In the Afghan war, the English were surprised by the facility with which the natives disappeared from the field of action, only to re-assemble elsewhere. After the fight, the Afghans often hid their arms and then welcomed the English into their villages. The French experienced similar surprises in Morocco.

The fundamental elements of strategy, time and space, are important to the conduct of guerrilla warfare. A popular rising, like any other military operation, should occur at the right place and at the right time.

From the strategic viewpoint, the time factor has a totally different value in guerrilla movements. Whereas the regular armies are in existence before the outbreak of hostilities, the guerrilla movements have to be organized mostly during the war. The political organization necessary to muster the malcontents nationally or socially entails hard work, and reaching the popular masses by propaganda is a long and arduous task. As experience of the Second World War has shown, long wars tend to foster the development of resistance movements by gradually transforming them from primitive forms of fighting to the status of semi-regular armies. This gradual development is natural. It would be difficult to compel a resistance movement to take definite shape in advance, as can be done with regular armies. Furthermore, the evolution of an underground war depends much more on special circumstances than a normal war. All one can do is to try to influence the development. But this is a delicate task, similar to that of a gardener who, slowly and carefully, seeks to change the form of a plant; there is always the risk of complete failure.

From the point of view of 'place' the more important a region is strategically, the greater, obviously, is the value of the risings which break out in it.

Highly civilized countries are much more sensitive to the effects of underground attack than primitive communities. At the same time, such regions are more easily organized for defence, as we shall explain at a later stage. In guerrilla warfare, the strategic importance of a region is determined principally by the operations of the regular armies and its economic and industrial value to the enemy. In these days when everything is tied to the war machine, all regions, considered in terms of purely military economics, have their value. Any resistance movement creates a festering sore in the back areas and draws away troops from the front. In our time of unlimited warfare, a belligerent power may even start a revolution in a neutral country merely to deprive the enemy of important economic aid, and in certain circumstances this can be more profitable than bringing the neutral country into the war.

Of course, the creating of popular revolt is easier in primitive countries than in thickly inhabited regions, a factor directly opposed to the strategic utility of underground movements, whose main objectives are in populous areas. These not only contain important economic centres; they are also the principal centres of communications and therefore constitute important objectives for classic strategy. However, what the guerrillas cannot achieve alone against the industrial centres by sabotage, they can very often bring off in their neighbourhood by staging continuous attacks on the lines of communications. It is possible, of course, that important supply lines of the regular army may run through completely primitive countries.

To these considerations should be added another, equally important. In a world conflict, it is possible to start several popular risings in widely separated areas, synchronizing them in time and space both with each other and with the strategic operations of the regular armies. In this way there will be created similar reciprocal effects to those between the separate

battles of a regular campaign. While one guerrilla war is paralysing petroleum production, another can sabotage coal-mines and steel works somewhere else, and a third can attack and stop the traffic on a main supply line to the army at the front.

In popular warfare, a region is strategically won over when its inhabitants are prepared to fight for the political idea of the resistance movement. Considered in this sense, the notion of space has quite a different meaning in clandestine warfare from that which it has in classic strategy. A guerrilla movement does not conquer terrain by a large-scale, well-organized and co-ordinated manœuvre. Its objective may be anything but that of normal territorial acquisition. Only rarely can conquered regions be guarded militarily and scarcely ever can they be defended by force of arms against a regular army. But new regions can be won over by propaganda and held by underground political organizations.

From what we have said above, it is obvious that strategic movements in guerrilla warfare are very different from those of normal war. Resistance movements are restricted to the area of their origin, to which they are bound by their cut-and-run tactics of ambushes and sudden blows. Their operations in other parts are generally in the nature of raids. The farther they range from their district the more likely they are to lose their advantages of knowing the localities, the ground, the inhabitants and their manners, customs, dialects, linguistic peculiarities, etc. They would find it very difficult to effect any large-scale movements as regards extension, force and strategic objectives, because of their need always to operate secretly and to maintain their characteristic of surprise. Besides, the success of large operations calls for exact co-operation in time and space and a strictly centralized command. Neither of these conditions is likely to be found in resistance movements, which are by nature illegal.

These remarks apply particularly to the conditions found in European countries, but the experience of Russian and Yugoslavia are no exception. Although guerrilla warfare in the Balkan mountains is greatly favoured by the nature of the ground, the initial character of Tito's resistance movement was strictly local. There, at the beginning, purely local resistance organizations were set up called 'Odreds', which were a kind of regional unit. It was only later that the Yugoslavian army of liberation was formed. In his book on the Yugoslavian movement, Basil Davidson writes:

'The normal course of resistance had been for a small group of men to form an Odred in some fairly small area of mountain or forest; this Odred would be named after the largest mountain or the thickest forest or the most important town in the neighbourhood; and its activities were specifically local. Only superior enemy force would drive it out of its own particular area of operations, and once it was driven out it must try to get back again as soon as possible. This ensured the essentially popular character of resistance. Men began by defending their homes and localities. Hundreds of these Odreds came into existence during late 1941 and 1942; and right up until the end of the war they were regarded as a main source of recruits for the mobile formations.'[1]

In this way the acquisition of fresh territories certainly increases the number of guerrilla fighters. Admittedly, the regular troops possess material superiority and better organization but taking into consideration the sympathies of the great mass of the people, the guerrillas are generally superior in manpower. In this connection, it is interesting to look at the situation of the German troops in Europe in the spring of 1944 by comparing the two following tables.

[1] Basil Davidson: *Partisan Picture*, p. 99. Bedford Books Ltd., Bedford.

I. NUMBERS OF GERMAN TROOPS IN COMPARISON WITH THE POPULATIONS OF VARIOUS OCCUPIED COUNTRIES

Country	*Number of occupation troops, police, auxiliary forces, etc.*	*Population in millions*	*Number of inhabitants per German*
France	500,000	40	80
Belgium	100,000	8	80
Holland	100,000	8·5	85
Denmark	40,000	3·6	90
Norway	150,000	2·8	18
Balkan countries	200,000	21	102

II. NUMBERS OF GERMAN TROOPS AS COMPARED WITH SURFACE AREAS OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES OCCUPIED

Country	*Number of occupation troops, services, auxiliaries, etc.*	*Surfaces of the country in sq. km.*	*Number of Germans per sq. km.*
France	500,000	550,986	0·9
Belgium	100,000	30,440	3·2
Holland	100,000	34,181	2·8
Denmark	150,000	22,681	6·0
Norway			
Balkan countries	200,000	403,865	0·5

These two tables show how difficult it is to cover wide areas. It should be remarked that entire regions had no occupation troops, for only the most important areas could be controlled. The farther away the Germans were from home, the longer their lines of communication, the more troops had to be detached to guard the countries behind their front lines. Hitler's armoured legions, which were able at first to surround the enemy forces, were themselves ultimately surrounded by wholly hostile populations.

To be fully effective, guerrilla movements require plenty of elbow-room. The vaster the insurgents' territory and the

smaller the number of enemy security troops, the better the conditions. Normally, certain regions, particularly those of strategic importance, tend to retain large numbers of ordinary troops and security services. Their activities, however, are much more dispersed in large territories and this provides the guerrillas with the free space they require. It is also the reason why the organization and conduct of a revolt are much easier in larger surroundings. The wider the field of action of a resistance movement, the more powerful can become the guerrilla units operating in it. Of course the general geographical structure plays an important part, and that is a feature which we shall consider further in due course.

Events may develop so that a clandestine movement obtains such complete control of entire regions that the struggle can be transformed into open warfare. If so, semi-regular troops may be formed out of former guerrilla bands. In this connection, the development of the Yugoslavia resistance movement is interesting. Turning again to Basil Davidson's book we find: 'It was clear however that no nation-wide movement of resistance could be built up from an infinity of local groups who were tied to their own backyards. Alongside these Odreds, therefore, the partisan leaders formed mobile brigades, which later became divisions and corps (always on a miniature scale when compared with regular troops to allow of high tactical mobility and ease of command). It then became the practice to recruit from local Odreds, in areas through which the divisions passed, all the younger volunteers, leaving the seasoned men to carry on the work of local organization, recruitment and resistance. In this way they could ensure a regular flow of the right type of young men and women into military formations that were tied to no particular part of the country, and one of whose special aims was to break down the narrow provincial loyalties which are so strong in backward countries.'

Admittedly, this was made much easier by the extremely

difficult mountainous country and the lack of roads, which seriously hampered the German counter-measures. Furthermore, Marshal Tito was favoured by another event: the fall of Italy. Large numbers of occupation troops in the Balkan peninsular consisted of Italian units, which simply abandoned their garrisons after the capitulation. A considerable quantity of modern materials and supplies fell into the hands of the guerrillas, thus enabling them to equip whole divisions and army corps.[1] So strengthened, the army could undertake operations involving more regular methods of warfare, although it was, of course, handicapped by the lack of motorized units and air forces. However, this example shows how strategic movements are nearly always reduced to a minimum in guerrilla warfare, even when the guerrilla bands can operate in a certain strength. Partisan movements are generally restricted to the marching pace of the infantryman, and cannot keep up either in time or space, with motorized units.

The task of the reserves, whether strategic or tactical, presents a double character in normal warfare. They serve first to redress dangerous situations and secondly to deepen and widen successes already obtained. But what is the problem facing the reserves in guerrilla warfare? They do not exist in the same form as in classic strategy. In underground warfare, it would be illogical to try to remedy a dangerous situation by throwing in large effectives. This, in fact, might involve the guerrillas in the kind of regular battle which is contrary to their fundamental principles. In dangerous situations, efforts should be made to relieve hard pressed guerrillas not by committing strategic reserves but by means of a num-

[1] In 1943 there were altogether 17 Italian divisions as occupation troops in the Balkan peninsula. Ten of these divisions were disarmed by the partisans. In Montenegro the Venezia Division, headed by its commander, General Oxilia, went over to the guerrillas. With the surrendered material Tito was able to equip a large part of his army, which grew to 250,000 men.

ber of violent diverting actions. Wherever possible, these diversions should take place in quite different zones of the insurrection area, and should be directed against targets so important that the enemy is compelled to take account of them. Sometimes, however, the guerrillas may first attack objectives of secondary importance, in order to distract the enemy's attention and draw off his forces into a different region. Once this has been achieved, the action against the principal target can be undertaken. Instead of sending reinforcements to a sector where the situation is threatening, the enemy is forced to split his forces by despatching some of them into another region. To manœuvre on these lines, a well-directed resistance movement should be constantly planning diversion raids; the schemes, material and men must all be prepared in advance. The problem of enlarging or consolidating a success is quite different. Here, reserves can be thrown in as in normal warfare, though the guerrillas should never, of course, abandon their own peculiar methods of fighting.

The foregoing considerations are always subject to higher underground strategy. They lose much of their value if applied to the isolated combats of small-scale warfare.

An exceptional method of creating reserves in the People's War consists of forming, in the same region, a number of strictly isolated secret movements. In this way, first one organization and then another can be engaged in the struggle, according to the overall situation, while a certain force is kept in reserve. The French underground movements were organized in this way. One part worked in conjunction with the Anglo-American General Staff, the other was directed by General de Gaulle.[1] Again, whereas some movements were

[1] The first-mentioned was called Buckmaster, after its chief; and the second was under the orders of Colonel Passy and was controlled by B.C.R.A. (Central Office of Information and Action.)

active during the occupation, others took up arms only at the time of the invasion. Such a division of forces has its advantages; for instance for security reasons. If the enemy intelligence discovers one of the secret groups, continuity of the insurrection can still be ensured, even in the event of heavy losses from fighting or betrayal. It goes without saying that very complicated staff work is required to control such a widespread resistance movement, especially as it has to be carried out in a foreign country. For instance, it is almost impossible to seal off the various movements within the same insurrection areas without awkward situations arising. Nevertheless, such a method has its advantages. The splitting-up into parts is mostly done according to the political convictions and allegiances of the partisans. Consequently, it is possible to arrange in advance that the main support of the insurrection is given to the particular group which has either proved itself most reliable in the fighting or else represents most fully the political guarantee sought in the peace. By comparing the foregoing with our previous considerations, we can form a fairly accurate conception of the tactical and strategic reserves of guerrilla warfare. The one ensures continuity in the actual fighting while the other keeps the movement going as a whole.

In our comparison of the strategies of normal and underground warfare, we now come to the last problem, that of bases. Guerrilla warfare has no back areas and consequently no bases: resistance movements are almost independent of terrain and lines of communication. At the most there exist only small tactical bases in the insurgent countries. As regards provisioning, the guerrillas live principally on the country itself. Their requirements in ammunition are small, for their tactics demand short, sharp attacks rather than long battles. At most it might be said that the strategic bases of guerrilla movement are represented by the airfields from which their supplies are despatched. Then, of course, the flying

distance plays a certain part. The greater the distance, the greater the danger to the supporting planes of enemy interception. This distance moreover has a bearing upon the co-operation between the guerrillas and the supplying air force; and on this co-operation depends largely the whole effectiveness of the underground war.

To return to the subject of guerrilla fighting, the principles we have set forth can only apply to underground warfare itself. Logically, a guerrilla movement which increases in both numbers and territory will lose its initial character. Its methods will become increasingly those of normal warfare. Moreover the foregoing principles do not apply only to guerrilla war, which is only one form of resistance. They are also valid for sabotage or strikes. To be thoroughly effective, these should also be dispersed in time and space, and carried out on a large scale. Important acts of sabotage are like concentrated attacks and numerous small acts of sabotage are equivalent to the effect of one large one. The greater the field of action of a secret movement, the greater the possibilities of sabotage and the more difficult for the enemy to prevent it.

In guerrilla fighting losses in killed amongst the combatants are astonishingly small. This is due to their mobility and their tactics of surprise attacks and escape from the enemy. Whereas the regular war machine, with its long columns of troops, huge auxiliary services and industrial and economic organizations, presents easy targets on all sides, the guerrillas offer only elusive ones. Regular troops therefore try to stamp out risings by terror and losses in human life and property from reprisals are high. Guerrilla warfare has so far proved to be the cruellest method of waging war. Partisans who have no back country and must live a lawless life can rarely take prisoners. It even happens fairly often that partisans kill their own wounded, so as to avoid any possibility of betrayal. Nobody can alter this state of affairs, not even the International Red Cross. If the regular troops looked

upon the guerrilla prisoners as ordinary prisoners of war, what would the partisans do with their prisoners? It is, unfortunately, an insoluble problem.

We append a few examples to illustrate this point. In the summer of 1942 the Yugoslav partisans captured several towns. In these operations they sustained the following losses:[1]

Scene of combat	*Partisan Losess*		*Enemy prisoners taken*
	Killed	*Wounded*	
Priyedor	20	50	1,500
Krupa	1	2	40
Kozarats	0	0	250
Klyutch	14	25	250
Dobrlyin	0	2	350
Glamotch	3	8	0
Mrkonyitch Grad	0	0	250
Sanitsa	1	5	300

RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN FRANCE
ARRESTS MADE BY GERMANS IN 1944[2]

Reason	*By German police*	*By French police*
Participation in movement	3,444	121
Communist activities	1,035	477
Acts against the Third Reich	1,664	246
	6,143	844

The whole of these losses spread over a population of forty millions may appear trivial, and it must be remembered that in March 1944 the French resistance movement was very active. On the other hand, losses due to reprisals in other countries were considerable. For example, according to statements dated 20th August 1945 made by Mitar Bakitch,

[1] According to Basil Davidson's book, *Partisan Picture.*

[2] *Le Parisien* of 10th January 1948.

Chief of Cabinet of the Residence of the Yugoslav Government, Yugoslavia's losses in human lives amounted to 1,685,000, of which 75 per cent died in concentration camps. The disabled number 425,000; and two-thirds of the country's dwellings were destroyed.

So far we have dealt only with the general strategic rules of resistance movements but now we shall consider other equally important features of the subject and particularly these problems:

1. Preliminary political and ideological conditions of secret warfare.

2. Influence of the traditions and temperament of the people.

3. Geographical elements in resistance movements.

A guerrilla war must be able to lean closely upon the people and be nourished by them. But to that end the people must first be imbued with a political ideal. Of course, every war is fought on the basis of a political ideal, but in the People's War the ideological foundation should grow into genuine fanaticism, into a sort of political religion. In normal warfare a government calls for general mobilization and, if necessary, invokes laws which oblige the citizens to do their duty. In People's Wars, the contrary is the case. There, it is the people who demand war and force the government into action; the people may even rise and form a new government. It therefore happens that in a normal war the only political aspect is the end sought; politics do not enter into the technical methods employed by the armies strategically. On the other hand, in a People's War, not only the object in view, but also the methods and the secret organizations are essentially political. That is why, in the Second World War, political commissars figured in all the resistance movements.

Whatever may be the political motive of a popular rising, it should appeal to the widest strata of the population and not only to certain castes. Since a guerrilla war is generally

declared not by a government but by the people, and the guerrilla armies are usually recruited at the beginning from volunteers, or, to be more precise, from 'political fighters'. These, however, are not the kind to accept and submit to the military discipline and hierarchy of a regular army; as volunteers, they consider themselves superior from the point of view of morale. This does not mean that regular armies lack morale, but that guerrilla armies keep theirs at a very high level. Fanaticized by their political ideal, partisans are born fighters with a highly developed combative temperament. A partisan or saboteur is very often regarded by a regular soldier, as well as by a part of the civilian population, as a criminal under Common Law. He is not, in fact, protected by law, and whereas the ordinary soldier feels that he has legal backing, the partisan, living a life of secrecy and conspiracy, tends to suffer from an illegality complex.

At the same time, the regular soldier feels less obliged to make the fullest use of his senses, his intelligence and his skill; whilst the employment of these qualities is a primary condition of success for the partisan. The partisan trusts to his own judgment in time of danger; the regular relies on his officers. Consequently, from the individual angle, the regular troops are inferior to their partisan opponents.

In this age of total warfare, the whole nation is engaged in the struggle. In underground warfare, however, the population is even more intimately concerned. Each man fights in his own particular manner, some with weapons, others by passing on false information to the enemy, others by sheltering members of the resistance movement and using their dwellings to hide arms and stores, while many can help solely by withholding their knowledge from the enemy. By these means the whole nation takes part; men and women, old people, even children. That is why the underground organizations are of such diverse composition and character.

As long as a popular war is waged by partisans of a single

political mould, the conduct of operations is relatively simple. The situation is more difficult when a common front is formed from several political movements of different shades. Subordination to a single command is less easy to obtain, for the interests of the numerous components are often divergent. There is agreement on one point only; the struggle against the enemy. Consequently the alliance is only transitory, and there is a great deal of jealousy and mistrust. However, in order to create something in the nature of a unified military command, various liaison committees are set up to co-ordinate the various parties. In many resistance movements, in fact, the various groups possess their own organization and even their own private guerrilla bands and it is useless to talk of absolute subordination to a single command. The decisions taken by mixed political committees too often bear the mark of unhealthy compromise. A fairly substantial co-ordinating influence can, however, be exercised by foreign military missions, acting as advisers to the resistance movement outside the arena of internal politics. We shall discuss their important function later. But, from what has been said, it will be clear that it is more difficult to control a resistance movement than to conduct a tank battle.

Leadership in a People's War calls for broad views, psychological instinct, tact and, above all, political skill. For this reason very few regular officers were successful in the various resistance movements of the Second World War. Their whole education and completely different conception of war were against them. They sought to apply orthodox methods to irregular situations and were never capable of fully understanding the numerous intrigues caused by the predominantly political background. Moreover, the leaders who had risen from the ranks and commanded the partisan movements often saw dangerous competitors in these officers and, from sheer distrust and jealousy, sought to counteract their influence. At the same time, nothing is more disastrous than



GENERAL STRUCTURE of the RESISTANCE from April 1944

THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICS ON THE ORGANIZATION OF UNDERGROUND MOVEMENTS

This diagram clearly shows how the different groups of the French resistance sought to avoid centralized control. Many of them were in only indirect contact with Headquarters staff

to seek to organize resistance movements in a regular military form, for they thereby lose those very qualities which, despite certain drawbacks, constitute their main strength. We must take the guerrilla movements as they are, with all their advantages and disadvantages, and extract from them, from a military point of view, all the help they can give.

A few instances taken from the Second World War serve to illustrate the foregoing. Internal political differences brought about strife between Tito's partisans and the Chetniks of Mikhaelovitch, as well as between the three groups of the Greek guerrilla movements: E.L.A.S., E.A.M. and E.D.E.S. Marshal Tito's movement was more political than military in character, and it was directed by the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberators (A.V.N.O.J.), comprising Communists and twelve representatives of other parties. The Slovakian insurgent movement was directed by the 'National Council of Slovakia' which actually held sway not only in political but also in military matters. The situation was even more striking in France, where all the threads of political and military control were held by the 'National Council of Resistance' in which the parties lived in a kind of internal political armistice rather than an atmosphere of peace. In spite of the numerous official and semi-official announcements, relations were always strained between the different organizations F.T.P., O.R.A., F.F.C., and others.[1]

The traditions and character of a population are important features in a people's war. As each army creates its strategy and tactics according to the national character, so each underground movement has its own characteristics. Not every nation is adaptable to underground war. For instance, the German's inborn sense of discipline and respect for constituted authority are serious handicaps. In general, Germans are not natural conspirators and it is interest-

[1] F.T.P.—Francs Tireurs and Partisans; O.R.A.—Army Resistance Organization; F.F.C.—Fighting French Forces.

ing that many German 'Werewolves' would fight only in uniform. This is probably the reason why, despite all the blunders committed by the Allies in their occupation policy, no extensive resistance movement has emerged. It is probably for similar reasons that the English were never skilled guerrilla fighters. But with the more individualistic and passionate Latin nations, such as Italians, Spanish and French, it is a different matter. With the Slav peoples, it is their native treacherous cunning and taste for intrigue and conspiracy that make them good organizers of underground movements. And nations that, in the course of their history, have suffered many trials and hardships are more warlike than others. The inhabitants of the steppes or mountainous countries are more accustomed to war than the people of the more civilized plains. Poor countries have less to lose than those where life is comfortable; and this factor can apply to internal conditions within a single nation. The privileged and propertied classes shun grave decisions more readily than the less favoured classes. Highly civilized peoples accommodate themselves only with difficulty to the deprivations and sufferings to which they are exposed in People's Wars. In resistance movements, town-dwellers behave differently from country-folk. One can go so far as to say that the profession or occupation of the individual has a deciding influence on the part he will play in the movement. The reaction of a business man is quite different from that of a workman or peasant.

The more civilized a nation becomes, the more it loses its natural warlike instincts. It would be true to say also that the more a nation is civilized, the more it inclines to the clandestine methods of secret warfare than to the open kind. That is why the resistance struggle in western European countries took the form of sabotage, spying and propaganda. From the human point of view it is easily understandable. It is less risky to be a wastrel than a real thief, as it is safer to be a

thief than a murderer. Of course, these are only general reflections and there are no rules without exceptions.

The Russian partisans did not acquire their traditions solely from the guerrilla struggles of the Russian revolution. More than a hundred years ago, the Russian peasant proved himself an excellent guerrilla fighter. 'It is the Russian peasant', wrote Tardié, 'who destroyed the magnificent cavalry of Murat. They killed the horses by setting fire to the hay and oats when the men came to requisition fodder.' His life in the forests and swamps, his frugal habits, his faculty for easy and practical improvisation, and his native wiliness, made him a remarkable partisan. In Yugoslavia, as well, guerrilla warfare has deep roots. The traditions of the Junaks, or warrior bands, go back to the secular struggles of the Serb and Croats against Turkish rule. The combats of the Serb, Bulgarians, Albanians, Greek and Macedonian Comitadjis against their Turkish masters were all fought out on the lines of guerrilla warfare, against the background of a relentlessly cruel hatred of the oppressor shared by the greater part of the population. Later, during the First World War, these same warrior breeds constituted a constant danger to the Austro-Hungarian occupation troops. However, the farther we turn to the West, the more cunning becomes the waging of clandestine war and the less do we find force operating in the open. It was only in 1942, in the mountainous regions of France, that the first 'Maquis' was developed; there, for the first time, open fighting took place, and then mostly for defensive purposes only. Throughout the greater part of France the guerrilla combats began only after the invasion when the Maquis could count upon receiving immediate help from the regular Anglo-American armies.

Here again, special mention should be made of the exceptionally favourable situation of the Communist parties in underground movements and in guerrilla wars. The Communist ideology undoubtedly exercises a very great attrac-

tion among the 'have-nots', who precisely because they possess nothing, are the best fighters. 'It is the one who shows the most endurance amongst the mass of the people who wins the war . . . in that respect we are superior, for we have larger resources and we shall continue to draw upon our workmen and hardworking peasants, upon those who constitute the great mass of the population. We can draw upon this vast reservoir because it supplies the most trustworthy leaders, who are in closest touch with the workers and peasants in the building up of Socialism. Our enemies have nothing which even remotely resembles this reservoir.'[1]

The Communists possess very useful experience of illegal organizations and their party, divided into small cells, is especially suitable for the development of clandestine movements. We have already mentioned that its traditions go back to the time of the Marxist pioneers. The adversaries of Marxism are at a disadvantage when it comes to a People's War for their ideologies have not the same attraction to the popular masses as Communism, which has become almost a religion. Although the resistance to Marxism is progressing generally in the satellite countries of Russia, it has not yet got anything like the same deep roots. The agrarian parties of Poland, Hungary, and Roumania lean mostly on the owner-peasants and not at all on the outcasts of fortune who, if they are not Communists, are for the most part indifferent and in no way fanatical. There is, however, one important circumstance which should be noted: the love of the peasant for his fields and cattle, that spirit of husbandry which characterizes all the peasants of the world. An army which lives on the country like the Soviet army, is forced to resort to requisitioning. But woe to him who takes a peasant's cow! Any army's requisitioning may be the cause of a general rebellion in the ranks of the peasant classes.

Another reason for the strong position of the Communists

[1] Lenin: *The People's War.*

is that, after dissolving the Comintern in 1941, they again organized a central administration, the Cominform, to plan the co-ordination of all subversive activities. 'The Communist Information Bureau in Belgrade will co-ordinate the common struggle of all the Socialist movements in Europe . . . the working classes of all nations will render the necessary assistance.'[1]

The political bases of a People's War are seen more clearly in the following sentence of Lenin:

'The problem of partisan operations has a very great importance for our party and for the struggle of the working class. . . . What are the circumstances which a Marxist should take into consideration when analysing this problem? Above all it should be clearly understood that Marxism differs from all other types of primitive Socialism to the extent that it does not limit itself to any particular kind of fighting. Marxism is prepared to adopt any form of strife provided the means achieve the end. In fact its policy is to seek to make all methods universal by organizing them in such a way that the tactics of all the revolutionary classes will be built upon them as they develop. All abstract forms and pedantic theories are extraneous to Marxism. It devotes its attention principally to the struggle of the masses which, according to the development and growth of working-class consciousness, simultaneously with political and economic crises, constantly engenders new methods of attack and defence. In this manner Marxism recognizes all forms of war as long as they achieve their

[1] On 19th April 1948, Mr. Hector McNeil made a statement in the House of Commons in which he said of Protocol M that at first it was thought to be authentic but when the German (not employed by the British) who compiled the document was found, his statement was not convincing. Though there was no doubt that Protocol M was compiled from authoritative Communist sources, the authenticity of the document must still lie in doubt.

purpose and it changes its fighting methods whenever changes in the politico-social structure demand it. In this sense Marxism seeks to profit, so to say, by the experience of the masses themselves and does not pretend to lay down for them rules of combat.'[1]

These words explain many apparent enigmas of the Communist movement, such as the policy of the popular fronts before the Second World War, the sudden volte-face of the Third International after the Stalin-Ribbentrop pact of 1939, the Chauvinistic and pan-Slavistic tendencies after the end of the war, the present policy against the Marshall Plan, and the change-over from the national platform to that of international class-war. Lenin's quotations do not only determine the principal lines of Communist policy; they also apply to small tactics. We have seen that a clandestine movement cannot be forced into any predetermined form, but that its development can be influenced to a certain extent by the use of propaganda and subsidies. Lenin's words mean, therefore, that the communist parties may regulate and adapt their tactics according to the feelings of the masses, but they never lose sight of their main objective of World Revolution.

The subject of geographical structure, the nature of the terrain, is important in any kind of military operation—it certainly is in the case of Resistance Movements.

Partly for psychological, partly for military reasons, it is in mountain country that guerrillas can most favourably operate and develop their People's War. The guerrillas feel instinctively that they are safer in the mountains than in flat country which can be easily patrolled. Regular troops are at a disadvantage in the mountains and are constantly exposed

[1] 'Partisan Warfare', article in *Proletarier*, 13th December 1906. It would appear, however, that the Communist movement has relinquished these principles to the extent that during recent years they have sought to create social unrest by artificial means, in order to profit by it politically both at home and abroad.

to the danger of ambush or surprise attack at the hands of enemies whose expert knowledge of the terrain stands them in good stead. Broken ground also makes co-ordination of movement difficult for regular troops, and forces them to operate in small detachments. They lose their advantages of material and numerical superiority, and run the risk of seeing their small detachments destroyed piecemeal by the guerrillas. Large bodies of troops are generally tied down to roads and valleys, where they can drive off the guerrillas but not destroy them. In mountain warfare heavy weapons cannot keep up with the troops; and artillery shelling and air bombardments are in any case considerably less effective. To sum up, the more broken and wild a mountainous region is, the less do the advantages of regular troops outweigh the shortcomings of the guerrillas. Although both may be fighting with the same kinds of weapons and using the same methods, the guerrillas have their superior knowledge of the country and the help of the population. Either by instinct or by reasoning, resistance movements make use, whenever possible, of the advantages afforded by the broken nature of mountain ranges.

It is a different matter in flat country where the regular troops enjoy distinct advantages. Their motorized units can exercise a strict control over the country, their armament is much more effective and aircraft can more easily reconnoitre and spot small troop movements. Resistance movements tend to resort to clandestine methods in direct contrast to the methods most in favour in the mountains. Such statements should not, however, be accepted at their face value. They certainly apply to countries of western Europe, but not to the steppes of Russia or Poland, or to certain regions of Asia or Africa. In those flat countries, where vast forests and extensive swamps exist, the conditions for popular warfare are similar in some respects to those existing in mountainous districts. It is worth mentioning that a popular rising in the



INFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHY ON RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

In the Second World War guerrilla movements mainly developed in mountains or steppes, while in the plains of civilized countries the sabotage activities were more important than the open fighting

open is also possible where the enemy is already demoralized, as with the Germans during the battles against the Anglo-American invasion armies in France, Belgium and Holland.

But all this does not mean that active resistance should be restricted only to regions which are geographically favourable. On the contrary, every effort should be made to de-

velop secret warfare in all directions and with equal intensity. Only the ways and means should differ. As an illustration we can take the medieval castles. They were bases for the guerrillas who made raids down into the plains and then withdrew rapidly into the mountain fastnesses. To conform to a strategic plan these tactics, carried out by guerrillas from the hills, can be combined with the static resistance of the insurgents in the plains below. Saboteurs, informers, propagandists and mountain guerrillas work hand in hand and support each other. And a daring raid can often set off the general insurrection which has been smouldering for a long time.

In wars of the past, the centres of Yugoslav movements were principally in the high mountains of the Balkan peninsula, and round their perimeters numerous local Odreds spread the power of the partisans far afield, down to the plains of the Danube and the shores of the Adriatic. It is not, incidentally, by pure chance that the vast flat expanses of France were dominated from the Alps, the Pyrenees, the Massif Central and the Jura.

The question of localities merits special study; particularly the part played by large towns in resistance movements. From the point of view of secret warfare, the characteristics of towns place them halfway between mountainous regions and flat countries. The labyrinths of great cities offer first-class hiding places from enemy security services. Usually the centre of various public and private administrations, they are besides the site of important industries and the nodal junctions of main lines of communication. For these reasons they are always the central points of sabotage, espionage and propaganda. It is another and more difficult matter to assess their value from the viewpoint of open warfare. Although isolated agents can easily remain hidden in large towns, it is doubtful whether this is possible for bands of any size. Open fighting, especially when followed by reprisals, can involve the population in enormous losses in human lives and



The influence of the geographical structure of France on underground activities during World War II

property, and the successes obtained in street fighting may not by any means justify the sacrifices made. In the mountains, guerrillas find cover among the scrub and rocks; but in towns they hide amongst the inhabitants, who may become the victims of retaliatory action. In actual fact, only large cities really lend themselves to underground activities and, moreover, the larger they are, the better the conditions for secret movements. Small provincial towns, where the inhabitants know each other and any unusual activity is easily

observed, are not at all suitable for extensive conspiracies.

The Second World War provides several examples of popular risings in large cities, in Paris, Warsaw and Prague. It is interesting to note that these revolts had many points in common. From the military standpoint, disregarding all political, patriotic, psychological or other sentiments, the risings in Paris and Prague had no strategic importance. During the street fighting in Paris (18th to 25th August 1944) the Battle of France had been decided by the breakthrough at Avranches, and the losses suffered in the revolt, about 9,000 killed and wounded, were really unnecessary. The same thing happened at Prague on 5th May 1945, when the war was practically over and the Russian troops were only a few miles away. Everything goes to prove that the military value of underground movements lies in the assistance they can give before the final strategic decision has been obtained on the principal field of battle. Its initial importance slowly diminishes, and it can even become an embarrassment in the general strategic and political conduct of a war.

In Paris as well as in Prague, the German troops, with the exception of the S.S. formations, kept on the defensive. In Paris, they showed no desire to fight but remained inside their barracks awaiting the arrival of the regular Allied troops. In Prague, the panic-stricken Germans tried hard to reach the American lines to escape the danger of internment in Russian concentration camps. In both cities, the garrison commanders had concluded an armistice with the insurgents. Complications arose later because these contracts were not recognized by the S.S. troops and because other units, retreating through the city, were totally unaware of the armistice. The German troops did not trust the irregular insurgent bands and merely defended themselves until they could surrender to a regular army. The street fighting in Paris and Marseilles would have developed more dramatically if the German troops had really offered determined resistance. For

in Paris the German garrison amounted to 17,000 men and 150 armoured vehicles and in Marseilles it was about 15,000 men. The Germans could have shaped events quite differently. When passion runs less high than at present, it is to be hoped that the humane action of the German general in command, von Choltitz, in refusing to defend Paris in spite of Hitler's express command to do so, will meet with its proper recognition.

In Warsaw, the popular revolt of September 1944 had results of a much more tragic nature. There the Red Army could not, or did not wish to, arrive in time to help the insurgents. The result was that they lost about 200,000 victims. As is always the case, the movements in Paris, Prague and Warsaw were more of a political than a military nature. They were intended to be worked up by Communist propaganda into symbols, for political purposes. The Communists in Paris therefore sought to carry on the fight in spite of the armistice. They were less concerned with the immediate purpose of the battle than with the long-term political influence of the party in liberated France. The fights at the barricades, which lasted only five days in Prague, appeared in Communist propaganda as a national revolution, and even to-day they are still the boast of the Communist government. In Paris, however, it seems that any ideas of this nature came to naught. Matters were different in Warsaw where a political advantage was sought by the Polish government in London, whose representative, General Bor Komarovski, was at the head of the insurrection. All these happenings are attributable to the political character predominant in resistance movements, with which we dealt elsewhere. The political colour of a great capital certainly exercises an important influence on the development of a country as a whole.

As we have shown, the conduct of secret warfare calls for special strategy with a totally different set of rules from those of normal warfare. Some of these have been recapitulated by Lenin as follows:

1. Never trifle with a popular rising. Once the fight is on, it should be conducted consistently and to the bitter end.

2. Always spring surprise attacks, particularly when the enemy's forces are dispersed.

3. Constant striving towards the goal, even by means of small successes won day by day at all costs, is an indispensable condition of final achievement. Only by these means is moral superiority acquired. 'Audacity, more audacity and always audacity,' said Danton, the greatest leader of the French Revolution.[1]

History shows that peoples' wars have won great successes against many an adversary. Final victory, however, has depended on a favourable combination of the nature of the ground and exceptionally advantageous strategic and political conditions.

We can summarize the conditions necessary to ensure the success of a popular war under the following headings:

(1) The movement must spring from a wide cross-section of the population.

(2) The guerrillas must fight on their own ground.

(3) The war itself, by which is meant the conflict between the warring nations, must last long enough to allow the underground movement to achieve full development.

(4) The guerrillas must have plenty of space in which to operate.

(5) The character of the people, especially in tenacity and agressiveness, must be such as to allow them to fight this type of war.

(6) The nature of the ground should be suitable.

(7) The resistance movement should be either supported by a regular army, with which it should co-operate, or receive political and other assistance from a foreign power.

Whatever form a future war may take, secret warfare is unlikely to be abolished from motives of principle. In these

[1] *Advice to Insurgents;* by Lenin, 21 October 1917.

first two chapters we have given sufficient evidence to prove that it will in fact retain and increase its importance. No General Staff can afford to ignore it. In the total war of the twentieth century, all ways and means will be adopted, combining the most modern techniques with the most primitive methods. Every state must take into account the possibilities of underground movements. They facilitate victory for the regular army in offensive operations, and constitute a vital part of defensive strategy in case of invasion.

CHAPTER III

Technique of Underground War

A Power which bases its foreign policy on Communism can easily solve the problems of underground movements. In almost every state the Cominform controls extensive Communist organizations, and in many countries it exercises a powerful influence over trade union movements. In democratic states, where free expression of opinion is allowed, Communism can develop the greater part of its propaganda in the open. Parliamentary institutions and practices, and a right to strike guaranteed by law, provide additional means of effective action.[1] In many states, highly placed officials are inscribed members of the party. They are subject to strict discipline, and the obedience to party cannot always be reconciled to orders or their duty to the government or the national interest; they are in fact often placed in the position of representing primarily the interests of the movement.

All rights and privileges are used by the Communists to further their own advantage, and to exploit to the full the weaknesses of democratic institutions and the breaches democratic liberties tend to create. In the satellite countries of the

[1] '. . . to use the parliamentary platform for the purpose of acquainting the masses with the paradise that would be theirs under Communist rule and thus alienate them from the other parties, irrespective of whether the Communist proposals can or cannot be carried out in reality. . . .' Josef Stalin: *Problems of Leninism.* Edition Moscow 1947.

Soviet Union however, use of any similar rights is made very difficult for the opposition parties.[1] This fact is proved by conditions after the Second World War in Yugoslavia, Roumania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the lawful activities of the Communists are only the visible part of the movement. For there exists also, admittedly on a much smaller scale, a widespread and well-planned underground organization which functions admirably. 'For tactical reasons it is necessary that comrades holding official positions should not be in the forefront of future strikes,' states a paragraph of the celebrated Protocol. The two organizations, secret and public, are independent of each other but are kept sufficiently in touch to make co-operation easy. Consequently, Communists are able to slip into secret illegality whenever necessary without losing contact with the working masses. And, whereas in every country the visible activities of the party remain strictly national, the secret organization, despite the dissolution of the Comintern in 1941, has retained its completely international character. It is these secret organizations which co-ordinate, in time and space, Communist strategy throughout the world. Thus, whilst the French and German Communists are quarrelling

[1] In this connection an interesting example is the financing of the strike in France in the autumn of 1948. In several countries, especially in the satellite states of the Soviet Union, the Communists organized public collections in order to help the French miners. The proceeds were mostly transmitted through the diplomatic agencies of the Communist countries. For instance, Czechoslovakia handed 250 million francs to the French Trade Unions which represents practically the entire weekly income of the Czechoslovakian miners. This was obviously a case of official subsidy by the Cominform and not an amount collected by public subscription. In Paris the 'Banque Commerciale pour l'Europe du Nord' was established, 90 per cent of the shares being in the hands of eastern European Governments. This Bank finances the Communist Press which is often in difficulties.

fiercely over their national interests in the Ruhr and Saar disputes, the secret organizations maintain the most cordial relations between them through the Cominform. Moscow was compelled to establish the Cominform as an instrument of co-ordination, for in the years 1945–7 differences of opinion between individual Communist parties had become wider and wider. The problem of the Hungarian minority had separated the Communists of Prague from those of Budapest, the Trieste question those of Rome from those of Belgrade, and the partition of eastern Germany those of Berlin from those of Warsaw. Such serious divergences threatened to destroy the very roots of their common ideology and, in fact, these differences of opinion went much further than the Politbureau of the Kremlin cared for, as in the Tito affair and the strife within the Communist Party in Poland, and later, in the spring of 1949, in Bulgaria. The pan-Slavic line which Moscow's official policy had followed since 1942 had become so deeply engrained amongst certain leading Communists, that a party switch-over from national to international Communism as it exists to-day could not be effected without a considerable upheaval in the internal structure of the movement.

However, in all this subversive activity, the Soviet government is careful not to compromise itself officially. Before the arrival of Hitler the general headquarters of Communism were in Germany. The influence of the Comintern Secretary there extended over Europe, Africa and America. Its political chief, the Bulgarian Georgi Dimitrov, was responsible only to Molotov, the real master of the Comintern. After Hitler rose to power the Berlin organization was transferred to Copenhagen. With the establishment of the Cominform which is only a variation of the Comintern, the centre of the movement was shifted to Belgrade; since the Tito affair, the new capital of Communism appears to be Bucarest.[1]

[1] Even to-day the Soviet Union takes care not to be openly

The political foundation of a people's war is a different matter for a Power which, while having the sympathy of a large number of partisans, lacks the advantage of such a widespread organization as that of the Communists. It has first to create the necessary preliminary conditions for a popular rising. This it can do either by enlisting those political movements which already exist in the form of opposition, or by creating a new movement amongst the discontented elements by means of propaganda, subsidies and promises. The first method is by far the better: it is always easier to extend and encourage than to create an entirely new opposition. The first step is to win over a number of influential people who, by their relations with men in positions of trust, can help devise methods of infiltration. Bit by bit the organization is built up, and out of a fragile framework grows a substantial edifice. In the creation of a secret movement, however, it is necessary to proceed very carefully. Its activities are not equally distributed over the whole country and bases must first be established in those districts most important from a political, economic and strategic point of view. Particular attention must be given to large towns.

It is the custom of Communists to create secret cells in other parties, less to win them over as allies than to cause dissension in their ranks. Another favourite method is the organization of associations apparently neutral and innocuous, into which the party ideas can be introduced by suitable propaganda. Only one of many examples is the non-political organization known as 'Friends of the Soviet Union'.

compromised by the activities of the various Communist Parties. Since World War II there have been plenty of possibilities for maintaining illegal connections with Communist circles in the democratic countries through the numerous diplomatic agencies of Moscow's satellites, practically all of which are important liaison channels between the organs of the Cominform and the Communist Parties.

Political infiltration is accompanied by extensive propaganda. Whenever the Communist press of any country suddenly begins to popularize the army, it is safe to say that the party is attempting to create cells within the armed forces. This procedure was adopted in the eastern European countries, as well as in France and Italy after the war. Many prominent non-Communist political and military leaders allowed themselves to be persuaded into writing for the leftist press, little realizing how important their articles were to the Communist propaganda.

But now let us return to the military aspect of underground movements, the principal subject of our survey. Its essential secrecy calls for perfect trust and confidence amongst the members of the organization. Most of them if not all, especially in the early stages, should have known each other for a long time. Men who live as neighbours naturally trust each other far more than they would strangers. That is why the inhabitants of a locality are better able to form those first revolutionary cells which are of such importance at the beginning of a movement. The further the struggle spreads and the more the partisans are united by common trials and sufferings, the less do these factors apply.

Guerrilla fighting-men, as we have said, are almost exclusively volunteers. As distinct from regular soldiers, they are not full-time conscripts; but in order to hide their identity, they work at some trade or occupation which confines them to certain fixed localities. Consequently, in a People's War, the organic parts of a movement are considered more in terms of regions than of units. According to the strategic situation, there are brought into play not military units but the organization of a particular region or, in certain circumstances, several or all of the regions together.

To achieve co-ordination and general direction on the fullest possible scale, the country where a rising takes place should

be divided into regions according to one or other of the following methods:

(1) Taking as a basis the administrative divisions of the country, such as counties, departments, districts, etc.

(2) Dividing according to the geographical structure as defined by rivers, mountains, etc.

(3) Using the economic structure of the country by making, for example, the industrial regions the centres of gravity of the movement.

Each of these three methods has advantages and disadvantages and the choice depends upon the general situation and strategical aims. The various government districts of a state form at one and the same time economic and administrative units. Industrial regions are important to the enemy's war machine and are thickly populated, mostly by workers. On the other hand, the partition of a country according to its geographical structure will generally be for purely military reasons. Thus organization according to administrative divisions is suitable for sabotage, propaganda and espionage; whereas organization based on geographical structure is more likely to suit the requirements of guerrilla warfare. It is often possible, of course, to arrange sub-regions within main regions, according to local geographical conditions.

The resistance movement in France during the Second World War was based on the administrative divisions of the country. A committee of three men commanded all the forces of a department, irrespective of the numbers involved. This committee was subordinate to an inter-departmental committee consisting also of three members, which was itself under the orders of a National Military Committee. On the other hand, Tito organized his movement in June 1942 into five zones defined by the geographical structure of his country. Large towns, on account of their importance, each constitute a definite territorial unit, and are divided into sections according to size and situation. Paris had four areas (North,

East, South, and West) which came under two different administrative departments.[1]

There will, however, always be organizations that cross any territorial boundaries. Such, for instance, are undertakings like the railways, shipping, postal services, etc., which are distributed all over a country. Certainly no useful purpose would be served by preventing these from operating as an effective whole. Here the threads of the conspiracy should be in the hands of the highest administrative organisms, such as the Railway Boards, Ministry of Posts, of Telegraphs, etc., or in workers' trade union organizations where full use can be made of the professional militants. Workers' associations can also play an important part in organizing and starting insurrections in important industrial and economic regions and the professional organizations offer excellent opportunities for infiltrating into State Departments, and especially into the Police Service. It would, therefore, be advisable to keep the professional organizations apart from the territorials. The two kinds should work on parallel lines, and relations between them be maintained exclusively through central organisms of the movement; for example, through Regional Committees upwards. The hermetic sealing-off from each other of the different branches of a resistance movement is essential for security reasons. Nevertheless, the whole framework should be built so that it remains flexible and can function freely in all its parts. To avoid falling into a state of com-

[1] In future we shall try to avoid the use of such terms as Headquarters Staff, or Command, and substitute the various types of committees, as being more in accord with the essence of underground movements. We adopt the following new definitions:

(*a*) General Committee: directing the resistance movement from abroad.

(*b*) National Committee: principal directing body in the insurgent country.

(*c*) Regional Committee: directing several districts.

(*d*) District Committee: directing body in a single district.

plete anarchy, the supreme directing body should exercise the strictest control over every branch of affairs. Of course, what we have just said applies only in a general theoretical sense, and its value lies in the initial stages where these principles can guide the whole movement into the desired course. In time, the various component parts of the organization become welded together, and this process of building themselves up during the struggle itself ensures the natural development best suited to local conditions.

In secret activities and guerrilla wars, the personality of the leader is of supreme importance. In all Communist organizations, each leader designates his successor in advance to ensure continuity of the struggle in the event of his own arrest. The experience of the Second World War proved that guerrilla warfare requires a very special kind of leadership. It is not altogether a question of military ability, for the technical knowledge required is of a relatively simple nature. The command of guerrilla bands, which generally consists of the most diverse elements, calls more for psychological instinct and political skill. In the same way that the officers of regular troops prepare their men for battle, the partisan leaders should know how to make their followers battle-minded and sustain the courage of the people who keep the fight going. They are less chiefs in the military sense than they are chiefs of popular tribes. They must be men who have risen from the people, and are accustomed to a simple life. By achieving distinction amongst their fellows, they gain the individual confidence of their followers. The best training for guerrilla chiefs is a hard life. The qualities expected of a guerrilla leader are those of any officer, but there are also some of a different nature:

1. He should be capable of keeping secrets and be able so to organize even quite important actions that as few people as possible are 'in the know.'

2. He should be a born conspirator and able to deceive not

only the enemy but even his own comrades, if that is necessary for maintaining secrecy. (At all levels of a resistance movement, each man should know only what is essential to his own task.)

3. A partisan leader can exercise effective command over his men only if he is able to make them political fanatics. This implies a deep political conviction on his part.

4. He must have quick judgment and appreciation. He should have an alert and inventive mind, be resourceful and, in addition to having a capacity for decision and initiative, be able to steal a march on the enemy.

5. He should have the moral courage to take responsibility and the will to accomplish whatever mission has been entrusted to him.

6. He must be physically vigorous and self-denying, so that he can accommodate himself to the simplest surroundings.

Guerrilla leaders should be men who have risen by their own qualities and exertions. It is a fundamental error to send emissaries from abroad to take over partial or general command in the movement. Even if those emissaries are native-born themselves, they run the risk of creating personal or political rivalries or of aggravating those already in existence. For these reasons the leaders of communist movements are always chosen from amongst the party militants who have proved their worth in their native country. The best, those who gained the confidence of the Kremlin, were called to Moscow where they received instruction under the International Division of the Communist University. These courses provided a detailed study of class war and communist warfare, armed insurrection, strikes and civil war. The subjects ranged from the theories of Marx and Engels to the application of Clausewitz's strategic rules for the conduct of strikes; from revolutionary defeatism and the transformation of an imperial war into civil strife, to the art of propaganda and the psychology of the masses. For this purpose a corps

of International Political Instructors was formed. There are experts in propaganda, strikes, industrial organization, and technicians for each of the principal industries such as steel works, shipbuilding, railways, mines, textiles, public services, agriculture, chemical industry, etc.

In his time Clausewitz had already drawn attention to the necessity of supporting a guerrilla war from outside. 'Through reinforcing the partisans by small detachments from the regular army, the general in command remains master of the situation and keeps control of the popular insurrection, making it conform to his plans. Without the encouragement and support of the regular army, the citizens lack confidence and the courage to take up arms. The more such detachments are available to arouse and maintain enthusiasm, the more they carry the masses with them.' This is still valid to-day though in a modernized form.

It is particularly important to send liaison missions into the insurrection areas, though in no circumstances should these missions figure as instruments of command. It must be emphasized once again that the conduct of a clandestine movement should remain in the hands of the inhabitants themselves. The liaison officers should keep aloof from all internal political quarrels, intervening only as arbitrators, and then only in exceptional circumstances. In other words, they should be nothing more than the representatives of the power for which the underground movement is working. This calls for a sound knowledge of the local language and conditions and considerable diplomatic skill. The business of the liaison officers is to supervise the activities of the insurgents, to report to their supreme headquarters, to provide and distribute money, weapons and other auxiliary supplies, and to give to the struggle the desired political impress. Only by carrying out their duties in this manner will they, as Clausewitz says 'remain masters of the situation' and maintain control of the insurrection.

The country or region where a clandestine movement develops is its battlefield and it is there that the National Committee exercises a command comparable to the advanced headquarters of an army. The back areas of a People's War are to be found largely abroad, or behind the front of the allied regular army it is supporting. Let us take a look at these back areas. The principal body there is the General Headquarters of the movement. Whereas the advanced H.Q. (National Committee) directs the underground movement within its region, the central H.Q. (General Committee) has the task of harmonizing the movement as a whole with the strategy of the war and of supplying the insurgents with their requirements.

At the beginning of the Second World War the western powers did not appear to realize the possibilities of including underground movements in their strategy. All the services dealing with sabotage, propaganda and guerrilla warfare were subordinate to the military intelligence department which was more interested in gathering information than in executing active operations of an irregular nature. The secret services of the belligerent powers were too insufficiently organized to develop such activities satisfactorily. They lacked the necessary materials, arms and propaganda systems. It was only later in the war that the British, as well as the Americans, organized special services to deal exclusively with secret movements.[1] Even then they did not do all they might have

[1] During the last war, the following command posts directed the underground activities in western Europe:

B.C.R.A. (Central Office of Information and Action) organized in January 1942 by General de Gaulle.

The British Organization S.O.E. (Special Operation Executive).

American O.S.S. (Office of Strategic Services).

In January 1944 the S.O.E. and O.S.S. merged and formed the Command Post S.F.H.Q. (Special Forces Headquarters).

In December 1940 S.O.E. had only three fast scout vessels at

done. Aircraft and arms were placed at their disposal only when they were not required elsewhere. The history of the Slovak risings shows that the Russian General Staff could have profited much more if it had given supplies to the insurgents. The methods of a People's War were not exploited to the full, either in the East or the West.

The preparatory work for underground organization, especially on the political side, should be undertaken in peacetime. When war comes, the following measures should already have been adopted for the immediate development of partisan activities:

1. A well-organized Central Command set up.

2. A special air transport fleet and landing fields made available for the purposes of the rising.

3. Supplies of arms, explosives, foodstuffs, etc., suitable for underground purposes, disposed in readiness.

4. Centres of instruction for forming agents, emissaries, liaison officers, parachutists, radio-telegraphists, etc., fully organized.

The central organ of a resistance movement, the General Committee, which directs the struggle from abroad, is a specially designed Headquarters Staff. Its activities require that it should work in complete independence. One could even maintain that in addition to the three usual G.H.Q. Staffs of land, sea and air, a fourth General Staff for partisan operations would be fully justified. Otherwise, there would always be the danger of its being regarded as a branch of secondary importance.

The headquarters of an underground movement should not be a central body dealing exclusively with military questions but a political-military organism, capable of solving both the political and the military problems arising out of

its disposal and not until July 1941 was it allotted three planes.

At the end of the war there were about sixty instruction centres for agents in existence.



SUGGESTED STRUCTURE OF A GENERAL COMMITTEE OF A RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

As an example only

insurrection. It should be halfway between these two sides of the conduct of the war. If a state is acting in support of an underground movement abroad, there should be collaboration between the General Committee and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs: when a secret campaign is being developed in an occupied home-country, collaboration should be with the Home Office.

Specialists of every kind can find useful employment in such a headquarters; intelligence officers, police officials, specialists in the preparation of false identity papers, radio-telegraphists for liaison, journalists and artists for propaganda, engineers and specialists in railway work and industry, telegraphy, finance and commerce, soldiers for open fighting, military instruction, control and distribution of arms, explosives and other military stores; pilots and specialists in military aeronautics, and many others. It is particularly important to have available a certain number of parachute units and of tried and trusted agents, ready to go into action wherever the situation requires. It is naturally a great advantage if all these members of the General Committee speak the language of the country and know the places where they are to operate, or in which they are to direct operations.

The underground movements work in four different tactical ways:

1. Information services (intelligence).
2. Propaganda.
3. Sabotage.
4. Guerrilla warfare.

The intelligence services and propaganda are, to a certain degree, preparatory to the other two branches of the struggle. Intelligence is not a directly active medium, but propaganda can be when it is engaged in destroying the morale of the enemy. Sabotage and guerrilla warfare are direct actions in every respect.

It is difficult to combine these four methods into one sys-

tem. Theoretically, they could perhaps be arranged as follows:

SECRET WARFARE

1. *Preparation.*
   (*a*) Intelligence
   (*b*) Propaganda
   } Cause invisible damage.
2. *Action.*
   (*c*) Sabotage
   (*d*) Guerrilla Warfare
   } Cause visible damage.

It would also be possible to imagine another classification by grouping them into passive and active resistance, but it is difficult to mark out the boundaries because these four different methods more or less overlap. It would, for example, be as impossible to say definitely where propaganda finishes and sabotage begins as to draw the line between clandestine and open fighting.

To turn our theories into practice, it is advisable, for tactical purposes, to divide the four fighting methods into three separate organizations.

(*a*) Intelligence services.

(*b*) Propaganda services.

(*c*) Sabotage and guerrillas.

In the strategy of a people's war, each of these departments has a clearly defined task. The two first consist of a series of intelligence and propaganda centres in the area of the revolt itself. Each centre is a sort of nodal point; it looks after its own agents who must refrain whenever possible from engaging in open fighting. These two networks should be in contact only through the top administration of the resistance movement. The 'active' department comprises the bulk of the combatants, who are under the direct orders of the various local and regional committees. The intelligence and propaganda networks are therefore exclusively elements of



ORGANIZATION OF AN UNDERGROUND MOVEMENT
IN FIVE SEPARATE NETWORKS

As an example only

the top administration, to which in practice they are subordinated. Together with this directing administration they form the backbone of the resistance movement. This does not mean that the members of the 'active' department are not supposed to gather information or carry out propaganda; but they are expected to do so only within the framework of their own tactics. Whereas the two first departments are intended to prepare the general strategy, the third is the tactical executive of the plan in the form of sabotage and guerrilla war. One distinct advantage of this type of organization is that administrative headquarters are able, by means of their intelligence department, to exercise a political supervision over the action of the movement, whereas the propaganda side ensures political influence. Until 1941 the organization of the Comintern, under the orders of the G.P.U., comprised several departments called Apparats. Thus Apparat S was responsible for espionage, Apparat M dealt with communist infiltration into the armed forces, Apparat F the undermining of morale of the police and public services, Apparat BB spied on industry, Apparat N looked after passports, courier services and communications. Other Apparats directed the disintegration of parties or political organizations which were hostile to communism. Each was directed by a special delegate from Moscow.[1] As we pointed out, the Supreme Directorate should make use of any and every means to re-

[1] To hide their real identity more securely, the executive organs of underground movements mostly used cover names. Their function could be recognized from these pseudonyms. For instance in the French underground movement, the military delegates sent from London to work in the various regions used geometric nomenclature such as Triangle, Equilateral, Polygon, Circumference, Parallel, etc. Officers in charge of aerial operations were in principle the bearers of the names of such dignitaries as: Pope, Archduke, Sultan, etc. Saboteurs adopted appellations from maritime language: Caravel, Submarine, Liner, etc., this facilitated also the composition of coded cable.

tain complete control over the whole movement. That is possible only if the various parts of the underground organization control each other reciprocally, and yet avoid misunderstanding.

Most underground movements are built up step by step. They begin with intelligence and propaganda services, which are followed by sabotage and guerrilla warfare. That is their natural development. But in certain circumstances, this order of development may be altered by strategic, political, geographical or psychological demands. It appears, however, that such variations are not advantageous. Without well-established intelligence and propaganda services a secret movement would find it difficult to reach its full effectiveness within a reasonable time. In these circumstances a normal development would be achieved only after the whole movement had been exposed to a series of jolts and tribulations which could otherwise have been avoided.

1. INTELLIGENCE AND LIAISON.

'A necessity was perfect "intelligence", so that we could plan in certainty. The chief agent must be the generals' head; and his understanding must be faultless, leaving no room for chance. Morale, if built on knowledge, was broken by ignorance. When we knew all about the enemy we should be comfortable. We must take more pains in the service of news than any regular staff.' (T. E. Lawrence)[1]

Good intelligence work makes it possible to hit the enemy when and where he is most vulnerable, and at the same time, to guard against disagreeable surprises.

Clandestine movements are not the only sources of information for a belligerent power, but they are nearly always the most important. They can provide the various headquarters of the land, sea and air forces with information of great value. Many important strategic decisions are based on

[1] *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, Chapter 33.



A LIAISON NETWORK

The various contacts are made abroad, where a radio-telegraphic central station acts as a switch-board and maintains liaison between the various posts

information concerning sea and air bases; large industrial centres and their movements and tactics; as well as the moral and material condition of the enemy's army or civil population. However, for the underground movement itself, only a part of this information can be of use. The situation of the intelligence service of an underground movement is similar to that of a battalion in the front line. It passes back to headquarters all the information which it gathers even though it is interested primarily only in the immediate vicinity. The intelligence services in general offer a very important field of activity to underground movements and one in which they find scope for their natural aptitudes.

The efficient development of propaganda, sabotage and guerrilla activities depends entirely upon the smooth and adequate working of the intelligence service. Good propaganda depends first on accurate knowledge of the internal political currents in a population and their relation to the underground movement and the army. The same kind of accuracy and appreciation are essential to the saboteurs and guerrillas. They depend on special information, often of a technical nature, such as the erection of various industrial establishments and their processes of manufacture, the location of the most vulnerable and important machines and their weak spots, how these works and plants are guarded, etc.

For guerrilla operations it is essential to know the distribution of the enemy garrisons, their particular tasks, their state of mind, weapons, equipment, and a host of other things. However, the intelligence service should not limit itself to this offensive activity. In a people's war, the defensive activity of the information channels is also important. It can prevent the enemy from discovering the underground movement and ferret out traitors. It is always a good thing to keep an eye on one's own organization.[1] Information is of value only if it can

[1] In the Communist movement, it is a point of honour with the militants to supervise each other. In party parlance this super-

be used in time. Furthermore, reports should come from varying sources, so that their accuracy can be checked. If well-organized, the intelligence service will have its confidential agents, not only in its own ranks but in those of the enemy, in political organizations, in the police forces, government offices, railway and postal administrations, important economic and industrial centres, banks, etc. These agents bring their scraps of information to the central intelligence points, which in turn pass them on.

It is impossible to set up a model for the organization of a department of intelligence or of liaisons. As in tactics generally, much depends upon local conditions. But secret service organizations in underground movements should always maintain the following liaisons:

(*a*) Between the General Committee and the National Committee of the country where the movement is taking place.

(*b*) Between the agents and the intelligence points, and between the latter and the General Committee.

(*c*) Between the National Committee and the commanding organisms which are subordinate to it, such as the National and Departmental Committees, etc.

In the present state of technical development, radio is the best liaison medium. Nevertheless the maintenance of personal contacts, by means of parachute drops and other methods, is very often necessary. Their advantages, their possibility of direct conversations for example, are of considerable importance. All the same, they can have their drawbacks. There is always the danger of betrayal, and the diffi-

vision is described as 'bolshevist vigilance' or 'mutual control', and its threads lead into the hands of the Soviet Secret Police, formerly known as the GPU, then the N.K.V.D. and now M.V.D., which is directly subordinate to the Politbureau. During the war, the Soviet partisans were controlled by special agents of the N.K.V.D., whose families, living in unoccupied Soviet country, constituted a guarantee for the reliability of the agents.

culty of isolating such activities exposes members of the underground organization to danger. For this reason, meetings between individuals known to each other should be avoided. Liaison should be maintained either by radio or by strangers who recognize one another by means of secret code words. Wave-lengths, broadcasting times and call signals are required to maintain liaison and transmit information. Code prevents the enemy from understanding messages and the constant changing of wave-lengths, transmitting times and call-signals confuses the enemy's listening posts. Moreover, the greater the number of sending stations, the more difficult becomes the enemy's task and so the greater the safety of the senders. To guard against the risk of betrayal it is as well, when technically possible, not to have direct radio intercommunication within the same sector, but to connect all the posts with a central radio-telegraphic station abroad. This then acts in a similar manner to a telephone switchboard. In this way, the liaison network, despite its centralized character, is isolated in its various parts. But though radio technique has reached a high stage of development and it is possible to manufacture portable long-distance apparatus, technical troubles do occur. Generally, radio-telegraphy is more reliable than radio-telephony and morse signals are less easily picked up by the enemy. Telegraphy uses a very narrow band of only one kilocycle, whereas radio-telephone communication needs a band of six to seven kilocycles. A radio-telephone message can be easily overheard and it is often possible to recognize a voice. This can lead to identification of the sending station and the marking of its exact position.

The difficulties of liaison by radio often make it necessary to maintain contact by special agents. For this, the most suitable persons are those whose jobs call for frequent journeys, such as railwaymen, postmen, commercial travellers, chauffeurs, etc.

The principles and suggestions given above are valid not

only for an intelligence service but also for all questions concerning underground movements.

2. PROPAGANDA

The importance and influence of propaganda in modern wars and its technical and psychological methods are now so well-known that they do not need long description here. Propaganda in war seeks to strengthen and defend the national morale whilst undermining and weakening that of the enemy. It has the same task in underground movements. Sometimes it works on the offensive, at others it acts defensively. Its principal weapons are the spoken word, mostly transmitted by radio and less frequently by personal contacts, and the printed word published through the underground press.

The distinction between external and internal propaganda is that the first emanates from abroad, from the General Committee of the underground movement, while the latter is created within the region of the insurrection. Newspapers can be dropped from planes, sometimes in special containers. Printed news from friendly countries has a strong psychological effect: it gives the reader something concrete from the outside world in which all his hopes lie. Newspapers can also be useful to wireless propaganda by giving the times, wavelengths and programmes of foreign stations.

Propaganda should seek to popularize the war aims and ideals of the underground movement. It should function continuously and always be novel and interesting.[1] It should focus attention sharply on the enemy's weaknesses and, whilst clarifying the general political aims of the movement, lay down lines of conduct for the population *vis-à-vis* the occupying power. It can deal with the problems of the movement and draw attention to any political organizations set up by

[1] '. . . to set up and promote slogans which draw the masses to the principles of the Party. . . .' Josef Stalin: *Problems of Leninisme.* Edition Moscow 1947.

the enemy, or to individuals collaborating with them. To be successful, propaganda should be based on a serious study of the psychology of the people at whom it is directed. Methods which have succeeded in one country may not be suitable in another. And then inside the country propaganda must be adapted to the various classes of society. Different methods and slogans appeal to intellectual circles and to peasants and town-dwellers or workpeople.[1] Generally to reach its maximum efficiency, propaganda should be in tune with those ideas which are most wide-spread in the most important strata of the population.

[1] By way of example in this matter here is the declaration made in the Paris Chamber by the French Home Secretary on 16th November 1948, in which he described the methods of Communist propaganda as follows:

'It would appear as though the directives issued at this period were sometimes contradictory in view of the monolithic character of international Communism. These divergences may be intriguing. They are explained by the fact that Communism, like any other organization inspired by mysticism, is subject to various degrees of inspiration to which the slogans are adapted according to the intellectual level of ideological capacity, or the public or clandestine role of the recipient. Hence it may be admitted that many Communists are sincere when they declare that they are not subject to foreign influence.

'The present conflict shows up very clearly this hierarchy in initiation. For the miners it was merely a question of achieving material benefits in the shortest possible time. For the slightly higher branches, by which I mean the cells and sectors, the declared objective was the overthrow of the present Government and the constitution of a Ministry with either Communist participation or control. For this an action spreading over several months was foreseen. At a stage higher the aim was to bring about the failure of the Marshall Plan by ruining French economy and discouraging America in its efforts to help Europe. At this level the Communist viewpoint extends beyond France to the whole of Europe and is considered to be part of a plan of several years' duration.'

All information given over the radio should be accurate and objective. The publication of unreliable news can only obtain insignificant and short-lived successes. Confidence lost is difficult to win back: the collapse of Goebbels' propaganda was one of the causes of the complete demoralization of the Third Reich. Allied propaganda also made many mistakes, amongst which were several concerning the resistance movements. Much damage, for instance, was done during the war by the rumour that 'Partisan resistance had been organized by a former counsellor of the Soviet Legation in Belgrade called Lebedev. It was even said that Lebedev was Tito, that Tito was a woman, that Tito did not exist, that he was a cover name for a whole series of sinister persons.'[1]

Here is another example:

'Colonel Sava Orovitch, a Montenegrin officer of the pre-war Yugoslav army, who had commanded a regiment of infantry during the fighting of 1941, had to hear himself branded by the B.B.C., speaking in the name of the exiled Royal Yugoslav government in London, as a German traitor and an enemy. When this unusually fine example of misinformation was broadcast, this gallant old gentleman was commanding the Officers' School at Bihatch.'[2]

Everything should be done to spread confidence in the veracity of the propaganda. Predicted aerial attacks on special targets, carried out at the request of the underground press or after being foretold by radio, not only create confidence but also tend to augment the number of listeners or readers. There is born a subconscious desire to listen regularly. Propaganda from abroad which gives an accurate picture of what is happening in the resistance country quickly seizes the attention of listeners and is one of the most effective countermeasures against enemy propaganda.

The general task of internal propaganda is to give local

[1] Basil Davidson, *Partisan Picture*, p. 100.
[2] Basil Davidson: *Partisan Picture.*

news. Of all the methods used, clandestine newspapers take first place. During the Second World War a large number were published in the western countries and many of them reached quite big circulations. About five hundred underground papers appeared in Belgium during the German occupation and many of them printed up to 20,000 copies an issue. In France, the paper *Liberation*, got up to 50,000 copies. It need hardly be said that their production was fraught with many dangers in the editing, assembly, transport of materials, printing and distribution.

As regards information, external propaganda, like its internal counterpart, depends principally on the perfect function of intelligence and liaison between the underground war region and the General Committee abroad. For this reason the information centres must send on their news as quickly as possible to the General Committee, and the sending stations of the external propaganda department should re-transmit it without delay to the editors of the underground press. In this way can be built up the necessary collaboration between the external and internal propaganda systems. It is possible, also, by these means, to prevent the internal transmission of news not in line with general policy. Obviously, only the General Committee is fully informed on the general situation and upon it rests the responsibility of deciding which news should be broadcast and which should be suppressed.

Secret broadcasts by stations situated within the resistance region can also be useful, but this method is too dangerous to be relied upon. And when propaganda from abroad is well organized, there is scarcely any justification for it. There are, however, uses for leaflets, whispered verbal propaganda, writing on walls, and many other ways. A vast field of activity lies open to the good propagandist. New methods must be invented to meet a constantly changing situation. The enemy's counter-propaganda should be outstripped though flexibility and resistance to it should not only take defensive

form but also act on the offensive. As good a way again is to destroy the enemy's propaganda installations by sabotage or guerrilla attacks. Propaganda, either external or internal, should not only be of interest to the population of the country in which the resistance movement takes place. It is useful to counteract the effect of the enemy's own propaganda at home and to penetrate into his territory, especially amongst his troops. Skilful distribution of newspapers and special leaflets by leaving them about in enemy barracks or any places frequented by soldiers, is a form of psychological treatment not to be despised. Their constant re-appearance eventually results in the enemy troops beginning to feel that they are caught in an invisible and intangible net.

Good propaganda, then, can only be built up on a good intelligence service. It should provoke those political and psychological reactions without which an underground movement cannot exist. It should provide the people's war with the spiritual mainspring of the urge to fight the enemy. And 'when you feel that you have succeeded in enlisting the sympathy and understanding of the people for your enterprise, do not leave them alone, never give them time to reflect; tell them how to make the best use of their time and make them feel that they are backed up by an omniscient power, which will guide them truly and faithfully all the time', said one of the greatest revolutionaries of our day: Georgi Dimitrov, the Secretary-General of the Comintern.

3. SABOTAGE

It is difficult to define the exact meaning of sabotage. It really consists of physical actions aimed at damaging the enemy's war machine. Sabotage embraces all actions against the enemy's occupation policy, against his administration, his lines of communication, industrial establishments and finished products; in a word, everything that benefits him. Everything is mobilized in modern warfare and sabotage is un-

restricted in its activities. In principle, sabotage consists of bold strokes executed without fighting and only resulting in clashes if the saboteurs are caught in the act. When this happens it becomes more like a guerrilla action.

Many acts of sabotage are discovered immediately by the enemy; others take longer before they become known. In the former, the enemy tries at once to track down the perpetrators and, if the saboteurs are still in the vicinity, the danger can be serious. The greater the delay before discovery, the less risk for the saboteurs. Certain kinds of sabotage, especially those committed within administrative organizations, very often remain undiscovered and only make their effects felt after a long time. Their authors are often never brought to book.

According to the nature of their objective, acts of sabotage can be carried out either by individuals or by a team. In mass operations, a section of the population may be employed. The danger in individual sabotage is not so great as in that carried out by teams. The greater the number taking part, the easier to discover their tracks, and the arrest of only one may lead to the apprehension of the others. The problem of mass sabotage is totally different. This takes the form of a multitude of small acts each of relatively little importance but which, in the aggregate, have a greater effect than large-scale acts accompanied by violence. Sabotage is a science, calling for exceptional psychological, technical and economic knowledge. Clever sabotage can inflict serious damage on the enemy by a series of small but well directed thrusts. A simple short circuit can have more effect than a large explosion. Here again, the spirit of invention and initiative is well rewarded and this spirit can be fostered by clever propaganda, hatred of the enemy being the best inspiration to discover where and how to hit him to the best effect. Many fighting methods tend to lose their effectiveness with time; new ones have to be invented constantly in order to retain

the initiative. The multiplicity and continuity of acts must be maintained, for they distract the attention of the enemy everywhere and all the time, and cause nervousness and anxiety. He is compelled to fall back on counter-measures which, in addition to the material damage he sustains, cause diversion and loss of personnel. During the Second World War, the Germans were compelled to increase their garrisons and to employ large numbers of technicians in order to guard the means of communication and transport, as well as industrial plants and other branches of economic life. In France alone the number of German railwaymen reached 25,000. Sabotage can be either offensive or defensive, and both forms can be used simultaneously. The more hatred of the enemy grows, the more passive resistance tends to take an active shape until it finally reaches its maximum point: guerrilla warfare.

(a) Passive Sabotage

Passive resistance on the part of the population can be an extremely efficient weapon. It hits the enemy's morale and can at the same time inflict material losses, whilst it is extremely difficult for him to trace the perpetrators. During the occupation the public in Prague were induced by the underground movement not to buy newspapers on certain days, and the German authorities were powerless to place the responsibility on anybody. In the Second World War the local inhabitants ostentatiously left public places such as cafés and cinemas whenever German soldiers entered them. In the street passers-by deliberately went out of their way to avoid Germans, who were compelled to lead a life apart. This kind of resistance gave the enemy a harmful inferiority complex. Enemy troops in the occupied countries came to feel isolated and abandoned.

Economic looting of occupied countries calls for collaboration between the enemy and the national administration.

The enemy cannot install his own personnel everywhere, and they would not, in any case, have the necessary knowledge of local affairs; he is compelled to chose men from the ranks of the population. Such control must be of a very general nature and possess many weak spots. This enables executive organs to find simple ways of evading the various ordinances of the occupying power, for example, by delaying their execution, not carrying out orders in proper sequence, and warning the population of the enemy's intentions. Many things, for example, of importance to the enemy, such as metals, vehicles, foodstuffs, etc., can be hidden or even, if necessary, destroyed before they can be requisitioned: doctors can deprive the enemy of manpower by declaring workmen as unfit.[1]

In works or industrial plants everything should be done to slow down the job. In time, the lost minutes mount up until they become millions of hours. The upkeep of machines and technical installations can be neglected; simply, for instance, by failing to lubricate them properly. The repair of important machines can be indefinitely delayed; spare parts can be mislaid so that they are missing when they are wanted. Slackness can be organized in such a way that products are practically useless on account of their bad quality. Another form of sabotage is for workers to drop all initiative and do everything to prevent collaboration between the various departments of a factory. Delayed deliveries from one shop to another have a detrimental influence on the whole organization. In a machine shop a workman running a lathe requires a spanner to tighten a loose bolt. Instead of applying for it to the nearby stores or asking his mate for his, he stops his machine—it would be wrong to work it in its present condition—and calls his foreman or shop steward or some other member of the labour hierarchy, and reports to him that a

[1] In 1941–2 in the Region of Lyon, out of 82,000 called up for compulsory labour, 71,000 were rejected as unfit; in 1943 there were 18,290 out of 26,790 and in 1944, 74,883 out of 77,481.

spanner is necessary. It is brought to him and he fixes the bolt. The machine is started up again after a five minutes' stop. Such non-collaboration is difficult of reproach. The workman is paid to accomplish a certain task and carries it out to the letter. He comes and goes at the prescribed times and is attentive and clever at his work. But he does not collaborate. And the whole working personnel adopt the same method which consists in doing exclusively the work for which they are engaged and paid. There is no question of sabotage or strike, only of non-collaboration. About 250,000 workpeople in Italy applied these tactics in the spring of 1949 in the metallurgical industries, principally in large concerns such as the Fiat, Ilva, Montecatini and Terni works, thereby bringing about a reduction of output varying between 5 per cent minimum and 16 per cent maximum.

Passive sabotage, however, cannot be called an organized resistance action and it should not be practised in methodical collaboration with the movement. It is more in the nature of a psychological action of the masses, the result of well-organized propaganda.

The French resistance movement has many classic examples to show. Take the railways, for instance. With the excuse of strictly carrying out rules and safety regulations—in which the bureaucrats also faithfully co-operated—artificial delays were created wherever possible. Changing was made difficult at important junctions, and serious bottlenecks, caused by the accumulation of wagons in shunting yards, caused complete disorganization of services over wide areas. Waybills were lost, wagon labels disappeared or were replaced by others giving a wrong destination. Works which were expecting to receive spare parts would get a load of foodstuffs. Empty wagons were purposely detained or sent off somewhere quite different from the place intended.

The French postal services also rendered great service. They made it possible for news, money, and supplies of all

kinds to reach the maquis organizations. The government authorities of the *arrondissements* and *communes* made out false workmen's cards and identity papers and compiled false statistics and false returns for the occupying authorities. The manufacture of counterfeit banknotes can also be very useful in secret warfare by undermining the financial stability of the enemy.[1]

(*b*) *Active sabotage*

In this category are those sudden violent actions which not only show visible results but often develop into real affrays. The offensive intention is obvious and the enemy knows perfectly well that it is not a case of mere negligence, but a planned attack. We have shown that, in passive resistance, propaganda creates a psychological atmosphere in which the masses commit a multitude of small deeds which have no organized cohesion. It is different with active sabotage. There, operations should be carried out according to a plan. This pre-supposes a unity of command. In past wars sabotage took place without methodical plans, but such blind exploits only caused limited damage which could be quickly repaired. *Sabotage operations should not only have their special tactics but also their own strategy. These actions should be co-ordinated in time and space and their sequence is of exceptional importance.* Organized sabotage operations are like battles in a regular campaign and the various individual actions should be as well co-ordinated as, in modern battles, are the infantry, artillery, tanks and aircraft.

The organization of a sabotage campaign, especially on a large scale, calls above all for accurate intelligence of the enemy's economy and industry. Theoretically this preparatory work can be divided into two parts:

(*a*) General economic reconnoitring (strategical).

(*b*) Special reconnoitring (tactical).

[1] The Germans tried to set up a printing press for counterfeit notes in their concentration camp in Sachsenhausen.

(A) GENERAL ECONOMIC RECONNOITRING

General economic reconnoitring establishes the economic and military importance of the various industrial regions and of the industrial establishments in them. It should discover the kind and volume of their products, their source of raw materials, and their dependence on other industries. But in order to find out the inner workings of the war production machine, it is necessary to know the whole of the economic structure of the country. Only so is it possible to determine the various centres and spheres of activity for sabotage purposes and cause serious damage by striking at its roots. For instance, one of the most important methods is the destruction of raw materials or their sources; by attacking the coal and steel industries, which are the basis of many others, severe and wide-spread damage can be caused at a single blow. Attacks against auxiliary industries such as rubber, precision instruments, or leather, important as they are, only concern certain branches. Sabotage of finished products, or of the assembly plants where they are handled, only affects one particular side of production.

(B) SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE

Special reconnaissance has to do principally with the technical and tactical details of attacks. It should decide which, from the point of view of production, are the most important machines of the factory in question, how long it will take to repair the damage caused, what means the enemy has to effect these repairs, where he can find spare parts, and whether and how such repairs can be prevented or delayed. It should discover also which men can be counted upon to help in obstructing the work, how the works are guarded, etc.

In organized sabotage the sequence of attacks is both tactically and strategically of great importance. It would be as illogical to destroy a factory first and its sources of raw



THE ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE OF A COUNTRY AS AFFECTED BY SABOTAGE

Acts of sabotage committed at the sources of some important raw materials, at power plants and against food production can affect the economic life of a country as a whole. Sabotage of auxiliary industries is less effective, and is least effective in assembly plants where its influence is felt only within a certain category of finished products

materials afterwards, as to commence by attacking assembly shops, where finished parts are put together, instead of the various auxiliary plants manufacturing special parts (gauges, tyres, etc.) for complete units such as tanks or aeroplanes. It is not at all the same thing whether one destroys a break-down train and its repair materials before or after the important bridge which is the principal objective of the attack. In certain circumstances the bridge should be destroyed first, all telephone communications cut, and then the break-down train dealt with; finally, to hamper the enemy in restoring his means of communication, all transformers in the electrical network should be sabotaged. All acts of sabotage should, according to circumstances, form a co-ordinated chain in terms of time and space. Actions systematically organized in this way cut more deeply into the enemy's war machine.

Technical and economic life has so many branches that we cannot consider all sides of the problem. Each factory produces different articles and requires different raw materials and technical installations. In one there is a turbine or a generating plant for electricity, in another a drilling machine or a laboratory, the destruction of which would partially or wholly paralyse the establishment. Each case calls for special technical and local knowledge. However, in spite of the multiplicity of conditions, there are ways of getting at whole industrial regions in a very simple manner. For instance, most technical installations in an area, say factories, railways, airfields, garages or other branches of modern life, depend upon electricity. It is used for points, signals, repair shops and the offices. Nowadays central power stations supply whole regions with current. The energy produced in the Massif Central in France is used throughout the industrial area of Lyons. The destruction of a power station or of a few pylons or a transformer can, by a single blow, reduce production in a large number of works. In this way the explosion of 14th July 1943, by destroying four high-tension pylons at Vieville en



EFFECT OF COALMINE STRIKES ON STEEL PRODUCTION

This diagram demonstrates how the strikes in the coalmines affected some weeks later the steel production and consequently the whole metallurgical industry in France

Haye, put fifteen works out of action in the Briey basin for a whole month. The destruction of a transformer on 23rd July 1943 closed down a factory at Perbal. Again, the blowing up of three transformers at the big Lorrain establishments at Luneville necessitated lengthy repairs to three of the principal machines. Only one machine could be run at a time, and production was reduced to 33 per cent of normal. By these means, and with less risk to the civilian population, it is possible to paralyse industries which would otherwise have to be subjected to aerial bombardment, which is not always accurate and causes only a limited amount of damage. Sabotage is also less costly than air attack.

Another method, in some areas, is the destruction of navigable waterways. In the north of France, in Belgium, Holland and the north-west of Germany, a large part of the traffic between the industrial regions, especially of coal and raw materials, is water-borne. By destroying locks, canal bridges, and alimentary reservoirs, such transport can be held up and cause a slowing down of industrial production. In any event, the railways become enormously overloaded. Destructions carried out in the Department of Meurthe et Moselle interfered seriously with the export of foodstuffs from France to Germany and also tied up, for three months, the supply of Ruhr coal to the industrial regions of Lorraine.

A very special branch of clandestine warfare is the use of strikes and sabotage to upset the working of maritime installations and organizations. This is done partly in the ports themselves and partly on the ships. The best known and most effective way of sabotaging a ship is to mix some sand with the oil used for lubricating the engines, preferably in the gears connecting the propellor with the main shaft. One handful of sand will immobilize the best vessel for several days. Another method is to put the compasses and sextants out of adjustment by displacing or tampering with the magnets. If the weather is hot, fires can be started by pouring petroleum

on the coal. The temperature in the holds of ships carrying tropical fruits can be lowered; cargoes of meat and other perishable goods can be drenched with kerosene. Grain ships can be sunk by opening the sea-cocks or fire pumps and flooding the holds with water, or, more simply still, by opening the air-ducts towards the wind in wet weather. Grain which becomes wet increases its volume threefold and will burst the strongest decks and bulkheads. In port, strikes or revolutionary movements amongst the dockers can be very effective. Cranes and other dock installations can be sabotaged and the shipping marks on cases containing merchandise altered.

At the risk of repetition we are going to refer again to passive resistance, to the tactics and strategy of strikes, which constitute a sort of sabotage. The principles laid down for the co-ordination of sabotage activities apply equally here. 'Workmen's movements should take place simultaneously in production and transport. In the latter and in the metallurgical branches of industry, the trade unions should arrange for a series of strikes. An essential element of the operation is the co-ordination in time between the strikes and the consequent delays in the arrival of foodstuffs, resulting in reduced production. . . . As far as organization is concerned, the centre of gravity is to be found in the Labour Federations of the metallurgical industries. Propaganda will be directed by the Central Committee. . . . Strike groups should be organized on proper lines and local leaders should lay their plans in January and February. In March, complete organized general strikes should be arranged to take place, their dates to be fixed in accordance with the circumstances ruling at the time. . . . The railway connections between Bremen and Düsseldorf and between Hamburg and Bielefeld (two of the principal lines running from western Germany into the Ruhr) will be cut. . . . Dortmund, important town in the Ruhr, will be the centre for the transport strikes. . . .'

These instructions figured in Protocol 'M'. Another example worthy of mention in this connection are certain directives of the French trade unions (C.G.T.) now mainly under Communist influence. They show at the same time the similarity of the methods employed in Germany and France, and probably also in many other countries. Here are some of the extracts from the documents seized by the French police and mentioned by Home Secretary Moch in his speech in the Paris Chamber dealing with the disturbances in the autumn of 1948: 'Only properly co-ordinated strikes can achieve success. . . . Each striker should accumulate a reserve of provisions. . . . Troop transport should be disorganized by the same methods as employed during the German occupation. . . .The official Civil Service stamps should be used and if these are not available duplicates should be made. . . .' All this sounds like so many paragraphs in operation orders, laying down the various echelons for battle.

The technique of strike co-ordination in time and space was fully developed during the disturbances in France in 1948. The first objectives were the coalmines, after which the Communist trade unions transferred their attention to coal imports and the transport of fuel in general, in order to reduce stocks to the minimum. A universal shortage of coal has its repercussions on all branches of industry, especially that of steel production, in which the Communists created trouble as soon as the coal strike ended. In view of this strategy it devolves upon the authorities responsible for preventive measures to exercise special supervision over those particular industries closely connected with the ones already hit by strikes. A suitable analogy would be that of a fire, where the fire brigade drenches the surrounding buildings to prevent the conflagration spreading.

So far we have limited our discussion to the economical and political rather than the military aspects of sabotage. But though its influence on events at the front is only of an



TIMING OF STRIKES

D-day: In the coalmines and some auxiliary industries.

D+10: In steel production.

D+20: In the motor industries.

D+30: In some auxiliary industries.

D+32: In harbours in order to stop import of coal and raw materials.

Sabotage on the transport network and power plants or high-tension lines in accordance with the timing of the strikes

indirect nature, it is none the less important to co-ordinate sabotage activities with military operations. The efforts of the French resistance movement during the Anglo-American invasion battles are a source of enlightenment on this subject. Plans had been in preparation by General de Gaulle's staff as early as 1943 and the following were laid down:

(*a*) Green Plan—against railways.

(*b*) Frog Plan—against all railway auxiliary services.

(*c*) Tortoise Plan—against road systems.

(*d*) Violet Plan—against underground telephone cables.

The basic idea of the *Green Plan* was to cut the railways all over France at hundreds of different places. In its original form, the plan was too rigid. Too little liberty of action was left to the saboteurs; it had not been sufficiently realized that sabotage has to be adapted to constantly changing circumstances and, in particular, to the enemy's counter-measures. All the same, results were obtained from the very beginning. On the important Strasbourg-Paris line between 6th June and 15th September 1944, in a section ninety kilometres long, the track was cut at eighty-seven places. It is interesting to follow the way sabotage methods developed as a result of practical experience. At first it was thought sufficient to wreck the tracks without bothering with the traffic. But this method meant the train personnel could often be forewarned. So mines were put on the rails that exploded only when the train rode over them; with good results, particularly when the explosions took place at curves, on inclines, or at switching points. But even then locomotive drivers, by proceeding slowly and carefully, could often discover the charges, or permanent way patrols would dismantle them in time. In the end two new methods were brought into use. First the charges were not placed in position until the last moment before the train was due. This was easily accomplished near to signals or with the help of a track patrolman. Then the explosive charges were camouflaged or disposed in such a

fashion that they could not easily be detected. Simultaneous destruction of telegraph lines delayed the arrival of help and attempts were made to sabotage the break-down trains. The best results were obtained by organizing all sabotage action in one region from a single centre so that the attacks were no longer made haphazard, but co-ordinated in time and place; the track was blocked at the last moment and at the right spot. In this way delays were caused on lines used by the enemy as follows:

Between 6th and 7th June 1944	7 hours
Between 8th and 15th June 1944	13½ hours
Between 16th and 20th June 1944	8 hours
	(*shortage of explosives*)
Between 21st and 30th June 1944	30 hours

The *Frog Plan* (attacks on railway auxiliary services) foresaw:

The neutralization of engine-sheds by upsetting machines into turntable pits.

The neutralization of electric sub-stations.

Destruction of telephone networks.

The *Tortoise Plan*, designed to sabotage communications by road, proved less effective than the campaign against the railways. In practice, road communications can only be badly damaged by destroying heavy-load bridges and this only serves a useful purpose if it makes wide detours necessary. Furthermore, these bridge-blowing operations call for elaborate preparations lasting from three to six hours and are difficult to hide from the enemy. Small bridges on the other hand can easily be replaced by temporary ones. An easy form of sabotage is the changing or destruction of signposts, road signs or even milestones, which the local population can do at night without running much risk. Whenever such tricks were played in France one could see not only isolated vehicles taking wrong turnings, but whole columns diverted on to secondary roads on which it was difficult for them to

turn back. By simultaneously strewing on the highway special nails which puncture pneumatic tyres, whole divisions can be thrown into a state of disorder. Blocking roads by felling trees across them is another way, but when, as is generally the case, explosives have to be used, there is the risk of reprisals. Clearly these acts of sabotage must be carried out at the most suitable time; that is, when the enemy is making large troop movements by road. Otherwise he has time to take the necessary measures, to put up new signposts or organize the local inhabitants to pilot isolated vehicles or entire columns. He can get rid of the road nails by means of vehicles fitted with special brushes, similar to road sweepers, or by using magnetic apparatus.

The *Violet Plan*—was concerned with the telephonic communications of the German army in France. The destruction of overhead wires is easy, but the main aim was destruction on a large scale of the telephone posts or the connections between the lines themselves, so as to cause short circuits or other damage. By passing high tension current into low tension systems, a number of installations can be burned out. Collaboration between two teams of saboteurs can ensure good results. Whilst one team removes the seals, or other safety devices, from a large telephone distribution box or similar piece of equipment, the other switches on high tension current. This destroys almost all the apparatus designed for low tension current. Telephone lines should always be destroyed at important points such as junction boxes or central switchboards.

Another method is to sabotage underground telephone cables. These are mostly laid along main roads at a depth of two to three feet in places known only to Post Office personnel. It requires about two hours to dig down to them, destroy them and remove all traces, so the work can hardly be done on a main road without causing comment. However, should it be achieved, it interrupts communications important to the

enemy for from three to five days. Underground cables can be cut most easily where they cross large rivers, when they are generally attached to the bridgework. Of course, it is not possible to destroy all the means of signal transmission of a hostile army, but the destruction of telephone lines can mean that the enemy has to overload his radio system and this, during important military operations, causes serious inconvenience.

According to General Eisenhower, the activities of the French resistance movements were equivalent, as far as their effects were concerned, to those of a force of fifteen divisions. Although this statement, probably made for political reasons, may appear somewhat of an exaggeration, thanks to the action of the F.F.I.:

The German 17th Armoured Division was lost or delayed several days between Bordeaux and Poitiers.

The 2nd Armoured S.S. Division, 'Das Reich', which left Montauban on 6th June did not arrive in Normandy until 17th June 1944 owing to the constant cutting of the railway from Brive to Toulouse.

The 11th Armoured Division from the eastern front took three times longer to cover the 450 kilometres in France than it required to travel 1,650 kilometres separating Russia from the French frontier.

The state of chaos on the railway system was so serious that at the beginning of July it took eight days to go from Geneva to Paris, a journey which previously required seven hours.

From 6th June to 26th July 1944, that is, from the invasion date to the break-through at Avranches:

Six German divisions were prevented from reaching the battlefields of Normandy.

Two divisions were pinned down in Brittany (1st Infantry Divison and 3rd Parachute Division).

The 715th Infantry Division was held back in the Mans district.

The 181st and 272nd Infantry Divisions were pinned down in the Toulouse-Bordeaux-Pyrenees district.

The 116th Armoured Division was pinned down in the Paris district.

We have seen that sabotage action, to be effective, must be carried out systematically.[1] Unco-ordinated or unnecessary attempts only result in little gain at great sacrifice. Sabotage is a dangerous job and it requires cool-headed men, true soldiers of modern warfare. However, sabotage actions, even in war-time, must be kept within certain bounds. The mass destruction of installations of technical and economic importance can seriously hinder post-war reconstruction, as was the case in western Europe. Far too many bridges and electric powerhouses were destroyed because of lack of method and technical knowledge. Installations were stupidly destroyed where they were not of the slightest interest from a military point of view. The populations of many regions were seized by a craze for destruction, which had disastrous consequences later on.

(4) THE GUERRILLA WAR

'The object of the struggle is the destruction of the living forces of the enemy.' The aim described by Clausewitz cannot be achieved by guerrilla warfare which is, correctly speaking, sabotage with violence, executed not by individuals or teams, but by organized bands.

This kind of war can only be waged successfully if every individual in the guerrilla forces is convinced of his importance in the struggle. He should be persuaded that the smallest effort of a single man carries weight in the final result and

[1] A further illustration of the effectiveness of organized sabotage can be found in the successes of the Greek Communists. In the single month of August 1948 they carried out attacks against 312 bridges, 325 railway tracks, 91 trains, 153 stations, 54 telephone and telegraph units as well as 21 acts of sabotage in various factories.

that, in the last resort, success depends upon his will-power, tenacity and personal valour. In a guerrilla battle partisans will, as often as not, feel they are surrounded; but no such encirclement is effective until they actually give way to the fear that they are lost. Guerrillas should remember that the attacking columns, penetrating deeply into insurgent territory, have just the same feeling of isolation as long as the guerrillas carry on the fight and keep up their morale.

The ceaseless movement which characterizes guerrilla warfare, not only makes it possible to retain the initiative but, at the same time, to keep the enemy on the move. The operations of regular enemy troops should be provoked by the partisans; not the other way about. Only in these circumstances can the underground movement retain the initiative and offensive character which cause the enemy forces to launch attacks that miss their mark, and so leave free new fields of action for the guerrillas and saboteurs. 'Guerrilla bands turned up everywhere; where we did not happen to be, they were there. When we arrived, they retired. When we retired, they came back,' General Heinrich von Brandt writes of the war in Spain.[1]

It is never advisable, in small-scale warfare, to use large groups of guerrillas for raids or surprise attacks. And, in fact, the more carefully an operation has been prepared, the fewer people are required. The smaller the attacking force, the less possibility is there of friction, and the greater the facility of action. Engagements requiring large bodies of combatants are doomed to failure in guerrilla warfare; they often end in total annihilation. A small group is better able to make such good use of the ground that it cannot be detected by tanks or planes, and after the action it can more easily retire into safe hiding. One of the principal elements of a successful raid is the proper use of darkness, fog and the advantages

[1] *Memoirs of the Spanish War of 1808–11* (in German), by Heinrich von Brandt, published by Gutenberg Press in Hamburg, 1908.

offered by broken ground. In a country where the support of the mass of the inhabitants can be relied upon and the security services are not too vigilant, the use of motor vehicles is of inestimable value. Unexpected appearances, lightning strokes and sudden disappearances become much easier to carry out. But francs-tireurs seldom enjoy the advantage of motorized transport, especially in regions closely guarded by the enemy, and they operate most of the time on foot. An exception is, in certain parts of Europe, the bands of mounted partisans. They have the advantage of being able to move more quickly than unmounted men and cross country more easily than motorized troops who are generally restricted to the roads. The distances partisans can cover on foot are, however, incredible. This was particularly noticeable in Russia. The group under Major-General S. A. Korpak marched 8,000 miles in twenty-six months in the Ukraine, Poland and the Carpathians.[1] In a single night Russian partisans have covered up to thirty miles, hiding in the woods during the daytime. On principle they preferred to stick to the smaller secondary roads, even if it meant making a wide detour. They often changed direction and always avoided large localities, especially those garrisoned by the enemy. Everywhere on the way the bands obtained recruits and found stragglers who had lost contact with their units. Thus they constantly grew in size. In small places they immediately created cells of new organizations, which protected the movements of the main columns. Territory closely guarded by the enemy was crossed in small parties or even individually, and always in a series of bounds from one region to another, the bands re-assembling at pre-determined spots. The movements of the Russian partisans were a mass infiltration of separate bands behind the enemy lines to a depth of 600

[1] During the same period they destroyed 52 railway trains, 256 bridges, 96 depots, 2 petrol refineries, 200 kilometres of track, 20 tanks, and killed 1,000 German soldiers.

miles. In the summer of 1944 the Russian leaders Colonel Velicka and Captain Jegoroy appeared in Slovakia in order to organize bands. At that time the real battle-front was 300 miles away from the Carpathians. Of course, the circumstances in eastern Europe favoured this kind of guerrilla warfare, but still more easily can it be carried out in the Asiatic theatres of war. Its adoption in western Europe is more difficult, however, although appreciable results can be obtained by good organization, provided the underground movement has the support of the population.

The Second World War provides useful lessons on resistance fighting in towns. We have already mentioned the risings in Warsaw, Paris and Prague, where we saw large towns lending themselves more easily to secret sabotage activities than to direct combat. The space necessary for guerrilla warfare is missing, and the population is too exposed to reprisals, particularly in the form of aerial bombardment. In street fighting barricades have lost much of their former value and are nowadays only used to bring tanks or other vehicles to a standstill. The defence of barricades is no longer conducted from behind them, but from neighbouring houses. Partisans firing from cellar or ground-floor windows can use such weapons as anti-tank guns, bazookas, or machine-guns to good effect, while from the upper stories and especially the rooftops, hand grenades can be hurled at the attacker. As soon as enemy troops push forward into the houses, the partisans should escape to take up the fight elsewhere. Signposts and street names should be removed before the fight begins for the enemy will be inadequately, if at all, acquainted with the town. Destruction of telephone communications will further obstruct him.

On the subject of underground movements in towns Lenin said: 'A resistance group should be formed from men living near each other or who meet regularly. The first duty of the combat groups is to ensure constant liaison with each other

and especially with neighbouring groups. Special recognition signs should be agreed upon in advance, such as signals from windows, whistling, or peculiar call sounds, so as to facilitate quick assembly of fighting units whenever necessary, even at night time. It is not sufficient merely to agree upon these signals; they should be used in exercises so as to make sure that they will function in practice. . . . The preliminary work should foresee an intelligence service, collection of maps showing prisons, police posts, ministries, etc. Service routine in government offices and post and telegraph offices should be noted. It is extremely important to know the situation of magazines containing arms, ammunition, etc. There is a great deal of work to be done in this respect.'[1]

All these tactical considerations lead us to another problem, that of the organization and armament of detachments in guerrilla warfare. The military grouping of various guerrilla bodies is never the same. Their organization depends on conditions in the field, kind and strength of the enemy supervision, possibilities of living on the country or provisioning by air (in the desert, water supply has a direct influence on organization and numbers) and many other factors. In tropical countries, the organizing of combat units may be influenced by the varying conditions between different races and their regional social customs. Colonel Lawrence tells us: 'Shock troops could not be formed up in accordance with general practice. On account of inter-tribal suspicions we were unable to get the members of different tribes to act together, or to operate with one tribe on the territory of another.' When you examine Lawrence's statement more closely, you realize that the self-same difficulties existed in Europe, especially where underground movements comprised a number of different political factions, a circumstance we have already analysed.

[1] This quotation is from an article by Lenin dated October 1905 and entitled *The Tasks of the Revolutionary Army.*

TECHNIQUE OF UNDERGROUND WAR

As already pointed out, vast expanses of territory, difficult to keep under supervision, are more suitable for operations by large-scale formations than smaller spaces where they are narrowly hemmed in. Whereas in Yugoslavia the partisans succeeded in forming entire divisions, in Russia the average strength of bands was between 100 and 120 men. In western Europe they operated in still smaller units. The organization of the F.T.P.[1] in France, was as follows. The basic unit, the combat group, was divided into two teams. The first consisted of three men and the group leader, the second of three men and the leader's second-in-command. The section consisted of three groups, a company had three sections, and a battalion was made up of three companies. Superimposed on this structure was the geographical organization by departments, groups of departments, territories and zones. A committee of three men commanded all the F.T.P. of one department. This elastic system was adaptable to the different kinds of fighting—in towns, villages, or in the maquis; in sabotage, bombing or in derailment missions. It also ensured the maximum of secrecy, the two teams of the same group, for example, only meeting, on principle, when on active duty.

During the Second World War the equipment of the guerrillas was inadequate. Many of them had only old weapons, others had to rely on arms taken from the enemy. In some cases partisans had to be satisfied with whatever they could manufacture themselves. The armament and supply of an underground movement is another problem. This can be done in different ways, sometimes by sea and sometimes overland, but generally the greater part will be airborne. There are two methods: the material can be dropped in special containers, or the aeroplanes or gliders can land and be unloaded on the ground. In both cases careful preparations are essential. The exact position of the landing ground, agreed in advance,

[1] F.T.P.: Francs-Tireurs and Partisans (Communist resistance organization).

should be checked by map reference with the air base from which the arms are to be despatched. The reception team should be waiting at the agreed time and contact with the aircraft made by means of optical signals, especially lights. At the landing spot great care must be taken not to attract the attention of the enemy. The material dropped should be stored away quickly in safe hiding places.

For aeronautical reasons most of these operations have to be carried out by moonlight and so are only possible for a few days in the month. A lot depends as well on atmospheric conditions, on the conformation of the ground, and on the enemy's activities in the territory. Whenever enemy vigilance is lax, parachute drops by large formations of aircraft can take place most of the time in daylight. Only so is it really possible to collect the containers and get the material safely away into hiding, though sometimes these operations can be protected by guerrilla bands. Here again the problem assumes a different aspect in the empty spaces of Asia and Africa where the enemy's counter-action can scarcely be instantaneous. Several days at least, or even weeks, may be available to collect, hide and even distribute the material. In its present stage of development the technique of arms supply by air is already very efficient and a large body of guerrillas can be equipped in a comparatively short space of time.[1]

The greater part of guerrilla armament consists of light portable weapons—partisans using heavy weapons lose their mobility. Light small arms can be manufactured in quantity in any country and consequently even a power which does not

[1] During the war the following arms supplies were parachuted into France:

198,000 sten guns	595,000 kg. explosives
128,000 rifles	723,000 hand grenades
20,000 Bren guns	9,000 mines
10,000 carbines	2,700 bazookas
58,000 pistols	285 mortars

possess a highly developed industry can still help underground movements. The partisans need principally automatic rifles and pistols, hand grenades, etc. Sometimes they may need light machine-guns and mortars but generally in guerrilla tactics (short distance fighting), the range of such weapons is too great and moreover, they are difficult to hide.

For fighting against tanks underground movements should be provided with bazookas or tank-mines. They also need explosives both for guerrilla attacks and sabotage actions. Saboteurs require special materials, such as chemical products which decompose petrol, lubricants into which fine grains of sand have been introduced for damaging machine bearings, and special bombs for setting fire to coal depots and similar places. Secret movements should be plentifully supplied with wireless transmitters and receivers. In certain circumstances it is even necessary to send them provisions.

The immediate distribution of arms to the more isolated combatants is generally not undertaken until the movement has got well into its stride. Otherwise some may give themselves away too early, or, as happened in France, part of the material may find its way into the black market. It is very difficult to store arms in bulk in large depots and keep them secret for any length of time, and material should therefore be split up and stored in a large number of small hiding places. Then, in case of betrayal, only a small part is lost at a time. The decentralization of stores is also advisable, even in the midst of the struggle, so that partisans and saboteurs can get supplies everywhere without the risks of transporting quantities from place to place. In any case, owing to the constant fluctuations of guerrilla warfare, it is wiser to have the material spread over several points than to have everything concentrated in one place.

The importance of replenishment in arms and ammunition makes it advisable to organize a special supply department to work alongside the intelligence, propaganda and action

organizations. In this department would be teams whose duty would be to receive, hide and also distribute the material sent. It would exercise the same function in the guerrilla movement as that of the Army Service Corps in the regular army. That does not mean that materials should be obtained exclusively through this supply department. Very often it is necessary to parachute supplies direct to the units. The supply department, however, can also keep a certain check on the conduct and political development of an underground movement.

Collaboration between guerrillas and the regular army, whenever possible, is an important factor in a people's war. But there are certain aspects of this problem that must be considered. The regular soldier is properly enrolled in the ranks of his unit. His military capacities are known, as well as the extent to which he can be trusted from a moral and political point of view—so far, at any rate, as can be judged by his past, his family history, etc. There are seldom such guarantees for a guerrilla combatant. He is an unknown quantity, an anonymous individual. This is a logical consequence of the illegal character of the clandestine movement. It is, therefore, easier for the enemy to introduce spies and provocateurs into illegal organizations than into a regular army. Moreover, the essentially conspiratorial character of clandestine movements, the unlawful atmosphere in which they exist, cannot fail to influence the characters of the guerrillas themselves. Trials held after the war, particularly in France, proved that many members of the resistance were also working for the Germans. For all these reasons it is evident that the greatest care is necessary when calling for collaboration between army and the guerrilla bands. The latter should never be allowed to know more about the plans, intentions, strength, or positions of the regular armies than is absolutely necessary. This does not mean that collaboration cannot be productive of good results; in all phases of the

struggle, the partisans can work very usefully not only with the army, but also with the air force.

The normal formations of a regular army—infantry divisions, mountain troops or motorized divisions—are rarely suitable for working alongside the partisans within the same tactical framework. It appears advisable, therefore, in modern warfare, to make provision for troops whose specialized training will adapt them to the fighting methods of the guerrillas. If these special troops also know the language and the nature of the country in which they are called upon to operate it would be a further great advantage. Such units created during the Second World War were, for example, the famous British 'Commandos' and the parachutist S.A.S. (Special Air Services).

A power which seeks to develop guerrilla warfare seriously, in another country, should dispose of entire brigades of special troops. They might be called 'Regular Guerrillas'. A 'regular guerrilla' division 15,000 strong would be able to form 1,000 detachments of fifteen men, who, well trained and equipped, could cause tremendous damage in the enemy back areas.

It would be a formidable task to enumerate all the ways in which guerrilla bands can co-operate with or directly support regular troops. But the supply lines of a motorized army give one example. They even encourage small-scale warfare! A continuous stream of petrol supplies the tanks, motorized units and air squadrons and if partisan warfare can be made to flare up along this channel it becomes a very serious danger for the enemy. The security of his supply line becomes more difficult as the armoured spear-head penetrates farther into open country. Attacks against it, even when the partisans are inferior in numbers and armament, can cause severe dislocations within the enemy's armoured formations.

But the most effective method of support for army opera-



ORGANIZATION OF THE REDOUBT OF VERCORS

This plan was formulated in 1943, when French patriots wished to establish a redoubt in the mountainous region of the Vercors. Although the plan is a model of tactical planning, it has to be borne in mind that, in this massif only thirty miles wide and fifty miles long, the guerrillas did not have the necessary space to exploit fully their mobility

tions by partisan movements lies in the creation of what are known as 'redoubts'. These are risings in mountainous regions, particularly those which adjoin lines of strategic importance to the enemy. These mountain fastnesses can in time become real fortresses of the guerrilla movement. The French had quite a number of redoubts, especially in the south and south-east of France. They became rallying points for guerrillas and the campaign centres which went by the name of 'maquis'. Begun in 1942, they displayed an activity very disagreeable to the Germans well before the American invasion. Similar nests were built in the marshy and wooded regions of Poland and Russia, as well as in the mountains of Yugoslavia.

These redoubts can be of two different kinds. In the event of enemy invasion, the commander-in-chief of a regular army can simply leave behind, in suitable regions, a number of regular army units specially organized and trained for guerrilla warfare. These regular guerrillas will form the nucleus of a resistance movement, built up of numerous guerrilla bands. At first, the arms and provisions left behind will provide for the upkeep of clandestine activities; later, they will have to be provisioned by air. The passes leading into the interior of the mountain regions should be closely guarded and destruction of bridges and erection of obstacles will make it difficult for the enemy to penetrate into the inner fortress. In the heart of these mountainous districts small aerodromes and landing grounds can be built for receiving supplies.

A redoubt of this kind forms a base of operations for guerrilla bands that can destroy the enemy's communications, carry out surprise attacks against columns on the roads, raid aviation camps, blow bridges, and in various ways support the people's resistance movement. In flat country they work in collaboration with the saboteurs, whom they also supply with arms and the explosives necessary for their exploits. In this way the guerrillas can dominate a perimeter around

their mountain redoubt up to a depth which may even reach 100 or 200 miles. Activities can be co-ordinated between the different redoubts; the space which separates them constitutes the common battlefield for the saboteurs and guerrillas.

Another form of redoubt of the Second World War created itself, one might say, without outside help. But this gradual formation of a redoubt in the mountains through the uncoordinated organization of one camp after another, can result in drawing the enemy's attention far too soon to a certain region. It gives him the opportunity to take counter-measures and occupy important localities in the district. It seems to be better therefore, whenever possible, to seize the whole mountain area in one stroke and reinforce the redoubt afterwards with regular airborne troops. This method of supporting guerrilla resistance movements can be particularly important in non-European countries.

The question arises: How long can a redoubt hold out, cut off as it is from the principal front? Apart from the question of morale, the answer depends upon the following considerations:

1. The number of troops the enemy can spare against the guerrillas. It should be pointed out here that if, on the one hand, the resistance movements force the enemy to withdraw important forces from the main battle front, on the other hand the regular army can also force the enemy to abandon his attacks on the guerrillas.

2. The situation on the principal battle front, which determines how and when regular operations can relieve the strain on the redoubt or raise the siege altogether.

3. The amount of help that can be given to the guerrillas by air supply and paratroops.

4. The extent of the air support that fighter and bomber aircraft can give in co-operation with guerrilla action.

Air support for resistance movements depends upon the

same factors as for any sort of co-operation between air and land forces. These are: the distance to the scene of operations, the number of aircraft available, the situation on the principal battlefield, which determines the importance and sequence of the operations, climatic and atmospheric conditions, etc.

If, however, the High Command considers it advisable to reinforce the guerrilla campaign, aviation is the most suitable medium. Scout planes can reconnoitre the whole insurrection area and no large-scale ground operations that the enemy undertake against the guerrillas can escape detection. The planes can warn the guerrillas and, by bombing the enemy columns, assembly points, and communication centres, isolate the insurrection area in the same way that a battlefield is 'caged' through cutting off the back areas by continuous air attacks. (An operation which pre-supposes practically total mastery of the air.) But guerrilla raids themselves can also receive effective air support. A very favourable moment to spring a surprise attack on a town is when it is being bombarded from the air. Whilst the sirens are warning the population (and the garrison) and everybody takes to the air raid shelters, the guerrillas can do their work much more easily and commit serious acts of sabotage.

We have analysed the four different ways of carrying on the struggle in a people's war: intelligence service, propaganda, sabotage and guerrillas, and we have shown how they complement each other. We have seen how and why an underground war, more than any other kind, calls for energetic leadership of a firm and resolute nature. Any nation which is content with spectacular but purposeless acts of braggadocio is incapable of that hard, cold resolution essential in a people's war. The accuracy and veracity of intelligence and situation reports are, we see, the very basis of confidence. Without them in secret warfare, the will to fight melts away. Not the fanatical followers of the Mahdi but the bands of

tough Serbian peasants should serve as a model for guerrillas. Nothing, we may conclude, could be truer in its modern application to secret warfare than Clausewitz's saying: 'Anything done without full knowledge of the facts, and a firm and resolute will, must assuredly fail.'

CHAPTER IV

Defence (Against Underground Warfare)

In previous chapters we have stressed the essentially political character of underground movements. Therefore it is obvious that action against them should be taken principally in the political field. A policy designed to capture the sympathy of the great mass of the people will effectively prevent, in advance, any sudden popular rising. Such measures are the best antidote to guerrilla warfare, which can only flourish where there exists discontent among the masses on social or national grounds.

Very often, such political campaigns are the most economical; certainly they cost less in human lives and property. But is it always possible to settle disputes in a peaceful manner? History does not encourage us to place much confidence in such a hope.

In its initial stages a clever occupation policy will take care not to excite national sentiment or encourage social differences unnecessarily, but this is far from easy in the present state of world politics. In nearly all countries, sympathies are sharply divided between 'East and West'. At the same time, the very presence of an occupying power in a country is naturally unwelcome and it is practically impossible to avoid friction.

If, then, it is not possible to smooth out the political disagreements, what should be done? One should seek to win over as large a part of the population as possible; the larger

it is, the more difficult for the opposition. Above all, every effort should be made to make the disagreements an internal affair. When several political parties are represented in a resistance movement it is of course easier to set them quarrelling and fighting with each other and small detached units can be dealt with more easily than a unified underground movement.

The German secret services were certainly deeply involved in the duel between Tito and Mikhailovitch, as well as in the stirring up of differences between the Polish partisans and the Polish emigrants from London.

In the fight against underground movements it is, however, essential to have the help of at least a part of the local population. They know the local conditions much better than the foreign troops or police and can render great service. In practically every country there are certain people who, either from pure political conviction or selfish opportunism, are prepared to place their services at the disposal of the occupying forces. A skilful political policy will encourage them. Propaganda, subsidies, and the founding of political associations and parties can make these elements multiply and serve as a useful counter-balance to that part of the population which is ill-disposed to the occupation. Only by these means can one hope to be spared the annoyance of open warfare. And even if this should come, then the political organizations thus formed can at least be looked to for valuable support.

But how is the situation to be dealt with if, despite all these measures, one is forced into open combat with a resistance movement? 'What is really meant by defence? It means parrying a blow which is aimed at oneself. What is its main characteristic? To be aware of the coming blow.' In these words Clausewitz opens his chapter on defence. The defence should clearly always be on the look-out for attacks by guerrilla forces. But the question of morale also plays a major part in the matter. Defence against a resistance movement neces-

sarily produces feelings of uncertainty, almost of frustration, when nothing seems to happen in spite of the fact that the threat is there all the time. These reactions can get on the nerves of the defenders to such an extent that in time they relax their vigilance.

If we count the political measures suggested above as the first, then the second stage of defence against underground movements will be the work of the police, which is to render the adversary powerless before he can resort to open fighting. Secret organizations should be attacked at the roots. A defensive intelligence service should be created with numerous agents at its disposal. Conspiracy is best met by counter-conspiracy. The struggle begins to resemble an old-time siege where both sides bored mines and counter-mines deeper and deeper with the intention of annihilating each other by subterranean explosions. No other way is possible. It may not be a chivalrous process, but neither is the use of the atomic bomb or aerial bombardment. 'Send spies out everywhere and keep yourself acquainted with the movements of the enemy partisans,' wrote Napoleon, 26th September 1813, to Marshal Lefebre. Spies must insinuate themselves right into the nerve centres of the underground movement. One need only think of the numerous tricks to which the German authorities resorted in dealing with the underground movements. Prizes were offered to traitors who would give away the position of wireless transmitting stations, arms depots, and the names of persons taking part in the conspiracy. In France, the Germans gave 250,000 francs to any person who disclosed to them a 'container' of parachuted weapons. How often have the agents provocateurs of the Gestapo passed themselves off as allied parachutists and, by so doing, won the confidence of the patriots? How many people were arrested in this way? It became almost impossible for the inhabitants of the occupied countries to distinguish a genuine parachutist from a bogus one, and the real parachutists eventually found it

difficult even to find hiding places. The Gestapo also released arrested patriots on condition that they worked in future for the German authorities. There were good reasons for this, for the difficulty and importance of introducing agents into the invisible network of clandestine organizations are very great. A few spies, once inside, can become such important sources of information that the capture of a considerable part of the network may easily result. They are certainly not pleasant people who take on these tasks, but in every nation there are individuals of all kinds, good and bad. It was not by mere chance that so many doubtful elements were to be found in the German secret police services; it is precisely they who are best suited to this kind of work. This is not to be taken as a defence of the Gestapo. In dealing with all aspects of secret warfare I am obliged to refer to these questions objectively.

The deeper a secret movement goes, the more cruel the methods it employs. Any means are considered justified provided they serve the purpose. It has always been so, and I think I am speaking the truth when I say that almost every nation, confronted by similar circumstances, would act in the same way. It should be pointed out, however, that violence is not always the best weapon of defence. For it is most often from fear or for vengeance that ordinary people themselves resort to force.

Defence against clandestine movements should, like the movements themselves, be systematically organized. The insurrection territory should be divided into regions and sectors where central bodies direct all activities. Otherwise it is like looking for a needle in a haystack.

We have learnt that without a proper network of wireless-sending stations an underground movement has no cohesion. These sending posts can of course sometimes be detected by agents. But more important are the listening posts, manned by what one might call the radio police. Take, for example,

the work of the German listening service during the Second World War. In 1942 a large central listening post was established at Charbonnières, together with a directional-finding station which registered all secret transmissions and their approximate location. Three radio-telegraphic and radio-telephonic listening cars were despatched into the region where the secret sending post was working. They were specially built cars, into which direction-finders were fitted. The sending station which had been logged continued transmitting and the Charbonnières central station steered the three direction-finding cars close in to the secret transmitter. When the cars got fairly near to it they separated and, by taking simultaneously separate bearings, succeeded gradually in fixing the location of the secret set within a radius of 100 to 300 yards.

In open country, where there were only a few isolated farms, that was near enough for their purpose, but in thickly built-up areas it was insufficient. The crews of the police cars would then dismount and, with the use of small goniometric apparatus, find their way to the very door of the building in which the transmitter was placed. The whole thing resembled a game of hunt the thimble, in which the radio-goniometers showed when the seeker was 'hot' or 'cold'.

Defence against wireless propaganda from abroad is much more difficult. It cannot be intercepted in the ether and it is psychologically a better policy to allow listening-in than to forbid it. Prohibition only increases the desire to listen and fortifies whatever belief there may be in its truthfulness. It becomes, moreover, even more dangerous by being passed on in whispers, as it will be, for it is impossible to stop it.

Another important means of defence against a movement is to tackle the leaders directly. Experience has shown that they play a vital part in secret warfare, as they do in revolutions. Resistance movements have always been the creations of a few brave and resolute characters. If it is possible to cap-

ture them, the movement receives a blow from which it has difficulty in recovering. It means 'a determined effort . . . to wipe out the brains of the army, and leave it without that central control which had built it up from a mass of irregular and independent groups into a coherent whole.'[1] It was for this reason that, on 25th May 1944, near Dvar, groups of German parachutists of 'Der Führer' Division were landed in gliders close to Tito's headquarters, with the order to take him dead or alive.

In regions where a popular rising is active everything should be guarded. Trustworthy technicians should be placed in industrial establishments to control production, reliable officials should be installed in government departments, the railways should be under military control. Towns should be strongly garrisoned. Aviation fields, depots, car parks, repair shops, electric or hydraulic central power houses and wireless stations, should all be strongly guarded. In particularly vulnerable spots, proper strongpoints can be established. The guarding of transport alone calls for large contingents of troops. When the total of special drafts required to safeguard rear communications is added up, it amounts practically to a complete army. In spite of that, they do not provide a full sense of security.

The measures taken by the Germans against the attempts to sabotage the Polish railways are instructive. The speed of the trains was reduced to a bare six miles an hour. In due course mixed trains were organized; that is, military trains in which the first carriages were occupied by Polish civilian passengers. The underground Polish propaganda immediately advised the local population not to travel. The German military authorities posted sentries every 150 yards or so along the tracks. To cover 400 miles this meant about 5,000 men on duty at a time, and, taking into account reliefs, maintenance, and headquarter organizations, a total number of

[1] Basil Davidson: *Partisan Pictures.*

about 15,000 men. In addition there had to be guard posts at the railway stations. A much more effective method was to compel the local population to guard its own section of the railway. If necessary they were even armed for the purpose. Their lives were forfeit for the security of the sections for which they were responsible. In other cases, hostages were taken as a precautionary measure against partisan attempts. In Yugoslavia alone, 65,000 hostages were executed. 'Terrorism was the solution of many problems posed by the resistance in occupied countries; it was one of the principal weapons of the Wehrmacht.'[1]

But in spite of all this the Germans never succeeded in crushing the spirit of the resistance movements. The struggle only became fiercer, every action was productive of reaction. It was like being attacked by thousands of small insects; you try first to get rid of them by waving them aside, then by crushing them. Hundreds replace those killed. Finally one becomes exasperated and strikes blindly in all directions. In this way such tragic reprisals were taken in the occupied countries during the Second World War. They proved in fact only how powerless the German authorities were. They are just as clear proof of the effectiveness of a people's war.

I should point out that reprisals have always been carried out in this kind of warfare. Lord Cathcart wrote in 1852: 'A war can end by the capture of the sovereign or leader who represents his people, but in suppressing a rebellion the insurgents should be punished and brought into subjection.' Lord Wolseley wrote: 'Seize everything of the highest value to the nation and either destroy it or take it away; this will probably hasten the end of the campaign.' If one wished to pursue this matter further one could quote many military writers of practically every nation. Defence against a resistance movement cannot, in fact, be entirely of a passive nature. A troop

[1] Statement by the President of the Nuremburg Tribunal, Chas. F. Wennerstrum.

which carries out a security task by remaining on the defensive will inevitably be at the receiving end, like a boxer who does nothing but cover up all the time. The defender plays a losing game, and in struggles of this kind experience goes to show that surprise attacks and lightning thrusts are far more effective than heavily armed defence.

Napoleon recognized the value of these principles. He disapproved of the attitude of garrison and fortress commanders who were content to remain static. 'If you tie down 1,500 men and 4 cannons at four separate guard posts, you immobilize uselessly 6,000 men and 16 cannons, and they will do nothing to protect our lines of communication. The enemy will attack our convoys four or five kilometres away from each post. I propose to abolish the system of garrisoning such posts and replace four of them by one mobile column. . . . It is the only way to clear the region and thus ensure the safety of our transports. . . .' Napoleon insisted upon fighting and beating the insurgents by adopting their own methods and hounding them down with mobile columns. . . . 'Use partisan methods when dealing with partisans,' he ordered Marshal Lefébre on 12th September 1813. However, these instructions did not help Napoleon to any great extent. His lines of march may have been cleared, but at what a cost! The bulk of his cavalry was engaged in guarding his supply convoys during the decisive battle of Leipzig.

The Germans used the same methods, and whenever possible organized detachments from the people of the country. In the First World War the Austrian High Command organized in Serbia bands of Macedonians, Albanians and Turks, who patrolled in native costume under their own officers. In the Second World War the Germans recruited whole divisions from the inhabitants of occupied countries, for example General Vlassov's White Russians of the Oriental Legion, the Oustachis of the Croat government, and the Militia in France. An interesting order gives us an insight

into the tasks allotted to these detachments; here it is in full:

1. Just as the uniformed police require the assistance of plain-clothes police, we must have bands of our own to support the troops against the enemy guerrilla bands.

2. The chief value of our bands does not lie in their numerical strength, but in the personality of their leaders.

3. The number of men in each band should be kept at 15 to 20. Armament—rifles and hand grenades.

4. Each band will be ordered to track down a specified enemy band for days or, if necessary, for weeks. This principle is fundamental and should be regarded as an order.

5. Our tactics should be the same as those adopted by enemy bands. Their principal mode of action should be surprise and their chief strength initiative. Secrecy of movement is of extreme importance.

6. An intelligence service is a primary need. Leaders of bands should notify their chiefs of their whereabouts every two days by messenger. They should pass other news on to neighbouring troops.

7. Bands should obtain their provisions either from the nearest troops or by requisitioning from the local inhabitants.

Signed: Chief of Counter-Guerrilla Movements, Col. T——.

The keener the guerrilla struggle becomes, the more bands are required to cope with it. Alongside these tactical measures, administrative regulations were also devised to assist in the fight against the resistance movement. In Yugoslavia each inhabitant had to carry a passport with a photograph of himself. Everybody was under obligation to warn the nearest military police as soon as a guerrilla band made its appearance in the neighbourhood. At night nobody was allowed to leave his house. The removal of cattle and the destruction of grain are also methods which can be adopted in

small-scale warfare, particularly outside Europe. It is a barbarous process which can result in the starvation of an entire population. In desert lands wells can be filled up or destroyed. These tactics of the counter-guerrillas, however, can only have good results if the people's war has not yet reached its full development.

Motorized transport can be used to good effect in defence against resistance movements. Motorized troops or anti-guerrillas can, in certain circumstances, succeed in holding up a small-scale war and considerably reducing its possibilities of success. Air forces can also be used in locating and fighting partisans, though there are difficulties in adapting the new types of fighters and bombers, for high speeds make it difficult for an observer to spot small enemy bands. It is, moreover, difficult to distinguish between enemy guerrillas and friendly bands. For that reason full collaboration is of considerable importance.

No doubt specially constructed aircraft could be used, preferably helicopters, which would be attached permanently to the security troops. They can fly slowly and low enough for thorough patrolling, and they can also land on uneven ground or in a limited space. Collaboration between aircraft, bands of anti-guerrillas and special parachutist units is another important matter. The first ensures aerial, the second ground reconnaissance, and from their results parachutists can be dropped where the situation demands.

The permanent allocation of aircraft and parachutists to the police forces of a country in which underground warfare is taking place can free large forces of infantry and tanks for more important work. But if the measures described do not prevent a general popular rising recourse must be had to orthodox military operations. We will see how these fit in with the methods of guerrilla warfare.

At the beginning, regular troops nearly always work in the dark. Fights with guerrillas almost invariably flare up sud-

denly and in unexpected places. The roads leading to these scenes of action are, for the most part, unknown. Another peculiarity of a guerrilla war is that it is impossible to gauge the exact strength of the guerrilla forces. They are generally overestimated, the natural consequence of surprise tactics in which small bands score important successes. During the Second World War the numerical strength of the partisans operating in the Carpathians was estimated by the German General Staff at about 15,000; in actual fact it scarcely exceeded 3,500 men. It was the same in France, where the Germans imagined there were 15,000 armed fighting men in the maquis of the Massif Central; there were barely more than 2,500. This uncertainty is one of the main characteristics of small-scale warfare and the less the enemy forces are organized, the more difficult it is to estimate their strength or quality.

A serious danger which a regular army has to face in a war against guerrillas is that of betrayal. Guerrillas generally know about any troop movements the moment they take place, and often before. News spreads in a mysterious fashion. However, by spreading false rumours it is often possible to start the enemy leaders off on a false scent.

When two armies find themselves face to face they are more or less able to guess not only the dispositions and strength of each others' forces, but also their intentions. For both regular armies conform to the same laws of strategy. Things happen differently in guerrilla warfare, where forces are not bound by any strategic code. Troops which, after a reverse, simply disperse, cannot be followed up in the same way as others which, in similar circumstances, retire in good order and compact formations to regular operational bases. Another peculiarity of the guerrilla troops is the extreme rapidity of their movements. This mobility, which has a considerable influence on the strategic and tactical conditions of small-scale warfare, is due to several causes; good marching

capacity, knowledge of the ground, freedom from auxiliary services, etc., and amongst the consequences arising from it are doubt and uncertainty for the regular army which confronts the partisans.

The resulting vagueness and indecision make the war against the guerrillas a sort of nightmare in which figure long marches without any apparent objective, attacks followed by retreats, the evacuation of conquered ground—all of which tend to lower the troops' morale and make the campaign long, costly, ineffective, and possibly even disastrous.

It is essential that any operation undertaken by regular troops should have a definite and fixed object and, once begun, should be carried out to the bitter end. Half measures are fatal.

It is precisely the superior organization of regular troops which interferes with their liberty of action in guerrilla warfare. Their complicated armament and equipment tie them down to their bases. Especially in non-European theatres, the lines of supply and communications necessitate large numbers of personnel. In advancing, a regular army drags behind it a long chain whose weight increases at every step forward, but the guerrillas have no base or even territory of their own—they need little in the way of stores and can take with them whatever they require. In view, moreover, of the fact that operations by the guerrillas against lines of communication are their best means of defence, the regular troops are obviously at a disadvantage. Of course, if aircraft and parachutists are available, their use can put a different aspect on affairs.

The tactics of these bands was admirably described by one of the leading French communists, Charles Tillon: 'The tactics of a globule of mercury which, as soon as one tries to seize it, scatters in small drops, which easily come together again into the original globule.' We have, then, to solve the problem of how to force the guerrillas into regular fighting.

The most effective way is to surround them. This can be done by isolating good-sized regions by concentric and simultaneous attacks. These regions are subsequently subdivided into separate sections in which the bands of guerrillas are cut off one by one and destroyed. But such operations can be very costly.

The effort of destroying a resistance movement can absorb an incredible number of troops, far greater, in fact, than that of the guerrillas themselves. It often happens that only a very small part of the troops in action actually succeed in engaging the enemy, say one battalion out of a division. Yet in order to bring the enemy to bay, the eight remaining battalions have had to be used as stops. Let us imagine a massif with a circumference of 600 miles. If it takes one division to screen a front of thirty miles, twenty divisions are necessary to surround the enemy effectively. In this way Marshal von Weichs, German Commander-in-Chief in the Balkan Peninsula, had to throw in twenty-five divisions in his sixth offensive against the Yugoslav guerrillas in mid-October 1943 and eighteen German and eight Bulgarian in his seventh offensive between April and June 1944. Early in 1948, in Greece, 20,000 members of guerrilla bands were fighting 120,000 regular troops.[1] The same applies to French Indo-China.

To sum up from a practical point of view, operations against guerrillas are executed somewhat as follows:

(*a*) Occupation of all important strategic points in the insurrection area, such as towns and villages, railway and road junctions, etc. Detachments of troops maintain liaison by constant patrolling of neighbourhood and approach roads. (Static defence.)

[1] A good example of this kind of 'rounding-up' operation is to be found in the efforts of the Greek government troops in the Grammos mountains in the summer of 1948, which, as is well known, did not by a long way accomplish the hoped-for final destruction of the insurgents, which was achieved only in 1949.

(*b*) Encirclement of insurrection area to prevent the escape of guerrillas. As pointed out, this requires a divison for every thirty to forty miles of line. The enclosed area is then reduced by drawing in the net tighter towards the centre. (Regional barrage.)

(*c*) Mobile columns, comprising different arms, penetrate deeply into the insurrection area and split it up into small sections. These columns work in close collaboration with the anti-guerrilla bands; their task is to surround the guerrillas more and more and, if possible, drive them back against the barrages mentioned in paragraph (*b*). (Mobile defence.)

(*d*) During the operation, aircraft should observe the movements of the enemy guerrillas and so help the ground troops in their operations. In certain cases parachutists can be used to intercept the withdrawal of the guerrillas.

In such ways the various branches of the defence, static and mobile, ground and air, can work in close co-operation. They are all complementary to each other. However, are such tactics practicable in jungle country? Or where the guerrilla fighting men suddenly transform themselves into peaceful peasants leaning on their ploughs whilst contemplating with astonishment the enemy troops passing by?

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of this chapter we made it clear that the best defence against people's revolts lies in the adoption by every possible means of a reasonable policy. In other words, prevention is better than cure. We were thinking at the time of a situation where one power is in occupation of another's country. But the prevention of peoples' wars does not always depend entirely upon internal policies, in spite of the fact that, in the ordinary course of events, the latter are very

often intimately bound up with foreign affairs. Foreign policy can often have quite a lot to do with the problem. A disconnected or hesitant foreign policy creates doubt and uncertainty, the concomitants of insecurity, which create an atmosphere favourable to insurrection. If we take a look at the actual world situation in the light of present-day events, and especially in view of the tension between East and West, we find that all the circumstances of our times lend themselves to the development of civil wars and revolutions.

Europe had already begun to disintegrate at the time of the Versailles Treaty, when our continent was split up lightheartedly into small disconnected units with no cohesion, either internally or externally. Twice in thirty years, these newly-born and badly-shorn lambs were wolfed, first by Hitler and then by Stalin. After the First World War the unity of the Danube countries was destroyed and, after the Second World War, Germany was pushed over the edge, with the consequent loss of the balance-weights of European stability. So far nobody appears capable of creating order out of the chaos. In the heart of Europe, where at one time the German Empire and the Danube countries existed, there was created a political, moral, economic and military vacuum which was inevitably filled by Communism. True, Pan-Germanism was destroyed but, as a result of the ensuing confusion, there has arisen in its place a greater danger, that of Asiatic Communism. Europe nowadays is like an apple which has begun to go rotten—you have to take off quite a lot of the peel before you get to the sound core. Is this to be wondered at, when the fate of Europe lies in the hands of people to whom our history, mode of living and traditions, yes, even our civilization itself, are practically unknown? Our continent is now in the period of its greatest fight for survival and our Western friends, generous-minded though they are in their efforts to help, often cause us as much embarrassment as our enemies cause us harm. It is as though an inexperienced

surgeon, with the best will in the world, creates new complications by his intervention. Unfortunately, the way out of our problems is not as dead straight as the boundary line between Arizona and Utah and it is only by our own continued efforts that we shall eventually succeed in pulling Europe out of the morass.

If only Britain would understand that she belongs to the European continent and that we all look to her for leadership. Her place is in the forefront of our ranks. The world must also realize that there can be no Europe without a free and healthy Germany, that we have to finish the Second World War in order to prevent the Third. Pan-Germanism is a peril of the past, the danger of Asiatic Communism is a very present one. It is not possible to fight successfully on two fronts and, if we are to meet the new danger, we must make peace with our adversaries of yesterday. Hatred and revenge never were, and never can be, the basis of constructive policy.

Time is getting short in which to remedy the results of the mistakes committed since 1945 and, unpleasant though the idea may be, we shall have to make 'unconditional peace' with Germany if we are to escape *our own* 'unconditional surrender'. Unfortunately my voice is too weak to reach those in whose hands the fate of humanity lies. Make up your minds, gentlemen; do not hesitate until it is too late!

Index

Active sabotage, *see* Sabotage
Aerial bombardment, 39, 166; *see* Collaboration
Afghanistan, 54
Afghan War, 69
'African line', 54–5
Aircraft: against guerrillas, 166; and tanks, 36
Air-lift, 35
Albania, 30, 57, 86, 164
Alps, 57
Annamite guerrillas, 54
Anglo-Saxon operational bases, 52
'Apparats' of Comintern, 114
Arab Free Rangers, 34, 64
Arabia, 54, 64
Aral, Sea of, 51
Armenian question, 57
Asia: and future war, 52–3; guerrilla bases in (possible), 56; and the Cominform, 53, 171, 172; 'Asia for the Asiatics', 52
Asiatics as guerrilla fighters, 55
Astrakhan, 44
Atlantic Wall, 44
Atom bomb, 17, 55
Austria, 42
Austrian General Staff, 1914, 29, 30, 164; and Secret Service, 30
Austro-Hungary, 32, 33, 86
Austro-Italian war, 23
Austro-Piedmontese war, 24
Austro-Prussian war, 23
A.V.N.O.J., 84
Avranches, 94
Azerbaidjan affair, 57

Bakitch, Mitar, 79
Balkans, 30, 46, 49, 73, 75, 92, 169; guerrilla war in, 33–5, 72, 75, 92
Baltic, 43, 46
Baluchistan, 54
'Banque Commerciale pour l'Europe du Nord', 99
Banska Bystrica, 47
Barricade-fighting, 95, 145
Bavaria, 32
B.C.R.A., 76
Belgrade, 100
Belgrade guerrilla school, 49, 88
Berlin, and underground warfare, 50
'Big battalions', 38
Bihatch officers' school, 122
Bitolj, 49
Black Sea, 51
Bolshevik tactics, 27, 32
'Bolshevik vigilance', 118
Brandt, H. von., 143

Briey basin sabotage, 134
Britain's link with Europe, 172
B.S.O.E. (command post), 108 (also B.R.C.A.)
Bucarest, 100
'Buckmaster' plan, 76
Bulgaria, 49, 99, 100, 109
'Business-men' infiltration, 32

Carpathians, 47, 49, 167
Caspian Sea, 51, 57
Cathcart, Lord, 163
Cattle removal in warfare, 165–166
Caucasus, 43, 44, 57
'Centralization', 63
'Centre of gravity', 38
Charbonnières listening post, 161
Chauvinism, 89
Chetniks, 89
China, 46, 54; Burmese route to, 54
Choltitz, von, 95
Clandestine newspapers, 123
Classless society, 19
Class war, 19
Clausewitz, 17, 18, 22, 35, 41, 62, 68, 106, 107, 142, 156, 158
Coal, in warfare, 37
Coalmine strikes, 133, 136
Collaboration of anti-guerrilla forces, 166–7, 168, 169, 170
Cominform, 20, 88, 98, 100; in Asia, 53
Comintern, 88, 99, 100, 114, 124
Comitadjis, 86
Commandos, 151
Commune, 26
Communism, 17, 43–4, 45, 50; 86 *seq.*, 99–102 and *passim*, and Asiatic sentiment, 52; cells, in Army, 101–2; Chinese, 54; Dutch, 57; internationalism of, 19; internal disputes of, 19; Marshall plan and, 17; political objectives of, 19; propaganda methods of, 121; satellites of, 20–1; strategy of, 28; treaties and, 19; *see also* Partisans, Resistance
Communist University, 106
'Concentration in time and space', 62 *seq.*
Convention of Varica, 67
Co-ordination by radio, 40
Cossacks, 22
Council of National Liberators, 84
Counter-guerrilla instructions, 165
Crimea, 44; Crimean War, 23
Croats, 86, 164
Curfew, 165
'Cut-and-run tactics', 71
Czechoslovakia, 32, 49, 57, 99

Dajar-Djibouti 'line', 52
Damascus, 34
Danes, 44
Danton, 96
Danube, 30, 32, 92; basin, 42, 171
Dardanelles, 51
Davidson, B., 72, 74, 122, 162
'Decentralization', 63
'Defence' in People's War, 68, 158–170
Defence: mobile, 170; static, 169

Dependence of armies on industry, 35
Dimitrov, G., 100, 124
'Dispersion in time and space', 62, 63; strategy of, 63–4
Doenitz, Admiral, 44
Dollfuss, 42
Dornberg, General, 22
'Drawing-off' by guerrillas, 76
Dvar, 162

E.A.M. (Greece), 45, 84
E.D.E.S. (Greece), 45, 84
Egypt, 57
Eisenhower, on sabotage, 141
E.L.A.S. (Greece), 45, 84
Elberus, 44
Engels, 23, 24, 26, 27, 48, 61, 106
England, Secret Service in, 31
Erhardt, Arthur, 26
Europe and future war, 51
Evolution of military art, 18
External propaganda, 123 *seq.*

Fanaticism, 80, 81, 87, 106
Far East in future war, 51
Fascism, 42
F.F.C., 84
F.F.I. sabotage, results of, 141–2
Fifth column, 42
Finances of Communist press, 99
First World War, 29 *seqq.*; German armies and, 45; Ludendorff on, 39; surveyed, 299–33
Forged papers, 129
Foug tunnel, 26
France, Communism in, 57, 99
Francs-tireurs, 25, 84; and motorization, 144
Frederick the Great, 18
Free Corps, 22, 43
French Indo-China, 169
French sabotage, 128, 138–42
French Underground movement: arrests in, in 1944, 79; diagram of, 83; geography and, 93, 167; organization of, 76, 103
Friends of the Soviet Union, 101
Frog Plan (railway auxiliaries), 139
F.T.P., 84, 147
Fyfe, Hamilton, 31

Gaulle, General de, 36–7, 76, 84, 108, 138
Gehlen, Major-General, 44
Geography and resistance, 91; in France, 93, 167
Georgia question, 57
German: Free Corps, 22, 43; high command, 47; losses in Balkans, 47; Secret Service, 31, 43, 158
Germany, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 37, 42, 45; against Russia, 43; and Communism, 57; and discipline, 84–5; lack of underground movement in, 45
Gestapo, 159, 160
Gibraltar, in future war, 51, 54, 59
Gibraltar–Suez 'line', 52
Goebbels, F., 42, 122
Goniometric apparatus, 161
G.P.U., 114, 118
Grain destruction in warfare, 165–6

Grammos mountains, 169
Greece, 45, 52, 62, 86, 169; army of, in 1941, 47; civil war in, 45, 49, 67, 87; sabotage in, 142
Green Plan (rail sabotage), 138–9
Guerrilla leaders, 105–6
Guerrilla warfare, 22, 23–4, 25, 33 *seqq.*, 62 *seqq.*, 130, 142–56; adaptability of, 64–5; air forces and, 77–8; air support and, 154–5; cruelty of, 78–9; division of forces in, 76–7; independence of terrain of, 68 *seqq.*; individualism and, 85; mobility of, 68–9, 78; 'offensive' nature of, 143; provisioning, 77–8; reserves in, 75–6; 'room' required by, 73–4; waged in co-operation, 65, 150; waged in: Balkans, 46–7; Far East, 46; Mesopotamia and Palestine, 54–5; Serbia, 33–4; Spain, 143
Gulf of Bengal, 54

Helicopters, 166
Hitler, A., 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 73, 100, 171; attacks Poland, 43; attacks Soviet Union, 45
Hofer, A., 58
Hohenzollern, 23
Holland, Communism in, 57
Hong Kong, 54
Hostages, 163
Hungary, 37, 47, 49, 87, 99

Ideology and war, 35, 59, 60
Indo-China, 54
Indonesia, Marxism in, 52, 54
India: civil war in, 58; Marxism in, 52
Individualism, 85
Industry: and Asia, 40; modern war dependent on, 39–40; organizing, for revolution, 103,
Intelligence service in war, 130, 155–6; operations against, summed up, 169–70
Interdependence of industries, 39
Internal: politics and war, 107; propaganda, 120–3
International: political instructions, 107; 'civil' wars, 58; Red Cross, 78
Invasion and underground movements, 97
Iran, 54
Islamic propaganda, 44
Italy, 30, 49, 50, 57; and Tito, 75; Italian sabotage, 128
Izvestia, 26

Japan, 46, 52
Jegoroy, Captain, 145
Junaks, 81

Kalmuks, 44
Kashmir, 54
Kergelmann, L., 23
Kleinkrieg, 26
Komarovski, Bor, 95
Konitza battle, 63
Koratchenko, D., 46
Korpak, Major-General S. A., 144
Kremlin, supremacy of, 21, 43, 100, 106

Latsis, 46
Lawrence, Colonel, 34–5, 64, 65, 115, 146
Leadership in People's War, 82, 104, 105, 155, 161–2
Lebedev, 122
Lefebvre, Marshal, 159, 164
Leipzig battle, 164
Lenin, 19, 26, 27, 31, 32, 55, 58, 87, 88–9; advice of, to insurgents, 95–6, 145–6
Liaison: network, 116, 118; officers, in insurrections, 107, 115–17, 118, 119
Liberation, 123
Liddell Hart, 26, 35, 64
Lines of communication, 36–7, 70
Listening posts, 160–1
Little Tatra, 47, 48
Lorrain (Luneville) sabotage, 134
Lübeck–Trieste 'line', 50
Ludendorff, 22–3, 39, 41, 52
Luetzelborg tunnels, 26

Macedonia, 30, 86, 164
McNeil, Hector, 88
Maginot Line, 38
Malaya, 52
Malta, 52
Man-power tables, 73
Maquis, 86, 153
Maritime, sabotage, 134–5
Markos' guerrillas, 63
Marseilles, 94, 95
Marshall, Colonel, 21
Marshall, General, 50
Marshall Plan, 19, 121
Monty, A., 33
Marwitz, 22
Marx, K., 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 48, 61, 64, 68, 106
Marxism, 17–60, 87, 89; and the peasant, 58; in Malaya, 52
Mass production, of weapons, 39
Material weapons, 21, 22
'Medical rejection' sabotage, 127
Medieval castles, 92
Medina, 34
Mesopotamia, 34
Meurthe and Moselle sabotage, 134
Middle East, 34, 57
Mikhaelovitsch, 45, 84, 158
Militia (French), 164
Mobile defence, 170
Moch, J., 19; on strikes, 156
Moltke, von, 62
Montenegro, 75
Morava river, 30
Morocco, 69
Moscow, 19, 20, 21, 43; *see* Kremlin
Motorized: anti-guerrilla band, 166; troops, 36
Mountainous terrain, 89–90
Murat, 86
Mussolini, 47
Mussulman, 44
Mutual control, *see* Bolshevist vigilance.
M.V.D., 118
Mysticism in Communism, 121

Names in code, 114
Napoleon, 18, 22, 31, 36, 38, 40, 159, 164; in Austria, 37; in Spain, 23–4, 43, 47; on partisans, 164

National Council of Slovakia, 84
Near East, 51, 57
Nehru, Pandit, 55
Newspaper: distribution, 124; propaganda, 120
N.K.V.D., 118
Non-collaboration, 127–8
Northcliffe, Lord, 31
Noske, 32
Novara, battle of, 24, 25
Nuremberg tribunal, 43, 163

'Occupation' of Europe, 58
Odessa, 33
'Odreds', 72, 92
O.R.A., 84
Oriental Legion, 164
Orovitch, S., 122
O.S.S. (command post), 108, 109
Oudhaipur, 55
Oustachis, 164
Oxilia, General, 75

Palestine, 34, 57
Pan-Arab League, 57
Pen-Germanism, 171, 172
Parachuted: *agents provocateurs*, 159; armies, 148
Paris, 94, 145
Partisan fighting, 26, 27, 28–9; arms of, 147–8; elusiveness of, 78; high morale of, 81; lack of mobility of, 75
Partisan Picture, 72, 74, 79, 122, 162
Passive sabotage, *see* Sabotage, also 135 *seqq.*
Passy, Colonel, 76
Peasant problem (C. Europe), 58
People's War, 17, 18, 26, 28; back areas of, 108; bases of, 19; (Lenin), 88; brevity of alliances in, 82; conditions for success in, 95; ease of in primitive countries, 70; effectiveness of, 163; impossibility of compromise in, 67; in China, 54; in Greece, 49; in India, 54; in Spain, 143; and *see* other countries by name; leadership in, 82–3; Marxism and, 87; never defensive, 68; preparatory work for, 109; regional nature of, 102; strategy of, 61 *seqq.*; timing of, 69; underground cleavage in, 45; vulnerability in, 162
Perbal sabotage, 134
Persian Gulf, 51
Petroleum supplies, 37, 57
Poland, 30, 32, 37, 43, 49, 87, 90, 99, 158; railway sabotage in, 162
Politbureau, 100
Political objectives, 18–19; and Communism, 19
Ponomarenko, 46
Popular risings, 94
Prague, 57, 94, 100, 126, 145
Prisoners in guerrilla warfare, 78–9
Propaganda, 120–4; aims of, 120; Communist methods of, 121; external, internal, 120; psychology of, 121
Protocol M, 88, 99
Purges, 20

Quinine, 55

Radetsky, Field-Marshal, 25
Radio: liaison, 119; signalling, 30, 31, 40, 41; and underground warfare, 35, 36, 40, 109, 111, 116, 119, 161; goniometers, 161
Rangoon, 54
Rear areas, growing importance of, 38–40
Reconnoitring for sabotage, 129–30
Red Army, 28, 45, 47, 51, 54, 57, 65
Red garrisons, 32
Redoubts, 152–5; strength of, 154–5
Reichswehr, 32
Reinecke, General, 47
Reprisals, 163
Requisitioning, dangers of, 87
Resistance movements: and cities, 92–3; destruction of, 169; diagram of, 83; geography and, 89 *seqq.*; joint work with, 96; mountains and, 91; structure of, 92, 93
Revolutions, 17, 20, 102 *seqq.*, 146; cells and, 102; dependence of on outside assistance, 66, 67; preparing a, 31; Russian, 20, 77
Rhine, 57
Romarin, 25
Ronge, General Max, 30, 31
Rothermere, Lord, 31
Roumania, 32, 37, 49, 87, 99
Rounding-up of guerrillas, 169
Ruhr, 37, 100
Rumours, 161, 167
Russians: partisans, last century, 86; Second World War, 46; White, 27, 28, 33; of steppes, 90

Saar, 37
Sabotage, 28–9, 35, 48, 70, 78, 85, 91, 92, 103, 108, 114, 115, 117, 124–30, 162; active, 129 exaggerated, 142; French, 138–42; maritime, 134–5; mass, 125; passive, 126–9; plans for, 56, 98, 120, 131, 132, 152; reconnoitring for, 129–30; slackness as a form of, 127; stores to be decentralized, 149; surveyed, 46 *seqq.*; waterways, 134
Sachsenhausen, 129
Salonika, 30, 33
S.A.S., 151 (parachutists)
Satellites of Communism, 20
Schlieffen Plan, 51
Secret: services, 30, 31; war, and Kremlin, 21; war, elements of, 112; war, ideology of, 80 *seqq.*
Sedan, 25
Semi-regulars, 74
Serbia, 30, 33, 156; guerrilla war in, 33–4, 86, 156
Seven Pillars of Wisdom, 34–5, 64, 65, 115
S.F.H.Q., 109
Singapore, 54
Slavs, 85
Slogans, 120, 121
Slovak risings, 1944, 47, 109
Somme battle, 29
Soviet Union, internal weakness of, 44; *see* Russians

Speed and fire power, 37
Stalin, 21, 26, 27, 28–9, 48, 171
Stalin-Ribbentrop plot, 89
Static defence, 169
Steed, H., Wickham, 31
Strategy, 61–97; break-up of, 17–18
Strategy of Indirect Approach, 64
Street fighting, 94
Strikes, 26, 99, 106; and steel production, 133, 135–6; timing of, 137; transport, 135; *see* Coalmines
Struma river, 30
Success in war, 21–2
Sudeten Germans, 43
Suez Canal, 51, 54, 59
Supervision, Communist, 117–18
Surprise attack, 37
'Surrounding' of guerrillas, 169
Synchronization of popular risings, 70–1

Tanks and aircraft, 36
Tardié, 80
Tatars, 44
Tchapejev partisans, 28
Tchernitchev, 22
Technique, 17–18, 19, 98–00
Terrain and resistance units, 89
Terrorism, 163
Tetterhorn, General von, 22
Thailand, 54
Third International, 19
Third Reich, 42, 45
Tillon, C., 168
Timing of strikes, 137
Tin, 55
Tito, 45, 49, 65, 74–5, 84, 100, 103, 122, 158, 162
Tortoise plan, 139–40
Total war, 22, 29, 81
Tradition and temperament in resistance, 84 *seqq.*
Transport strikes, 135
Treaties, with Communist states, 19–20
Trieste, 100
Tsar, 30
Turkey, 34–5, 64, 86, 164

Ukraine, 43, 44, 47, 49
Ukrainian nationalism, 44
Underground warfare: circumstances favouring, 35; cleavages in, 45, 48–9; code names in, 114; command posts in (Second World War), 108–9; committees of, listed, 104; defence against, 157 *seqq.*; headquarters of, 109–10; main branches of, 111; main civil services and, 104; newspapers in, 123; officers (liaison) in, 115–17; organization of in networks, 113; police and, 104; regular forces and, 66–7
United States of America, 32, 50; Commission of Foreign Affairs, 50
U.S.S.R., 50, 55; strategic lines in Asia, 52, 53; *and see* Russia

Vardar river, 30
Velicka, Colonel, 146
Venezia division, 75
Vercors redoubt, 152
Verdun battle, 29
Versailles, Treaty of, 171
Vienna, 32

Vieville-en-Haye, 134 (sabotage)
Violet Plan, 140 (sabotage)
Vladivostock, 52
Vlassov, General, 164
Vulnerability, 39

War: defined, 17; etiquette of, 23, 25; future fields of, 51; of movement, 36 *seqq.*; success in, 21
'War to the Knife', 25
Warsaw, 32, 94, 95, 100, 145
Waterways, sabotage of, 134
Watson, Seton, 31
Weapons: brain as, 22; man and, 22; mass production, 38–9; modern dependence on, 38; non-surrender of, 45; psychological, 21; the new, 17
Weichs, Marshal von, 169
Wells, H. G., 31
Wennerstrum, 163
Werewolf organization, 44, 85
White and Asiatic antagonism, 35
White Russia, 27, 28, 33, 43, 46, 164
Wilson, President, 32
Wireless propaganda, defence against, 161
Wolseley, Lord, 163
Wrangel, General, 33

Yugoslav partisans, 44, 47, 92, 99; (1944), 79
Yugoslavia, 32, 46, 47, 49, 55, 66, 72, 92, 99, 147, 153, 163, 165, 169; old guerrilla traditions in, 86; partisan losses, 1942, 79

Zatec airfield, 57
Zdanow, 19